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This dissertation deals with American imperialism at the turn of
the century as seen through the eyes of a young naval officer, William
D. Leahy. Other works which have examined these years have dealt with
strategic, political, or economic matters, or with famous naval figures
of the times. This study, in contrast, focuses on the experiences of
William D. Leahy, whose very "averageness" makes his early life an over-
looked window through which the events of his day may be examined. During
the first two decades of his half-century career, Leahy saw in action
the first two of Admiral Mahan's "international principles"--cooperation
in the Far East, and dominance in the Caribbean, Central America (and
the Philippines). Leahy's experiences help to throw a new light on how
American imperialism affected both the victims of America's policies and
those who had to carry out those policies.
Chapter 1, "The Cutting Edge, " is an introduction to the disser-
tation. Chapter 2, "A Typical Naval Cadet," examines Leahy's formative
background and his education at the Naval Academy. Chapter 3, "Baptism
of Fire," introduces him into the fighting Navy in the battle off Santiago,
Cuba during the Spanish American War. Chapter 4, "Shanghai and Amoy,"follows
Leahy's participation in the events of the Boxer Rebellion. Chapter 5,
"The Philippines and After--Years of Growth" takes Leahy through the Ameri-
can conquest of the Philippines. Although the Philippines were technically
in the Far East, the basic assumptions of American foreign policy toward
dealing with weak, non-white, nations resulted in an American policy of
repression and subjugation of popular Filipino forces led by Emilio Aguinaldo,
The result was the same as in Latin America--total, if disguised American
political and economic hegemony. Chapter 5 then outlines his career during
the peaceful years, 1901-1912, when he served at sea on the West Coast of
the United States, and at Panama, followed by shore duty at the Naval Aca-
demy. In 1912, he again went to sea, serving on board the armored cruiser
California . He again travelled to the Philippines, the orient, arid South
America. Chapter 6, "Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic," des-
cribes Leahy's participation in the American interventions in those small
Caribbean nations. The final chapter, "The Force of Shared Assumptions,"
describes how his attitudes toward imperialism related to the general
attitudes and assumptions of his times.
The central pattern in Leahy's reactions to American imperialism
was a consistent duality between his conviction of America's absolute
right to further her own economic and strategic position overseas, versus,
his compassion for the victims of American policies and his awareness of
the unpopular nature of the regimes which were instituted by use of American.
naval ships and Marines. This duality between his ideas of "duty" and
his conscience continued into the World War II era. Although convinced
that Japan was an aggressor and a menace to American interests in the Far
East, Leahy consistently opposed the use of inhumane weapons, especially
the nuclear bombing of Japan. Yet, he concluded that, since international
controls were not yet perfected, America had to have the most powerful
arsenal of nuclear weapons.
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This dissertation re-examines the American imperialistic expan-
sion which accelerated after the Spanish American War and continued
through the first two decades of the twentieth century. The re-examina-
tion uses the experiences and thoughts of William D. Leahy as a vehicle.
Leahy was, in those years, a young officer just beginning a fifty-year
career. By using the life of Leahy, a rather average officer, rather
than the usual choice of a renowned hero, a novel and useful viewpoint
is introduced—that of the unsung agent of American imperialism on the
cutting edge of America's expanding overseas frontier.
Leahy's experiences and observations in Asia and Latin America
do not support the standard model promoted by American diplomatic his-
torians of an American foreign policy which favored "independence for
the whole New World," and "republican government for the new states."
Rather, Leahy's experiences underline the fact that, for whatever reasons,
American imperialistic policies in those areas where her economic and
military power could operate unopposed by other major powers, were almost
invariably used to impose unpopular, comprador regimes, or American
military governments. Puppet governments were installed over unwilling
majorities, and against the armed resistance of the popularly supported
leaders of those countries. In the final analysis, in spite of his
greater sensitivity, Leahy, who always followed the slogan "My country,
right or wrong," was as effective an instrument of America's imperial
growth as were his less sensitive shipmates.
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American overseas expansion at the turn of the 20th century fed
on and in turn sustained the growth of the American Navy. The literature
and the history of that expansion is enormous, but has primarily been
concerned with high policy--the politics and decision-making of political
leaders in Washington or of the few generals and admirals who gained fame
during the campaigns of the time. Few historians, however, have described
in detail the consequences of these policies from the point of view of
the junior officers on the cutting edge of America's new imperialism, the
As examples, see Alfred Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the
United States (New Haven, 1930); John A. S. Grenville and George B. Young,
Strategy and Diplomacy in United States Foreign Policy, 1879-1917 (New
Haven, 1966); Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America
to World Power (New York, 1956); Ernest May, Imperial Democracy; the Emer-
gence of America as a Great Power (New York, 1961); Julius Pratt, Expan -
sionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands
(Baltimore, 1936); Paul A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese and Diplomats :
The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China 1890-1952 (Princeton,
1958); William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific,
1897-1909 (New York, 1958); Charles E. Neu, An Uncertain Friendship :
Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906-1909 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); Dana
Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921
(Princeton, 1964); Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval
Power, 1776-1918 (Princeton, 1946); Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American
Policy of the United States (New York, 1943); Akira Iriye, Acro ss the
Pacific; An Inner History of America-East Asian Relations (New York, 196 7);
Richard S. West, Jr., Admirals of the American Empire; The Combined Story
of George Dewey, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Winfield Scott Schley, and William
Thomas Sampson (Indianapolis, 1948); Nathan Sargent, Admiral Dewey and the
Manila Campaign (Washington, 1947); William A. Goode, With Sampson Through
the War (New York, 1899); Winfield Scott Schley, Forty Five Years under
the Flag (New York, 1904).

men who conned the ships, directed the landing parties, and dealt with
the "natives" under orders from Washington. Without such studies the
history of American expansion appears as an abstract phenomenon, a weigh-
ing of broad considerations, a debate over theories, all without contact
with the people who were the real instruments and victims of American
policies. In Washington a President, or a Secretary of State, often at
the instigation of private American investors or economic interests,
would dictate a policy or military action. What was it like to be an
officer in the field--simultaneously at the receiving end of America's
chain of command and the dishing-out end of American armed force?
This study follows the career of one such American naval officer,
William D. Leahy, during the years of America's initial large-scale in-
volvement in overseas expansion in the Pacific, the Far East, Central
America and the Caribbean. Leahy's early career, which took him to all of
the areas of American colonial expansion, provides a virtual travelogue
2
of American imperialism. Within a year after his graduation from the
U.S. Naval Academy, he participated in the destruction of the Spanish
naval force of Admiral Cervera at Santiago, Cuba the sea battle which
completed the destruction of the Spanish fleet and empire and helped
dramatize the rise of America as a colonial power. In the years following
2
William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, Volume I
(New York, 1935), p. 67 defines "Imperialism" as "the rule or control,
military or economic, direct or indirect, of one state, nation or people
over other similar groups, or... the disposition, urge or striving to
establish such rule or control." Robin Winks, ed., British Imperialism,
Gold, God, Glory (New York, 1963), p. 1 describes the usual connotation
of the term being "one of abuse, a perforative term synonomous with
economic exploitation, racial prejudice, secret diplomacy, and war."

the battle of Santiago, Leahy's career rose with the worldwide expansion
of American imperial and naval might. An intelligent but not brilliant
officer of Anglo-Irish background and the most decent instincts, Leahy
steadily advanced up the Navy seniority ladder.
Unlike many of the military and naval heroes whose naval careers
have been analyzed by historians, Leahy was never a man marked for great-
ness by either personal brilliance, non-conformity, or dash. He was in
no way an original thinker like Alfred Thayer Mahan, nor a brilliant
iconoclast like Admiral William S. Sims of World War I fame. Rather,
he was an ordinary man--the type usually overlooked by historians, yet
whose very ordinariness can be used to gain a new view of the events of
those times. During the early years of Leahy's career he served on ships
on virtually every area of Asia and the Caribbean in which American imperi-
alistic expansion was taking place. In Asia he was an on-the-scene witness
to the strange mix of cooperation and competition which existed between
the great powers and China. On the one hand, at Shanghai and during the
Boxer rebellion of 1900, Leahy saw the western powers and Japan join forces
to combat any Chinese threat and to keep China divided and weak. On the
other hand, even Leahy noted that sometimes comical maneuvering between
the western powers and Japan, for economic and military advantage over
each other. In the Philippines and the nations of the Caribbean and
Central America, Leahy saw how American naval and military power, under
the protective cover of the Monroe Doctrine in the absence of any great
power rivals operated to impose a succession of unpopular comprador regimes
on the nations of the Caribbean.

This study is for the twofold purpose of gaining insight into
Leahy's attitudes and ideas as a man and as a naval officer, and of
viewing the growth of American imperialism through the eyes of an aver-
age, effective naval officer on the expanding rim of America's economic
and military power. It is intended as the first part of what ultimately
may be a full biography of Admiral Leahy. Leahy's career is of particu-
lar interest because he rose to command the entire American Naval esta-
blishment in the late 1930 's. Later, the senior American military
officer during World War II, he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and personal advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In these posi-
tions he was influential in American politico-military planning prior
to and during the second World War. In the same positions under President
Harry Truman until 1949, Admiral Leahy was also a key figure in helping
to formulate the policies of the cold War. It is significant that many
of Leahy's basic attitudes and assumptions toward American relations with
other nations did not change appreciably during his fifty-year career.
Nor did a dichotomy in his attitude toward the citizens of other nations
change during his career. While always the able and willing centurian,
Leahy, unlike many Americans of his time recognized the shared humanity
of his opponents, and sincerely appreciated the problems and injustices
which America's imperial policies often inflicted on the people of other
lands.
His ideas and attitudes, in spite of his sensitivity to the plight
of other peoples, included the standard American assumptions of the primacy
of American economic and strategic interests especially in the western

hemisphere and the Caribbean, the conviction of a God-ordained higher
destiny for the United States and its interests, and the superiority of
American ways and western civilization over other economic and political
systems. These assumptions served him as well leading the Navy of the
30
's and under Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman as they
had at the beginning of the 20th century. This may suggest that general
American attitudes toward colonial expansion, especially at the expense
of weaker non-white, non western peoples may have descended virtually
intact from the turn of the century or earlier and may, indeed, extend
into the present.
Family and social background were essential influences on Leahy's
later attitudes. His early youth and schooling, through his Naval Academy
years, and including his formative years in the American Fleet ingrained
in him most of the standard ideological assumptions of his society and of
the Navy of his time. By examining his environment and attitudes, this
study will further the understanding of some of the political and social
forces behind the Navy's role in the American expansionist era. On a
longer view, the study will follow the development of the early career
of an officer who later helped to initiate the Cold War, but who also
insisted on maintaining separation between civil and military authority
at the top levels of American politico-military planning with the mili-
tary at all times firmly subordinated to civilian authority.
Forty years after the Battle of Santiago, Leahy completed a highly
successful career as Chief of Naval Operations, the highest position in
the Navy. He retired in 1939 and was assigned by Franklin Roosevelt,

first as Governor of Puerto Rico, and then to the sensitive post of U.S.
Ambassador to the Petain government in Vichy France. He served in France
from January 1941 until May 1942. Leahy was recalled from France in May
1942 to serve again in uniform, as Chief of Staff to Roosevelt, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. In that position, as the senior
officer of all of the United States armed forces, he presided over the
meetings of the American Joint Chiefs and of the combined U.S. British
Chiefs of Staff when America hosted their meetings. He was at the same
3
time, Roosevelt's personal advisor.
Following Roosevelt's death in April, 1945, Leahy continued to
perform his Chief of Staff and advisory functions for President Truman
until his second and final retirement in 1949, after more than fifty
years of active service for his country. His career can be used as a
window through which many of the attitudes and assumptions behind American
imperialism and navalism, may be examined and through which the possible
continuity of earlier American attitudes with those of recent years may
be discerned.
3
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was There, The Personal Story of the
Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes end
Diaries Made at the Time (New York, 1950), pp. 1-5.

CHAPTER 2
A TYPICAL NAVAL CADET
The influences which operated during Leahy's boyhood and early
life at the Naval Academy were like those of most of his contemporaries.
He shared a background common not only to cadets at the Academy but
throughout the ruling elites of the United States. Leahy's family was
Episcopalian, Northern European, and middle class. Leahy spent his early
years far from the sight of ocean water. He was born in Hampton, Iowa,
a little town in Franklin County. Leahy's grandparents on both sides
had been Irish immigrants who had ultimately settled in Wisconsin and
worked themselves into comfortable middle class status. His mother's
father had served for many years as treasurer of Dane County, Wisconsin.
His paternal grandparents claimed descent from Irish chiefs who
had fought the English in the seventeenth century. They immigrated from
Ireland in 1838 and moved to Wisconsin in 1849 from Roxbury, Massachusetts,
One of their sons, William D. Leahy's uncle, John Edgar, who was educated
in a log cabin in Dodge County, Wisconsin, spent almost four years at
the state university, but did not graduate. He enlisted in Company C,
35th Wisconsin Infantry engaged in several Civil War battled, and then
entered the lumber and shingle business on his return to Wisconsin in
1866. A Republican politician, he was a member of the Wausau, Wisconsin,
City Council and School Board, mayor for three terms in succession and

was elected for a four year term In the State Senate in 1886. Another
of William D. Leahy's uncles, Stephen, was a lawyer and a graduate of
the University of Wisconsin.
William D. Leahy's father, Michael Arthur, received his law degree
from the University of Wisconsin in 1862 and served as a Captain in the
35th Wisconsin Infantry from 1862 to 1866. After marrying Rose Hamilton,
he moved to Franklin County, Iowa, in 1868, where he first taught school
and then opened a law office. He was elected to the State Legislature
from Franklin County for several terms during which time, in 1875, his
son William was born. In 1878 he entered into law partnership with
Colonel Arthur T. Reeve, a man who had led several detachments of black
Union Soldiers, including the 88th Colored Regiment, during the Civil
War. Leahy was also the acknowledged leader of the Franklin County Green-
back party. In 1889 the family settled in Ashland, Wisconsin, where he
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continued to practice law and engaged in the lumber business. Inspired,
Handwritten Preface to Leahy Diary--information gleaned by William D.
Leahy from "old letters." Leahy proudly noted that his father "was com-
pletely devoted to the ideals of American democracy"; History of Franklin
and Cerro Gordo Counties, Iowa (Springfield, 111., 1883), pp. 180-181;
Theobald (Legislative Reference Bureau, Wisconsin), to Thomas, December
28, 1972; "Leahy Appointment Brings Surge of Pride to Pioneer Hampton
Residents," Courier, Waterloo, Iowa, November 25, 1940; "Native of Hampton
Famed Navy Admiral," Hampton Recorder, October 31, 1929; The Blue Book
of the State of Wisconsin, 1889, p. 407; "Biographical Sketches of State
Senate, Twenty-First District," p. 497; Soldiers and Citizens' Album of
Biographical Records, State of Wisconsin, 1888 (Madison, 1888), Vol. I,
pp. 191-92; Reeve-Mallory to Thomas, November 15, 1972.
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History of Franklin and Cerro Gordo Counties, Iowa, pp. 180-81; History
of Franklin County, Iowa, Vol. I, p. 208, notes Michael Leahy as a man of
"literary tastes," and an attorney of "some force."

perhaps, by his soldier father and uncles, William D. Leahy had wanted
from early youth to enter the Military Academy, but had turned to the
Naval Academy when he found that no appointments were available at West
3
Point. His brother, Michael Arthur later followed in his footsteps to
4
the Naval Academy.
The sea and naval life were receiving favorable publicity from
the press at the time of William Leahy's entry, especially from journals
like the popular Youth's Companion, the most widely read magazine of its
time among American youth. An article by crusty old Admiral David Porter
was a typical description of life at the Naval Academy. The text was
accompanied by dramatic drawings of the Naval Academy buildings, a huge
mortar, cadets seated at the oars of twenty rowing boats, with great
American naval ships in the background
:
United States Naval Academy
And the Kind of Boys Wanted by the Navy
by Admiral David Porter
...What kind of boy does the government want.... The go-
vernment is a stern master, with no sympathy for anything
outside the strict line of duty.
The Naval Academy was established in order that the cadets
should obtain, during their first year's course, the pro-
fessional and general information to enable the government
to utilize their services, particularly in time of war....
A professor from Harvard University, who was really a
member of the Annual Board of Examiners at Annapolis,
3
Daily News, Ashland (Wisconsin), August 1, 1848, Feature Page quoted
a local speech given by Leahy.
4
U.S. Naval Academy, Register of Alumni (Annapolis, 1956), p. 186, shows
that Michael Arthur Leahy graduated with the Naval Academy Class of 1908.
He retired as Captain in 1947.
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pronounced the Academy course to be better learned,
considering the variety of subjects studied, than at
Cambridge. . .
.
The position of officer in the Navy is accessible to
any brave boy having the necessary physical and mental
qualifications to meet it....
5
When Leahy entered the Naval Academy in 1893, entrance was in the
hands of Congressmen, each of whom was free to establish whatever initial
selection criteria he desired to fill his quota, such as local competi-
tive examinations. Once chosen, the prospective Naval Cadets had to
proceed to the Academy, where they took written and physical examinations,
conducted both in May and September of the entering year. Leahy took
his examination in May, having received his appointment from Representa-
o
tive Thomas Lynch of the Ninth Wisconsin Congressional District. Demo-
cratic Congressman Lynch was elected to Congress in March 1891 and served
9
until March, 1895. Leahy who saw himself as apolitical, was apparently
not influenced by Lynch's Democratic leanings. In Leahy's graduating
David Porter, "United States Naval Academy and the Kind of Boys Wanted
by the Navy," Youth's Companion, Vol. 16 (April 28, 1887), pp. 189-90.
Park Benjamin (Naval Academy graduate, Class of 186 7), The United States
Naval Academy (New York, 1900), pp. 276, 357; Annual Register of the United
States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 1893-94 (Washington, 1893),
pp. 7, 67, 330.
Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 358-59; Annual Register, 1893-94,
p. 67.
g
Leahy Diary, p. 1; Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, p. 359; Annual
Register, 1893-94, pp. 28-29, 67.
9Larry Gara, A Short History of Wisconsin (Madison, 1967), p. 172; Con -
gressional Directory (Washington, 1893), p. Ill; Biographical Directory
pf the American Congress, 1774-1971 (Washington, 1971), Senate Document
8, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, p. 1318.
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class, seventeen of the cadets listed themselves as "Democrats," twenty-
six as "Republicans," while there were a few brave souls, one each, who
chose the titles of "Populist," "Greenback," "Tammany," "Prohibitionist,"
and "Tillmanite." Leahy, faithful to what was to be his lifelong disdain
for politics, alone had the distinction of listing himself under the title
of "Popocrat."
Park Benjamin, the historian of the Naval Academy, stated that,
"Political pull stops at the threshold of the very first examination room
at the Academy." However, with the system of Congressional appointments
to a limited number of spaces, the scramble for appointments prior to
arrival at the Academy was often frantic and sometimes undignified. In
addition to the Congressional appointments, the Secretary of the Navy
could fill unused Congressional vacancies, while the President of the
United States could appoint cadets at large, or from the entire United
12
States, to a maximum of ten at the Academy at any one time." These
presidential appointments were often sought by desperate parents as a
U.S. Navy Academy, The Lucky Bag of the United States Naval Academy,
Class of 1897 (Annapolis, Maryland, 1897), pp. 190-91; Samuel Huntington,
The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 254-269, tells how, in contrast
to the 1830' s, post-civil war U.S. Military officers believed that poli-
tics and military officership did not mix. Huntington estimated that
few officers ever cast ballots.
Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, p. 358.
12
Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 359-362; U.S. Naval Academy
Report of the Board of Visitors to the United States Naval Academy, 1896




last resort for entry into the Academy.
During the years when Leahy was at the Naval Academy, the background
of the cadets was remarkably uniform. In the first place, the ethnic
makeup of the cadet body was such that the great majority were reported
by the Academy Surgeon in 1895 to have been "blond or brown-haired, blue-
14
eyed, Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic." They were drawn predominantly from
the commercial, industrial and professional classes and included few sons
of working men or small farmers.
Studies of the background and attitudes of future Army generals
who attended the Military Academy during Leahy's era show that they were,
like the Naval Academy Cadets, predominantly Protestant. Nearly half
were, like Leahy, Episcopalians. Only fourteen percent were the sons
of professional military officers. To illustrate the homogeneity of the
American elite of that time, the leaders of other professional groups
13
Admiral Halsey's Story, Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, USN and Lieu-
tenant Commander J. Bryan, III, USNR (New York, 1947), pp. 3-4. Ralph
B. Jordan, Born to Fight: The Life of Admiral Halsey (Philadelphia, 1946),
tells of the difficulties encountered by the Halsey family in obtaining
a Naval Academy appointment for their son in spite of the father's Naval
Academy background.
14
Surgeon Henry G. Beyer, "The Growth of U.S. Naval Cadets," Proceedings
of the United States Naval Institute, XXI (1895), p. 298, quoted in Peter
Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy, The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emer-
gency of Modern American Navalism (New York, 1972), p. 16.
Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, pp. 10, 12, 16.
1
6
William Miller, "American Historians and the Business Elite, " Journal
of Economic History, Vol. IX (November 1949), pp. 203-06, quoted in Richard
Brown, "Social Attitudes of American Generals 1898-1940," unpublished
Ph.D Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1951, pp. 8-15.
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in addition to the military group, shared a similar upper middle-class
social, economic and religious background. To a striking extent these
leaders shared a religious, the Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, upper-middle
class heritage. Thus, to the extent that their origins shaped them, the
attitudes of America's military leaders differed little from those pos-
1 8
sessed by other leaders.
The entrance examination for the Naval Academy consisted of basic
achievement and aptitude tests in mathematics, English, History and
Geography. Candidates were expected to be able to read rapidly and write
William Miller, "American Lawyers in Business and Economics: Their
Social Backgrounds and Early Training," Yale Law Journal (January 1951),
p. 71, quoted in Brown, "Social Attitudes of American Generals," p. 16.
18
Brown, "Social Attitudes of American Generals," pp. 8-17. The conclu-
sion of Brown and Miller are in direct opposition to a thesis recently
proposed by Peter Karsten. Karsten has attempted to prove the existence,
during what he called the "Golden Age of Annapolis" of a unique and some-
what sinister "Naval Aristocracy." Karsten's conclusions were possible
only by his ignoring the massive similarities, shown by Brown and Miller,
in the background of all American ruling elites of the "Golden Age of
Annapolis," from 1845 to 1925. Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy . Ronald
Spector, Book Review of Peter Karsten's The Naval Aristocracy, United
States Naval War College Review, Vol. XXV, No. 1, Sequence 239 (September-
October, 1972), pp. 94-95. Spector criticized Karsten's open anti-Navy
hostility, which resulted in Karsten's one-sided reading of some of the
evidence to "prove" his "Naval Aristocracy" thesis. Karsten, a former
Lieutenant in the Naval Reserve implies (note The Naval Aristocracy, p.
280) that his three years of service may have given him added insight into
the "naval mind" over the work of civilian naval historians like Elting
Marison. On the contrary, Elting E. Morison's work on Admiral Sims and
the Modern American Navy (Boston, 1942), although somewhat pro-Sims, in
comparison with Karsten's work and conclusions appears, rather, to under-
line the old truth that historical writing does not depend as much upon
personal background as it does upon adherence to objectivity; Dr. Paolo
E. Coletta, review of The Naval Aristocracy, in The United States Naval
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 98, No. 12 (December 1972), also criticizes
Karsten's one-sided reading of the sources and his slanting of evidence
to "prove" the existence of a "naval aristocracy." Coletta, not unfairly,
states that "given several alternative interpretations of the facts he
garners, Karsten invariably chooses the one most damning of the Navy."
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grammatically. The mathematics examination consisted of questions on
weights and measures, arithmetic and basic algebra. The system of "prep
school cramming" which had developed for preparing for the entrance ex-
aminations to Annapolis following appointment was somewhat of a scandal.
Several one month preparatory schools had been set up at Annapolis which
apparently had gained access to the testing methods and questions used
at the Academy. Henry Williams, who entered the Academy in 1894, a year
after Leahy entered, wrote that although the questions in arithmetic,
geography and history were "elementary," it was virtually impossible for
a boy who had not been drilled at the one-month prep schools to pass the
examination, since the prep schools drilled the candidates on "all the
questions that might be asked. For instance, it was necessary to know
the location of practically every cape in the world, every bay... all the
principal cities... the arithmetic examination consisted of long division
...a cramming session. That's all it was... for one month." The cramming
situation grew so bad that in 1894 the Superintendent and the Board of
Visitors for the Naval Academy recommended a relaxing of the tight rote
learning requirements of the examination to allow for the entrance of
more talented boys and to eliminate "comparatively stupid" candidates
19
who were being literally crammed into the Academy.
19
Admiral Henry Williams, USN (Retired), The Reminiscences of Admiral
Henry Williams, USN (Ret.), Columbia University Oral History Research
Office (New York, 1972), pp. 3-4; Annual Register, 1893-94, pp. 69-70;
Report of the Board of Visitors, 1894, pp. 12-13; Benjamin, United States
Naval Academy, pp. 417-18.

15
Once the Cadets entered the Academy, studies emphasized technical
subjects, with little time allotted to the serious study of history, or
international events. The books used in those subject areas were generally
shallow, and were crippled by an Anglo-Saxon orientation and an insistence
on the old "hero" and "battle" kind of naval and general history. During
Leahy's years at the Academy, Swinton's Outlines of the World's History,
Labberton's Historical Atlas, MacClav's History of the United States Navy,
20
were used at various times.
Swinton's Outlines of the. World's History began with
an analysis of the "true racial framework" within which history had occurred,
Swinton pronounced that, since "Caucasians, " or the white race, were the
"only true historical race," civilization was the unique product of that
race. Swinton then concluded that "the history of the civilized world
is the history of the Caucasian race." As if to prove his point Swinton
then proceeded to write his World's History, with scarcely a mention of,
21
for instance, Africa, China, or Japan.
Eliot's History of the United States from 1492 to 1872, published
in the same year (1874) as Swinton's book, has been criticized by one
writer as defending "aristocratic institutions, such as the Anglican Church
20
Annual Register, 1894-94, 1894-95, 1895-96, 1896-97
. William Swinton,
Outlines of the World's History, Ancient, Medieval and Modern, with Spe -
cial Relation to the History of Civilization and the Progress of Mankind
(New York, 1874); Robert H. Labberton, Historical Atlas 3,800 B.C. to
1886 A.D. (Boston, 1891); Edgar Stanton MacClay, A History of the United
States Navy from 1775 to 1901 (New York, 1893-1901), 3 vols.
21
Swinton, Outlines of the World's History, pp. 2-4.
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of the pre-Revolutionary War era and the Society of the Cincinnati of
22
the Federalist Age." Eliot's work, however, was written on a somewhat
more objective and less Anglo-centric basis than Swinton and many of the
other works of the period. Eliot recognized that atrocities committed
on the native inhabitants of America by various white groups, and his
comments on the Society of the Cincinnati and the Anglican Church were
23
more to describe than to defend those institutions. " Labberton's His-
torical Atlas, in silent acceptance of the Anglo-centric assumptions of
the other works, does not even attempt to depict any historical events
in China, Japan, or black Africa. Labberton's idea of the world 1000 B.C.
includes only the Middle East, Egypt, and Israel. Japan and China show
up only as parts of a diffuse "Empire of the Mongols. . .1400 A.D."
For those outsiders who did not meet the ethnic or other prejudices
of the Naval Academy system, Cadet life was made intolerable. As one
result, the Academy did not have any black, and few Jewish graduates,
24
until World War II. Like most of his contemporaries, Park Benjamin
had no difficulty in justifying the exclusion or expulsion by hazing of
25
Negroes and other unwanted elements. In justifying the elimination of
22
Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy, p. 427. (Karsten's note on E. Digby
Baltzell's Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class
(Glencoe, 111., 1958), pp. 392-95, 35.)
23 Samuel Eliot, History of the United States from 1492 to 1872 (Boston,
1874), pp. 7, 15, 72, 145, 294-50, 258; Labberton, Historical Atlas,
Plate V, part CXXXVII.
24
Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy, pp. 16, 217-18.
25
Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 284-97, 377-79, 388-90.
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Negroes from the Academy, and in casting his vote against "legislating
morality," Benjamin said:
All race and political questions aside, the issue was
presented of whether or not a Negro could take his place
on the hierarchy of a warship and secure not only the
necessary recognition from his immediate associates, but
be able to maintain the discipline and enforce the re-
spect necessary from the crew.
In comparing the problems of black Navy officers and of black Army offi-
cers, Benjamin rationalized:
The conditions which would surround a Negro Naval Offi-
cer are widely different from those which bear upon his
brother in the Army. Men are thrown into far closer
companionship in the restricted quarters of the wardroom
of a man-of-war than they are in any army post, and
there are unwritten laws and customs of the naval service
which may make life unbearable to any one whom for any
reason, may be regarded as personally objectionable.
Naval regulations may compel undesirable relationships,
just as they may attempt to endorse proper deference and
subordination from inferiors in rank and station, but
they cannot insure that due respect and cheerful obedience
without which it is impossible to maintain the intricate
discipline of a man-of-war. 26
Aside from the fact that the fears expressed by Benjamin have long
since been proven to have been exaggerated, it never occurred to Benjamin
and his contemporaries that Negroes, Jews, and all other American youths
rated an equal chance to enter the Academy as a basic right--regardless
of sentiment or consequences. Thus, hazing being conscienceless, was the
most effective and fearsome threat against unwanted outsiders, especially
against the few Negroes who managed to secure appointment to the Academy,
Hazing played into the hands of those young men who, from immaturity,
viciousness or personal frustration chose to play the bully. The general
9 f
Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 292-93, 461.
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hazing situation grew so bad in 1907 that one student, James R. Branch
27
was killed in a "class fight."
Admiral William V. Pratt, who graduated from the Academy in the
class of 1889, told how, to the discomfort of his conscience, a Jewish
28
cadet had been mercilessly hazed out of the Academy. In his own case,
however, as in the case of most of the cadets, hazing represented apparently
not much more or less than a kind of fraternity initiation. Pratt said,
"Hazing did exist...but personally I never did much mind the mild form
we were subjected to.... On the contrary, I rather enjoyed it, preferring
29
to be noticed."
Thus, by the processes of selection, education, and example, the
Naval Academy tended to produce officers who were conservative not only
30
in a military, but in a political sense. Leahy, like most of his con-
temporaries, was proud of his conservative nature and of his political
27
Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 288-89, 301, 311, 332, 373.
Theodore Taylor, The Magnificent Mitscher (New York, 1954), pp. 20-26;
Park Benjamin, "The Trouble at the Naval Academy," The Independent (New
York, January 18, 1905), pp. 154-58; P. W. Moeller, The Naval Academy
at Annapolis and Hazing; Or, the Vindication of aft Honest Name (New York,
1884); Henry A. Wiley, An Admiral From Texas (Garden City, N.Y., 1934),
pp. 14-23. Wiley related that, although he had been expelled from the
Naval Academy for slapping and baiting a candidate for the Academy, he
felt that he had "done no wrong." Wiley returned to the Academy only
after the intervention of Senator Morgan of Alabama and Secretary of the
Navy Whitney.
28
Admiral William V. Pratt, "Autobiography," unpublished manuscript, co-
authored with Felicia Hyde, in Papers of Admiral William V. Pratt, Class
of 1849, at Naval Historical Division, Washington, D.C., pp. 5-7.
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Pratt, "Autobiography," pp. 5-7. To those who possess the desired back-
ground, hazing, of course, may serve as a form of "initiation rite," while
to the outsider, it serves as an unofficial elimination device.




"non-involvement. Leahy continued this pattern throughout his career.
His conservatism was apparently shared by most of his contemporaries.
Fifty years later, still only 5% of military officers identified them-
selves as "liberals" in a 1954 Pentagon survey cited by Morris Janowitz.
This preponderance of conservative viewpoint in the officer population,
especially in older Academy officers, is the reverse of the national
American trend in which higher education usually produces a higher pro-
portion of liberal thinkers. It is also based on an assumption in the
33
military that only those who are seeking political change are "political."
To accentuate the imbred nature of the Naval Academy of the late
19th century, Park Benjamin boasted of the uniformity of Academy instruc-
tion in 1900:
In all its departments it is now mainly controlled by its
own graduates. .. .At the present time the proportion of
non-graduates is only about twenty percent ... .The propor-
tion of civilian instructors to those holding official
rank is small, and averages for the entire school period
a little less than twelve percent. .. .The iron hand of
discipline is everywhere exerted. There are no bolting
of recitations, no cutting of chapel... no selection of
what will be studied and what not. 34
31 T , „-Leahy Diary .
32
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait
(Glencoe, 111., 1960), p. 236. Leahy, always a conservative, was dis-
mayed on visiting Australia in 1900-01 at the strength and independence
of the union movement there. Throughout his early years he maintained
a patrician sympathy for the status quo. In 1912, he counted on the "con-
servative element," which he trusted, to reject the candidacy of Theodore
Roosevelt who, although a friend of the Navy, was undignified and unpre-
dictable.
33
Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 236-39.
34




The students were expected to study or to be instructed eight out
of twenty-four hours of the day, sleep for eight hours, and drill, eat
or relax the other eight hours. All of the activity was tightly regu-
lated. Four hours each morning were devoted to study and recitation;
two hours each forenoon; and two hours each evening to study only. This
regime, plus enforced study hours each evening and for a part of Sunday
afternoons, gave the students about forty-four hours of study and instruc-
35
tion each week, plus about eight hours of practical instruction or drill.
Leahy's life at the Naval Academy followed the standard Annapolis
pattern of an average, effective student. Since he entered the Academy
in May rather than September he started his career, as all May entrants,
living on the ancient floating hulk Santee, sleeping in a swinging hammock
and struggling with an assortment of old lockers and accomodations. Then,
there followed a summer cruise on board the U.S.S. Constellation to the
Madeira Islands and to Fortress Monroe, Virginia. They returned to
35
Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 376-81. The entrance proce-
dures, instructional and disciplinary regime at the Military Academy were
almost identical to that at the Naval Academy. At both schools, emphasis
was on "things" rather than on "people," or on the historical or interna-
tional context of events. Identical or similar textbooks were used at
both Academies, including the racist and Anglo-centric Swinton's Outlines
of the World's History, and P. V. N. Myers', General History for Colleges
and High Schools (Boston, 1893). Hazing of blacks did not appear to be
as vicious or brutal at West Point as it was at the Naval Academy. (See,
Brown, "Social Attitudes of American Generals," pp. 23, 28; Lieutenant
Elmer W. Hubbard, "The Military Academy and the Education of Officers,
"
Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, XVI
(January 1895), pp. 1-24, quoted in Sidney Formen, West Point; A History
of the United States Military Academy (New York, 1950), pp. 141-42; Edward
S. Farrow, West Point and the Military Academy (New York, 1895), pp. 18, 64;
H. Irving Hancock, Life at West Point (New York, 1902), pp. 51-75; Myers,
General History, pp. 2-3; Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper, U.S.A., The
Colored Cadet at West Point (New York, 1969), pp. 61, 104, 121, 165.
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Annapolis in rough weather and were again put on board the Santee to await
the arrival of the September plebes.
In his diary, Leahy briefly recorded his summer cruise:
June 3 to September 2, 1892... ship Constellation-Frigate
built 1797. .. .Naval cadets' cruise in the summer of 1893
started for Europe but because of storm damage received
in mid ocean it was necessary to make port, at Fayal in
the Azores Islands, and to accomplish repairs at anchor
off Funchal, Madeira. My station at sea was on the Fore
topgallant Yard.... 37
Thus Leahy served on the last cruise of the venerable Frigate
Constellation . That old vessel had been authorized in 1794 during the
presidency of George Washington, launched in 1797 and served actively
. f . 38in five wars.
In the fall of 1893, the Naval Academy was still several years
away from the commencement of the building of its modern twentieth cen-
tury buildings and plant. The Cadets were housed in the dilapidated
"New Quarters," with one-fourth in the even more dilapidated "Old Quarters,"
The Lucky Bag, p. 34; Annual Register, 1893-94; "Summary of the Cruise,"
p. 20; in Pratt, "Autobiography," p. 577; Benjamin, United States Naval
Academy, p. 369; Wiley, An Admiral From Texas, pp. 9-14.
37
Leahy Diary, June 3 to September 2, 1893.
38
The Constitution was placed out of commission in September 1893, there-
after serving as receiving ship at Newport, Rhode Island. She was re-
commissioned in 1940 and served as the flagship of Commander-in-Chief,
U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and of Commander, Battleship Division Five, Atlantic
Fleet. She was finally made a naval shrine by the citizens of Baltimore
in 1955. (Writers' Program of the WPA in the State of Maryland, A Guide
to the United States Naval Academy (New York, 1941), pp. 100-01; United
States, Department of the Navy, Dictionary of American Naval Fighting
Ships, Vol. II (Washington, 1963), pp. 170-71, Frederick Stanhope Hill,
IVenty-Six Historic Ships (New York, 1903), p. 198.
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which dated back to 1845--the founding of the Naval Academy. The library,




During the school year 1893-94 at the Naval Academy, Leahy's Fourth
Classmates took mathematics, modern languages, and a composite called
"English Studies, History and Law." The mathematics consisted of algebra
and geometry, the French was introductory, and the "History and Law" sec-
tion attempted to cover history from Greece to the colonization of America,
using Swinton's Outlines of the World's History, and Samuel Eliot's
40
History of the United States .
By June 1894, Leahy's class had earned their relative "orders of
merit" positions, based on an academy marking system which included aca-
demic and deportment marks, combined in a weighted aggregate score. Leahy
stood 55th out of 77 classmates. In June of 1894, Leahy's third class,
along with the first class, line division and fourth class, embarked on
the practice ship Honongahela, for a cruise on the Chesapeake and visit
to Fortress Monroe, Virginia. During 1894-95, their second or "third
class" year, Leahy's group studied descriptive geometry and trigonometry,
English and the United States Constitution, and modern languages—French,
39
Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral Kins A Naval
Record (New York, 1952), pp. 16-17; Benjamin, United States Naval Academy,
pp. 369-72.
40
Annual Register, 1893-94, Appendix, pp. 7-9; Eliot, History of the
United States ; Swinton, Outlines of the World's History .
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The Army-Navy football games, which had been a high point of each
school year since 1890, were discontinued in 1894. The Secretaries of
War and Navy had jointly agreed that the games had a deleterious effect
on both the class standing of the players and of discipline at the Aca-
demies. The games were not reinstituted until 1899 and Leahy's class
42
missed the games during the last two years at the Academy.
In the summer of 1895, Leahy's classmates of the class of 1897
were old salts, chuckling at the plight of the new Plebes, whose life
43
on the Santee was described as "one continual round of pleasure."
They themselves went on their second year or youngster cruise "having
to pull on ropes--a disgusting occupation," and standing watches during
44
,
a coastal cruise on board the Bancroft . Following a month s leave and
back at the Naval Academy, they considered themselves not only old salts,
but "hardened sinners," several of whom managed to fly a pirate flag from
the staff of their new quarters, and to carry out pranks such as startling
45
the marine orderlies with clusters of buckets dropped down stairwells.
41




Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, p. 337.
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They survived quite happily and comfortably despite the critical reports
which condemned the entire dormitory and sanitation system of the Academy.
46
No action was taken, however, until after Leahy's class had graduated.
During 1895-96, their Second-Class Year, the emphasis was on
scientific and professional subjects. Languages and MacClay's History
47
of the Navy were studied, along with physics, chemistry, mechanics and
steam engineering. There was an additional emphasis of steam engineering
48
and, during the second term, on celestial navigation. In June 1896,
49
William D. Leahy had risen to 35th in a surviving fifty-six man group.
By the Spring of 1896, Leahy's classmates, now experienced Second
Classmen, drilled the batallion in infantry and artillery exercises.
By June they were "prayed over by the Chaplain and preached patriotism
by a member of the Board of Visitors," and they watched the class ahead
of them receive their diplomas, leaving Leahy's class as the new leaders
of the batallion—the new First Class. On the 15th of April, the new
First Classmen were allowed to choose either line or the Engineer Corps.
46
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of the Navy (Washington, 1897), pp. 23, 147, 151-53.
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Leahy chose the Engineers.
That summer, the Line First Classmen made their cruise on board
the Monogahela, while Leahy's group, the engineers sailed on board the
old Bancroft . The Bancroft, like the old Constellation, and the other
training ships of that time, the Monogahela and Chesapeake, were obsolete
and ill-equipped for training cadets in the needs of the modern steel
navy then building. Their emphasis was on sail and line handling, with
little opportunity given to the cadets to learn first hand the charac-
teristics of modern steel warships. Commodore S. B. Luce's Seamanship,
the standard seamanship text at the Naval Academy until 1901 emphasized
sails, rigging to the extent that it was virtually useless as a text.
As late as 1909, the old Hartford, made the last sailing practice cruise
with Academy classes.
The line cadet group sailed to Funchal, Madeira Island, while
Leahy's group, the engineers, sailed to Newport News, Virginia and then
to Philadelphia, Elizabeth, New Jersey and the New York Navy Yard, where
they examined ship building and other facilities. Leahy's group also
managed to enjoy garden parties and dances in New London, Boston, Ports-
52
mouth, Newport, Rhode Island and Bath, Maine.
Captain W. D. Puleston, Annapolis, Gangway to the Quarterdeck (New York,
1942), pp. 77-79, tells of the problems in utilizing the sailing ships for
training midshipmen for a modern Navy; Robert Greenleaf Albion, Naval
and Maritime History (Mystic, Conn., 1972), pp. 71-72, tells of the obso-
lescence of Commodore Luce's Text-book of Seamanship, the Equipping and
Handling of Vessels under Sail or Steam for the Use of the United States
Naval Academy (New York, 1895); United States, Department of the Navy,
Naval History Division, The Battleship in the United States Navy (Washing-
ton, 1970), p. 12, illustrates an original plan for the battleship Maine
rigged to carry a full set of sails.
52




The Lucky Bag of 1896 described the activities of Leahy's fellow
Second Classmen in a manner which implied that the class had not lost
its spirit of individuality. It was obvious from The Lucky Bag boyish
descriptions, that their previous year, in spite of their busy work and
study schedule, had been also filled with dances, pranks and young romance
Leahy and the other fourteen of his class who had elected to be
in the Engineer Division rather than the Line not only took their summer
cruises on separate ships for Line and Engineer Divisions, but also took
somewhat different course work. During their senior year, the Line Di-
vision Cadets took seamanship, naval orientation, naval tactics, ordinance,
mechanics, physics and navigation, plus international law from Woolsey's
International Law . Leahy's Engineer group took instead, naval construc-
tion, steam engineering mechanics and physics. Other instruction courses
were the same as those of the Line Division Cadets. Following the passage
of the Personnel Act of 1899, the Corps of Engineers was amalgamated with
54
the Line and all course work at the Academy was standardized.
Leahy was not a varsity athlete, and he did not attain a cadet
rank in the brigade during his years at Annapolis. Nor was he a particularly
53
The Lucky Bag, 1896. pp. 48-51.
54Annual Register, 1896-97 ; Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp.
391-97; The Lucky Bag, 1897, p. 21; Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, pp. 355-61,
The Navy Personnel Act of 1899 also eliminated some vestigial ranks re-
maining from the Civil War and to speed promotion established a board
to periodically retire the least efficient officers of command grade.
This act, plus the rapid growth of the Navy after the Spanish American
War greatly enhanced and speeded junior officer promotions.
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outstanding scholar. In June 1897, he graduated 35th in his graduating
class of 47. At the time of his graduation, rank and promotion sup-
posedly depended strictly upon the final graduating position of each
individual. Subsequent advancement, contingent upon successful passing
of an examination was strictly on the basis of seniority, with only court
martial or meritorious promotion capable of upsetting the order in either
direction.
Leahy had a solid and popular, if not brilliant record at the Naval
Academy. His classmate and lifelong friend, Thomas G. Hart later spoke
of Leahy's Academy career:
It would take a long time to describe Bill Leahy for he
was a queer combination. As a student at the Academy he
was not good, a little lazy. But when his classmates had
a problem, a dispute about it, someone would say, "Let's
go and ask Bill Leahy. He's got better sense than all
the rest of us put together." That was always true for
his common sense, his wisdom, was profound all through
his life.
Leahy's four years at the Naval Academy instilled in him, as in
all of the Academy graduates a standardized and uniform indoctrination
in Naval subjects, with virtually no effective questioning of the "right-
ness" and worth of their uniformly identical backgrounds or assumptions.
God, Duty and Destiny were so obviously on the side of Americans that
Register of Alumni, 1966 ; "Native Iowan Boss of U.S. Navy," The Sioux
City Journal, June 5, 1938.
Benjamin, United States Naval Academy, pp. 361-62, 382.
Thomas C. Hart, The Reminiscences of Thomas C. Hart (Columbia University
Oral History Project, New York, 1972), p. 44.
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only an anarchist or a madman would have even thought to question them.
Nor were the Naval Cadets apparently instructed on or bothered by the
implications of the international events of their times. The emphasis
was on conformity. Available sources and memoirs show little meaningful
organized academic or private discussion of such problems as the Bering
Sea seal hunting controversy, the growing internal troubles of Cuba, or
the explosive Venezuela Boundary dispute between Venezuela, Britain and
the United States in 1895. The Cadets at the Naval Academy, like most
Americans of their time, grew up in an atmosphere of comfortable assur-
ance and non-involvement.
Their education well prepared them for success in the American
Navy at the turn of the century. They were well prepared for the type of
mentality and the kinds of jobs which awaited them in the Fleet. The
United States had no major enemies threatening her borders or her fleet.
Thus, the still largely provincial, yet technically prepared men of these
years were well prepared to man the ships and guns which spread American
imperialism in the Far East and Latin America. The very limitations of





The Navy which Leahy entered upon graduation from the Naval Academy
in 1897 still operated with many obsolescent ships and guns. America
had relatively few modern steel battleships for a nation with growing
pretensions for first-rate naval status. Nor was American steel produc-
tion capacity, or naval shipyard or administrative organization suffi-
ciently developed to support a major fleet organization.
In spite of the increasing impact of Mahan's "battle fleet" doc-
trines, naval theory in the United States was still too much tied to the
outmoded theory of Guerre de Course or commerce raiding warfare. By this
theory, local defense depended on harbor installations and vessels while
swift commerce raiders would harass enemy merchant and naval shipping.
Prior to the 1890 's, this combination had been considered sufficient to
hold off an opposing fleet of conventional ships-of-the-line.
The naval officer corps, especially the Academy graduates, were
still a small, rank-heavy, group of competing comrades in 1897. The line
officers, until the Naval Act of 1899 integrated them with the engineers,
enjoyed an advantage in prestige over the engineer group in which Leahy
started his career. Shipboard life had become comfortable by 1897, with
opportunities for travel and adventure, and with shipboard enlisted
helpers to make life safe and convenient.
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But great change was in the air in almost every aspect of the United
States Navy. The modern armored vessels which had been built in the early
1890 's at the insistence of men like Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy,
Senator Matthew C. Butler of the House Naval Affairs Committee, and Navy
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan were at last available. They were organized
into a powerful North Atlantic Squadron consisting of four first-class
battleships, two second-class battleships and two armored cruisers—the
first Mahan-style modern American battle fleet. The three 17-knot, 10,000
ton displacement Indiana class battleships, Indiana, Massachusetts, and
Oregon, with 18- inch armor and 13 -inch guns and the larger Iowa with her
13-inch guns, were complemented by the older battleships, Maine and Texas,
and a growing host of smaller cruisers and smaller supporting vessels.
In addition five more first-class battleships, 16 torpedo boats and one
submarine were under construction.
Edward Mead Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, Military Thought from
Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, 1952), pp. 415-16; Harold and Margaret
Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918 (Princeton, 1946),
Chapter 1, and pp. 192-96; Charles Oscar Paullin, "A Half Century of Naval
Administration in America, 1861-1911," United States Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings, Vol. 40, No. 4 (July-August 1914), pp. 1059-65; Peter Karsten,
The Naval Aristocracy, The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of
Modern American Navalism (New York, 1972), pp. 52-92, Karsten emphasizes
some of the negative aspects of shipboard life, especially early in the
nineteenth century and following the Civil War, including brutality to
enlisted men, rank jealousy, conflict between engineers and line, and
"boredom." However, by the end of the century, even Karsten observed
that life for both officers and the increasingly native -American crews
had become relatively pleasant. In addition, the Naval Act of 1899 inte-
grated line and engineers and allowed for the elimination of deadwood
in the higher ranks, greatly opening promotion possibilities.
2
"Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Miscellaneous Reports," in Annual
Reports of the Navy Department, 1897, p. 3; Alfred Thayer Mahan, The In -
fluence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston, 1890), especially
pp. 1-89, 506-42; Chester W. Nimitz and E. B. Potter (eds.), Sea Power
A Naval History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960), pp. 344-45.
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Perhaps the major factor in the accelerating growth of the Navy
by 1897 was the belated impact of the ideas expressed and publicized by
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Although Mahan's ideas were by no means
novel, his lucid and readable exposition of the basic factors in stra-
tegic and naval power had immense impact on the growth of navalism after
the publication of his The Influence of Sea Power upon History, in 1890.
Mahan was the first major writer on naval affairs and strategy to marshall
the full case for a main battle fleet of long-range battleships capable
of destroying the main force of any enemy. This reversed American stra-
tegy dating back to the revolutionary war, which relied on a combination
of coastal defense ships and fortifications plus swift commerce raiders
to harass an enemy power. Mahan's ideas took even tighter hold in the
American Navy after 1897 with the appointment of his most influential
disciple, Theodore Roosevelt, to the position of Assistant Secretary of
the Navy in April, 1897. In a June speech at the Naval War College at
Newport, Rhode Island, Roosevelt used the War of 1812 to illustrate the
horrors of American unpreparedness. Roosevelt touted naval growth in a
variation of his later policy of 'Wlk softly but carry a big stick."
He emphasized to the naval audience that diplomacy was useless without
force behind it. Roosevelt concluded therefore, "the diplomat is the
servant and not the master of the soldier." His preparations for possible
3
Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion
1860-189 8 (Ithica, N.Y., 1963), pp. 61-2, 85-95, 415-16; William E. Livezey,
Mahan on Sea Power (Norman, 1947); William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of
Imperialism, 1890-1902, Vol. II (New York, 1935), pp. 429-31, describes
Mahan's impact also on German naval strategy and growth.
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war with Spain were of primary importance in the success of Dewey's success
at Manila in 1898. In fact, it was Roosevelt who had the aggressive
Admiral Dewey assigned to the critical position as the Commander of the
4
American Asiatic fleet prior to the commencement of the war with Spain.
In 1897, there were still only 1,508 naval officers on the active
list. Line officers on the list included 6 Rear Admirals, 10 Commodores,
45 Captains, 85 Commanders, 74 Lieutenant-Commanders, 75 Junior Lieuten-
ants, 179 Ensigns and 62 Naval Cadets. The Engineer Corps, which Leahy
entered upon graduation included 70 Chief Engineers, 66 passed Assistant
Engineers, and 22 passed Naval Cadets, including Leahy. Other officer
ranks included a Surgeon Corps, a Pay Corps, Civil Engineers and Naval
Constructors. There were, in addition, 11,000 petty officers and seamen,
plus 1,200 apprentice boys in training. The Secretary requested an in-
crease of 100 Lieutenants, 50 Lieutenants of the junior grade, and 15
Captains, and the additional authorization of a battleship and "a few"
4
Theodore Roosevelt, Address of Hon. Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secre-
tary of the Navy Before the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island,
June 2, 1897 (Washington, 1897), p. 20. William Reynolds Braisted, The
United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909 (Austin, 1958), pp. 9-12;
LaFeber, The New Empire, pp. 62-101, describes the influence of the war-
extolling cabal, including Brooks Adams, Roosevelt, and Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, which was strongly joined in 1897 by Captain Alfred Thayer
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first persuaded McKinley to appoint Roosevelt to his Navy post; J. A. S.
Grenville, "American Naval Preparations for War with Spain, 1896-1898,"
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American plans for attacking the Philippines; Brayton Harris, The Age of
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in the fall of 1897, used his position and political influence to secure




torpedo-boats and torpedo-boat destroyers. He reported the total cost
of maintaining the Navy for the fiscal year ending June 29, 1897 as
$17,514,213. 13. 5
Upon Leahy's graduation he received orders to report to the battle-
ship, U.S.S. Oregon . He joined several other young Naval Cadets, including
future Admiral Harry E. Yarnell on an exciting train trip via their Wis-
consin and Iowa homes to join the Oregon, which was travelling along the
northwestern coast of the United States. They finally caught up with
the battleship in the British Naval Station of Esquimalt, on the west
coast of Canada.
The Oregon was one of the handful of first-class armored vessels
in the fleet in 1897. She and her sister ships, Indiana and Massachusetts,
had initially been authorized by an act of Congress of June 30, 1890.
The Oregon was launched in 1893 and commissioned in 1896. For her time
the Oregon was a most formidable vessel. Her sides were armored with
the best Harveyized steel, eighteen inches thick. The 3 million dollar
vessel was 348 feet long, displaced over 10,000 tons and was manned by
32 officers and 441 men. She carried four thirteen-inch guns plus eight-
inch and six-inch secondary batteries. Leahy and a fellow naval cadet,
United States, Department of the Navy, "Report of the Secretary of the
Navy, Miscellaneous Reports," in Annual Reports of the Navy Department
for the Year 189 7 (Washington, 1897), pp. 3-9, 36-42; United States, De-
partment of the Navy, List and Station of the Commissioned and Warrant
Officers of the Navy in the United States and of the Marine Corps on the
Active List, July 1, 1897 (Washington, 1897), pp. 1-18.
Frederick Stanhope Hill, Twenty-Six Historic Ships (New York, 1903),
pp. 463-65; Leahy Diary, July 1897.
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Henry M. Jensen from Iowa, felt "very fortunate" to share a stateroom
which measured 6x7x8 feet, and which was located "directly over the
boilers" of the Oregon. The room, in hot climates, often reached a
temperature of 108 Farenheit.
Nevertheless, Leahy's new life was an adventure as he visited the
little Canadian city of Victoria, looked over the British cruiser Impereuse
and the gunboats Peacock, Pheasant, and Wild Swan and attended a host of
parties and receptions given in honor of Queen Victoria. Leahy and his
fellow Naval Cadets were at first ecstatic to be "just out from four
years of segregation within the walls of the Navy Academy." They were,
nevertheless, somewhat chagrined to find that the British naval cadets,
who were their "equal in such small rank as we had," were mere children
of sixteen years of age and less—a sobering situation from the point
of view of newly graduated American Naval Cadets. However, the round
of port visits to activities like the Tacoma Rose Festival, with its
pageants and lovely queen, to Seattle, then in the chaos and bustle of
gold seekers on their way to the Klondike, and finally to cosmopolitan
8
San Francisco, made their lives enjoyable.
At Port Angeles the wardroom was excited by the rumor that there
was trouble with Japan about the ownership of the Hawaiian Islands.
Leahy noted that, "we expected at any time to be ordered to the Islands."
Leahy Diary, July 1897.
Q
Leahy Diary, July 1897.
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Although there was no readiness to go to war with Spain at that time,
the officers, like all informed Americans, had been exposed to anti-
Japanese articles and rumors since the Japanese victory over China in
1895, and her "aggressive" attitude in Hawaii. American expansionists
kept one worried eye on China, where a half-dozen small gunboats and
cruisers tried to protect American lives and property interests. The
other eye was kept on the increasing Japanese population in Hawaii (25,000,
one-fourth of the population by 1897). But while the Japanese populated
Hawaii and worked its fields, the American colony on that island gained
control over the land, fields and political apparatus. The resulting
tension saw American and Japanese cruisers nervuosly facing each other
in Hawaiian waters, while men like Theodore Roosevelt and the American
9
oligarchy on Hawaii advocated immediate annexation of the Islands.
Fortunately for avoiding an outright conflict, Japan's primary
amibtions in China led her to back down and avert a major crisis at
Hawaii. Since there was no sequel to the Japanese war rumor, the Oregon
finally entered San Francisco harbor on July 18, 1897 to spend several
pleasant months in that city. In December, 1897, the ship moved to
9
Leahy Diary, July, 1897; Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific,
pp. 11-29; Thomas A. Bailey, "Japan's Protest Against the Annexation of
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Bremerton, Washington Naval Shipyard to enter drydock for the installa-
tion of new bilge keels to improve her stability at sea. Again Leahy
was occupied with both shipboard duties and with sightseeing, visiting
and parties. In January, 1898, he again visited Seattle, still a 'Vide
open" town in the grip of gold fever.
Finally, in February, 1898, rumors arose that the Oregon would
be sent to the Atlantic coast due to the Maine disaster and that there
was a possibility of war with Spain. At that time, Leahy reported that
"None of us except the Chief Engineer, R. W. Milligan believed that there
was any possibility of war and all of the junior officers anyway wanted
to go to San Francisco and did not want to go to the Atlantic."
On March 17, the ill Captain McCormick was relieved by Captain
Charles Edgar Clark and on March 19, 1898, the Oregon set out on her
historic race around South America to the Caribbean. On the afternoon
of March 30th, Leahy and all of those on board the Oregon not previously
initiated, had the "honor" of undergoing the traditional Navy ceremonies
reserved for those who first cross the equator. The hilarious ceremonies
were complete with a "Sea King," his wildly garbed "Court," and even his
"queen," Amphitrite. Although the enlisted members underwent the com-
plete "treatment," including being lathered with a paste of molasses,
dough and other sticky substances, dunked under water, etc., the officers
were allowed to "buy immunity" by paying their "ransom" in beer, a deal
Leahy Diary, July, 1897 to February, 1898.




which added considerably to the fun of the occasion and, incidentally
12
illustrated the privileges of rank.
The Oregon, making good 10.7 knots, arrived at Callao, Peru, on
April A. She remained for eighty hours of frantic labor, loading on board
the coal which the collier Marietta, which had preceded her into the port,
had arranged. At Callao, Captain Clark received a message from Secretary
of the Navy Long to be aware that the Spanish torpedo boat Temerario was
in Montivideo, Uraguay.
Leahy, as one of the two junior officers in charge of the native
coal handlers, arranged to work for twenty-four hours consecutively in
order to then have the opportunity to visit the countryside. When his
twenty-four hour stint was over, Leahy and his buddy, Harry Yarnell and
Assistant Engineer Frank Lyon took the primitive train for Lima. The
youths had time to see the main sights of the town, the cathedral, and
to enjoy one good meal, somehow communicating in their limited French.
Leahy also noticed that "The young women had a graceful carriage and
have a disconcerting way of looking at strangers with their brilliant
dark eyes."
The Oregon sailed from Callao on April 6, 1898, with one boiler
still under repair. Captain Clark telegraphed Secretary of the Navy Long
12
Leahy Diary, March 30, 1898; United States, Department of the Navy,
"Addendum to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation," in
Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1898 (Washington, 1898),
Vol. 1, pp. 46-56, "Voyage of the Oregon, Marietta and Nictheroy . " The
gunboat-collier Marietta preceeded the Oregon into each port during most
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on the Oregon upon her arrival.
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that if the Marietta could pre-arrange coal for his arrival at Sandy Point
(Puenta Arenas), Patagonia, he would be able to forego coaling stops at
both Valparaiso and Motivideo. With permission granted, the Marietta
proceeded ahead of the Oregon to Sandy Point to arrange for the coal and
the Oregon raced forward in pleasant seas until April 15. Then freezing
southerly winds hit the vessel and made the bow of the ship at times surge
under the waves of the Straits of Magellan. The storm threatened the
hugh ship and Leahy described the rocky apparitions which:
On our port bow and perhaps a mile distant rose out
of the heaving sea two ink black projections, upon the
perpendicular sides of which the great waves broke into
snaky spray that was thrown half way to the pinnacles of
their pointed tops. The crashing of the seas and the
boiling mass of spray, at first held all the observer's
attention, but seen through the driving mist a mile or so
beyond was a still more awesome picture made by a rocky
black and threatening shore line upon which stretched
as far as one could see a long line of curling white
breakers. .. .Our ship was driving head on into the sea at
a speed of 13 knots, not riding up on a wave and then
sliding down as do smaller vessels, but actually driving
through the mass of water. At times I saw fully fifteen
feet of blue water rush on the forecastle, break with a
crash on the forward turret, and throw white spray nearly
the entire length of the ship. Under the onslaught of
these gigantic seas the ship dove, trembled, shook them
off, and dove again, while her great engines with rhythmic
beat drove ten thousand tons of steel forward at a uniform
speed.
We said she smelled the Spanish fleet. Just at dark
we turned into the sheltered water of the Straits of
Magellan and anchored for the night in a cove that was
protected from the southerly gale.
On April 17, the Oregon anchored at Sandy Point (Puenta Arenas)
and began loading coal, having made the run from Callao at the average
14
speed of eleven and three quarter knots.
14
Leahy Diary, April, 1898; Hill, Twenty-Six Historic Ships, pp. 466-67.

39
The Oregon, having heard the rumor of a possible Spanish gunboat
night attack at Puenta Arenas, arrived after dark with a dramatic show,
described by Leahy as "searchlights playing on the shipping, and all gun
crews at battle stations made a warlike picture." The Oregon sailed from
Puenta Arenas on April 21, this time accompanying the Marietta, whose
slow pace exasperated the young wardroom officers of the Oregon . During
the transit, Captain Clark, still apprehensive as to the whereabouts of
the rumored Spanish gunboat Temerario, kept his ship lights carefully
screened and his batteries manned for instant action. On April 30,
Captain Clark released the hindering Marietta and the Oregon made the
rest of the run to Rio at a forced draft speed of 16 knots. Once inside
the harbor the Oregon crew strained to ask of passing ships "Is there
peace or war in the United States?" The eager Americans received no
response to their megaphone queries, however, until the harbor master
arrived on board and informed them that "war has existed since the 21st
of April." The Oregon officers and men were elated at the news of war,
the band broke into the "Star Spangled Banner, " and "everybody showed
their joy in the noisiest way they could think of."
At Rio de Janiero, Captain Clark was warned by a message from
Secretary Long of "four Spanish cruisers, heavy and fast, three torpedo
boat destroyers," which had sailed in April from the Cape Verde Islands
on a "destructive mission." After purchasing the Brazilian dynamite
Leahy Diary, April, 1898; Hill, Twenty-Six Historic Ships, pp. 467-68.
Leahy Diary, April 30, 1898.
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cruiser, Nictheroy to add to his little force, Clark sailed out of the
harbor on May 2. When the two smaller ships held his speed down to nine
knots, however, he left them at Cape Frio with orders to beach themselves
if necessary to avoid capture by the Spaniards. Clark then raced on and
entered the harbor of Bahia, Brazil to get what news was available. At
Bahia, once again his crew celebrated—this time because of the news of
Dewey's one-sided victory at Manila Bay. Captain Clark mustered the crew
of the Oregon aft and read them his orders from Secretary Long telling
of "four cruisers, heavy and fast." This sequence of events was almost
too much for the excited Oregon crew to bear. They cheered Captain Clark
and they cheered the Oregon . Then almost unavoidably, someone invented
a poorly rhymed ditty which Leahy recorded:
For days thereafter about the decks the sailors were
heard repeating "Four cruisers, heavy and fast, three
torpedo boats, deep sea class, we could tow a couple
of them home with us.-*-?
On May 14, 1898, the Oregon, racing off the coast of Brazil met
another famous American vessel and "crew" when she sighted and hailed
the tiny sloop Spray, sailed by Joshua Slocum on the last leg of a one-
man, round-the-world journey. The Oregon signaled to Slocum "Are there
any men-of-war about?", designating the nation concerned with "...the
yellowest Spanish flag I ever saw... larger than the Spray 's mainsail."
The astonished Slocum signaled back "No." Nevertheless, he had the
Long to Clark, May 1, Clark to Long, May 2, 1898, in "Addendum to the
Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation," in Annual Reports of
the Navy Department for the Year 1898 (Washington, 1898), Volume 2, p.
50; Leahy Diary, May 4, 1898.
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sense of human to signal to the Oregon, "Let us keep together for mutual
protection." He received no agreement from the Oregon, which was soon
over the horizon.
The race around the Horn in search of the Spanish fleet and battle
wrought a strange change among the crew of the Oregon . In February 1898,
prior to the start of her trip to Cuba, Leahy noted that the crew of the
Oregon was reluctant to go to the east coast on a war mission against
Spain. Leahy noted that, while the Oregon was still at San Francisco,
"of all the officers on board the Oregon" only the Chief Engineer, R. W.
Milligan believed that there was any possibility of war with Spain and
that the rest of the wardroom wanted to "stay in San Francisco and did
not want to go to the Atlantic." Yet, after her race around South America,
the members of the crew of the Oregon were literally raging to "get at"
the Spaniards. When it is considered that the crew existed in a virtual
news vacuum during much of their trip, it appears that the excitement
of the chase and the possibility of impeding battle and war triggered
an animal response in the minds of those initially reluctant warriors.
By the time they reached Brazil, they were not only raring to go to war,
Joshua Slocum, Sailing Alone Around the World (New York, 1900), pp.
264-66. Slocum, who referred to himself as "the crew" of the tiny Spray,
like the larger, naval crew of the Oregon, "did not think there would
be a war." Although he had been warned by South Africans on his last
leg of his journey that there might be a war between the United States
and Spain, Slocum "had hardly given the matter a serious thought." He
"pondered long that night over the probability of a war risk." Slocum




but their antipathy toward the Spanish had come from nowhere to urge
them on.
The metamorphosis of the crew of the Oregon, who as a group had
been free of any apparent enmity towards Spain or desire to fight her,
into a group of Spanish-hating killers, during their trip around South
America is of special interest. Many writers have advanced theories as
to possible causes of the aggressive expansionism which seemed to seize
America after her sudden victories of the Spanish American War. Some
writers have emphasized an historic American trend toward expansionism
leading to the sudden burst of 1898 and after. Others have noted the
rapid reversal of attitude among specific communities after the victories
of 1898. The American business communities abruptly shifted from oppo-
20
sition to support of imperial expansion following the American victories.
Foreign observers also seemed to be struck by the sudden turn-about of
general American attitudes toward the expansion:
Between April 30 and May 1 the weather vane which shows
the public breath swung clear around, "...The practical
American read the news, asked himself, 'well, why not?'
and hung another flag out his window. "21
19
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One potential cause which has not yet been offered to explain the rever-
sal is that which appears to have operated on the crew of the Oregon-
-
irrational animal joy at an approaching conflict.
After stops at Bridgetown, Barbados, the Oregon arrived at Jupiter
Inlet, Florida, on May 24th, 1898, receiving telegraphic congratulations
22
from both Secretary Long and President McKinley.
At Key West Leahy saw a beehive of military preparation and excite-
ment. "Newspaper boats" flitted about the harbor seeking information from
the Navy ships and a "World Herald" tugboat served to take Leahy ashore
for a few hours of dining and mixing with the naval officers and news cor-
respondents ashore. On May 28, Admiral Sampson arrived at Key West, having
received orders from Secretary Long to hasten the departure of the Oregon,
New York and Indiana for immediate action in Cuba. Sampson was incensed
at a later telegram from Long telling him that Commodore Schley had left
the blockade off Santiago with his ships for fear of running out of coal.
He hastened his own departure and on May 30, left Key West with the New
York, Oregon, and the little Mayflower and Porter, arriving off Santiago
on June 1, 1898. Leahy recorded the drama as the Oregon arrived off Santiago:
22
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The Indiana 's band played "there is a new bully that
just came to town." The Captains sent complimentary mes-
sages to our Captain and we began to think that perhaps
we had done something worthwhile.
The next day the Oregon was assigned her place for the blockading
23
and naval bombardment of Santiago.
During and following the month-long blockade duty of the Oregon,
Leahy managed to get ashore during side trips which the Oregon made to
refuel or to bombard the little town of Guantanamo with thirteen inch
shells—an action which Leahy felt "unnecessary and cruel." At least
during the duels with the batteries of Santiago, the American ships had
themselves been subject to countering fire, with some close calls which
^ * > 24Leahy felt
...could have made a wooden indian dodge. .. .While I was
pointing the camera from our quarter deck at the Iowa,
a shell making a more horrible shriek than usual fell
into the water a few yards away and deluged the quarter
deck with water. I was frightened as was everybody else
in the vicinity, but I did press the button, and am cur-
ious as to what the picture will be when developed.
Finally, on the bright Sunday morning of July 3rd, Leahy and his
shipmates were startled by the sound of General Quarters—the signal for
battle stations. The Spanish Admiral Cervera, with the pride of Spain
at stake, had been ordered to attempt to fight his way through the blockade
of the powerful American battleships. Cervera raced his obsolete squadron
out of the harbor and along the southern coast of Cuba. The over-taking
23
Hill, Twenty-Six Historic Ships, pp. 468-72; Leahy Diary, June, 1898.
24
Leahy Diary, June, 1898.

45
American battleships and supporting vessels successively pounded each
of his warships into sinking hulks or drove them into the beach in flames.
In his diary, Leahy recorded his first (and only) participation in a great
sea battle.
On Sunday, July 3rd, 1898, after the first call to quar-
ters for general muster had sounded and while we were in
the junior officers' quarters getting our badly laundered
white uniforms ready for inspection, the battle alarm
gongs rang. .. .Everybody was surprised and displeased at
the idea of a battle station drill on Sunday. .. .The enemy
ships came out at high speed, opening fire as soon as
their guns cleared the Morro, and by the time we were
ready for action all of them had cleared the harbor en-
trance and were steaming or turning to the westward....
The first two ships to emerge met a concentrated fire
from our entire fleet, and the first one, Reina Maria
Theresa went ashore about five miles from the Morro,
with her flag flying and flames bursting from every open-
ing. About a mile further to the westward, the Almirante
Oquando went ashore in the same condition. .. .The Oregon's
better preparation for speed permitted her to pass all
other ships except the Brooklyn, which had about the same
speed. . .within easy range of our big guns were four great
cruisers making a run for their lives against terrible odds.
Big red and yellow flags of Spain, floating straight out
astern first caught the eye, and then came long lines of
flashing fire jetting out from the broadside batteries at
short intervals, and for a moment obscuring the flag with
light brown smoke of their smokeless powder. .. .Shortly
after the chase began, I went below to look over my turret
25
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machinery, and finding it all right, returned to the
deck to watch the race (sic)....The Oregon and the Brook-
lyn led, apparently making the same speed, while the Iowa
and Texas were dropping slowly to the rear and firing at
long range ... .About an hour after passing the Oquendo
ashore, the Vizcaya, upon which we were directing our fire,
began to act as though she had lost her steering gear and
was unmanageable. Some of us thought she was going to
head out to us and close the range for a torpedo shot,
but instead she hauled down her flag, and ran ashore, im-
mediately thereafter bursting into flame. .. .Everybody on
deck cheered when the Vizcaya grounded and the Oregon
continued at full speed after the Colon... our thirteen
inch shells were striking dangerously near and throwing
columns of water higher than the Colon's masts. .. .When
the enemy ship ran ashore and hauled down its flag our
men cheered until their powder-coated throats refused to
make any more noise. Then they got the band instruments
and made a day hideous with noises, but everybody was too
happy to care what they did.
Leahy was thankful that "My duty in charge of the operating mechanism
of the forward thirteen-inch turret required very little personal atten-
tion and I took advantage of the opportunity to see much of the wonderful
spectacle presented by a great naval battle.
Leahy's excitement and joy at the one-sided contest with the Spanish
fleet off Santiago reflected the attitude of many Americans at that time
that war was a joyous adventure. To his credit, however, Leahy usually
recognized the human tragedy and the viewpoint of those on the other side
of the American guns and bayonets. In contrast to his attitude, the ex-
pansionist leaders of America at that time, like Mahan, and especially
Theodore Roosevelt, were secure in their God-supported conviction of the
superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race and customs, and their concommitant
conviction of the Tightness of America's expansionist role. They were
f\
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thus able to rationalize war and aggrandizement as an exercise beneficial
27
for all concerned, and even as a form of game.
By July, Leahy was so inured to the noise of battle that on 1 July,
dog-tired after working all night repairing some machinery in the forward
turret, he managed to sleep through a furious bombardment of the Spanish
positions, with an 8-inch turret firing literally a few feet from his
28
head.
Leahy's capacity to feel and respect the personal feelings of the
natives did not desert him in Cuba. On one occasion he met a Cuban offi-
cer...'^ colonel, who commands the Cubans in this immediate vicinity.
He spoke French at least as well as I do and we managed a conversation
that was most interesting to me...he was a tall, handsome courteous soldier
29
whose appearance would have been creditable in any army." ' On July 6th,
at Siboney, Leahy observed the pitiful Cuban refugees who:
travelled in small squads, probably families, old men and
women dressed in the most dilapidated clothing, children
of all sizes with no clothing at all; and all of them look-
ing hungry and fatigued after their long tramp in the burn-
ing sun.
...One scene that especially attracted my attention was that
of a little barefoot lad, apparently about eight years of
age, who trudged cheerfully along, with a smaller brother
on his back.
27
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He had fallen behind the others of his party, but
did not seem at all discouraged and smiled prettily when
I said "good morning." The brave little fellow is too
young to realize that when he returns to find his home
in ashes and his father and brothers who may be fighting
in Cuba, Libra or Spain, not there to welcome him. 30
On July 12, 1898, the heavyweights Oregon and Massachusetts were
moved into position off the Morro fortress in order to commence a final
bombardment of the city. However, the Spaniards, demoralized by that
time, proposed a truce, which became a complete surrender on July 17.
The Spaniards had no alternative, for on July 7 Commodore John C. Watson
had been put in command of a new so-called Eastern Squadron, formed for
the ostensible purpose of being a counter-threat to the western coast
of Spain in case a new Spanish fleet was sent from Spain to retake the
Philippines. The mere rumor of this Eastern Squadron caused consterna-
tion in Spain, and the fleet of Admiral Camarra, which was actually en
route to the Philippines via Suez, was recalled to Spain.
On August 6th, the beloved Captain Clark, a burly, capable mariner,
whose photos record a ready moustachioed smile, even in the thick of battle,
was retired and rowed to the Vulcan by a picked crew of his junior officers.
On August 20, 1898, the Oregon entered New York harbor with the victorious
Atlantic Fleet. The city greeted them with hundreds of small craft
surrounding the ships, whistling and tooting and with the Hudson River
lined with cheering crowds of people. Soon, however, the Oregon was in
the Brooklyn Navy Yard and Leahy was ordered to report to the battleship
30
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Texas for duty. After another round of triumphant fetes and parties given
to the Texas by the Philadelphians, the Texas returned to New York, and
sailed on December, 1898, for Havana. Leahy and his friend Cadet Morris
H. Brown, however, had ideas of further battle action. Leahy wrote that:
In December, 1898 the Texas sailed for Havana, . .
.
At this time stories of renewed warfare on the Philippines
against insurgent natives appeared in the news items, and
Cadet Morris H. Brown and I decided that we would like to
adventure in the Far East. The gunboat Castine (about
1400 tons) was in Havana en route to Manila via the Medi-
terranean and upon our making application for assignemnt
to the Castine. . .the Senior Officer present issued the
necessary orders and we moved over to that ship. 32
Leahy did not remain on board the Castine for long, however, for
in order to return to the Naval Academy to take his promotion examinations,
he soon began a bewildering series of transfers and travels. On leaving
Havana the Castine transited the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea
and then the Suez Canal, but Leahy left the ship at Ceylon to return to
Annapolis on board the U.S.S. Buffalo in order to take his examinations.
He finally took and passed his tests at Annapolis in June, 1899, visited
for several weeks with his parents in Madison, Wisconsin, and then spent
several months on board the U.S.S. Philadelphia, at Mare Island, California.
He then transferred on October 12, 1899 to the U.S.S. Newark, under Captain
McCalla, later of Peking Expedition fame, but who in 1899 suffered the
reputation of having an unhappy ship. On October 19, 1899 the Newark
sailed from San Francisco for the Asiatic Station and undertook a rather
leisurely pace for the Philippines. At Hawaii, Leahy passed several
pleasant days visiting and sightseeing. On Guam, which the ship reached
3T"
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on November 16, 1899, he found the natives to be clean, friendly, but
lazy, and somewhat immoral by American standards. Leahy recorded one
story, perhaps apocryphal, but which perhaps illustrated the actual
situation:
Morality as we know it is unknown to them, they consider
falsehood entirely justified, marriage was entirely a
matter of option before the arrival of the Americans.
Our Governor proclaimed that men and women living to-
gether must be married, and the natives came in crowds
to comply with the Governor's desires. One man came
with his sister and when the magistrate demurred, said
they had lived together for years and had several children.
Leahy also noted that natives were carefully trained by the Spanish
to say a polite "Buenos noches, Senores, " to all foreigners and he further
noted that "American rule will probably substitute insolence." At any
rate, life at Guam soon became sufficiently dull that Leahy wrote in his
journal
:
November 18th, 1899...news that Tom Sharkey is now the
champion prize fighter, having defeated Jeffries. I
don't know why such junk is entered in this journal,
probably because it is the only news; it certainly
doesn't interest me in the least.
It was with some relief that Leahy sailed from Guam on November
20th and arrived at Manila on November 24th. On November 29th he trans-
ferred to the U.S.S. Oregon , where he rejoined his old shipmates and finally
33
felt at home on the Philippine station.
33




In 1900, Leahy had the opportunity to observe the workings of the
primary rule of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan for the proper American diplo-
matic-military posture in the Far East— "cooperation." This meant America's
self-serving participation in the strictly limited joint military efforts
which were at times conducted by the western nations and Japan in China.
Their cooperation, as during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 was only to the
extent of jointly beating down the aspirations of the Chinese for true
economic and political independence and to protect the lives and property
interests of their respective nationals. In both Shanghai and Amoy, al-
though at the periphery of the major excitement and danger of the Boxer
Rebellion, Leahy saw both the positive and negative aspects of international
cooperation against the Chinese threat.
The negative side consisted of continuing jockeying for advanta-
geous political and economic position, even in the face of great mutual
Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The United States Looking Outward, " in Atlantic
Monthly, December, 1890, reprinted in William E. Livesey, The Interest of
America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Norman, Oklahoma: 1947), p. 88,
Livesey summarized Mahan' s recommended worldwide strategic-diplomatic
posture for the United States as "...dominance in the Caribbean, equality
and cooperation in the Pacific, and interested abstention from the strictly







danger. At Shanghai Leahy observed first-hand the almost comical efforts
of the foreign powers to gain economic and military advantage over each
other in order to ensure their own future prestige and power. Similarly,
at Amoy, his ship took part in the rapid marshalling of western naval
forces which successfully prevented a Japanese takeover of the island
2
and port of Amoy on the pretext of an insult to Japanese national honor.
The delicate balance between American "cooperation" in the Far East
and her attempts to gain some economic advantage for her own nationals
was made more complex by the diplomatic maneuvers of Secretary of State
John Hay. To insure that America, with no established zone of interest
in China and with no large fleet or forces could enjoy the benefits of
trade and commerce in China, Hay issued his first open door note in Sep-
tember, 1899 calling for equality of commercial opportunity for all western
nations within the several spheres of interest in China. Although he
claimed that the responses to his notes had been affirmative, actually
Hay received only equivocal replies for the nations circularized, when
in June, 1900 the patriotic Chinese "Society of Boxers" arose against
the abuses of western missionaries and businessmen, the China policy of
the United States was a shambles. The lack of European commitment, the
principle of the "open door," the lack of formidable American naval and
military strength, and Hay's determination not to form any alliances,
put the United States in a position of attempting to defend nebulous in-
terests with insufficient ships and forces. Thus when Hay sent out his
2




circular to the other powers in July 1900 declaring the American policy
of "preserving Chinese territorial and administrative entity," only Britain
3
responded and in a half-hearted manner.
Leahy's ship, the Castine arrived at Shanghai prior to the beginning
of the Boxer Rebellion. On December 17, 1899, the Castine had been ordered
to sail for Nagasaki via Hong Kong for repairs. Enroute however, on Febru-
ary 12, 1900, the ship developed engine trouble and a shortage of fuel
and anchored at Shanghai for repairs instead of continuing on to Nagasaki.
This, fortunately, put her in Shanghai as the only American Naval vessel
on that station during much of the Boxer Rebellion. In July and August,
she was still in Shanghai, completing repairs and "guarding American in-
4
terests" in the entire Shanghai and Yangtze River area.
Leahy's description of life in Shanghai contained in and between
its lines comments which may help to explain why the Chinese masses had
come to hate foreigners, especially the missionaries, and to fight for
their expulsion:
Shanghai from our anchorage off the "Bund" looks like
a European city. The busy commercial part of the foreign
city seems to consist of three streets parallel to the
waterfront and two or three streets at right angles. Most
3
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of the big business houses and the Shanghai Club face the
waterfront on a wide, well-paved street called the "Bund."
I am told that government of the British and American
concessions has been consolidated. The two consuls gen-
eral are the supreme authority. They permit the paying
residents to elect a municipal council which is in the
nature of an advisory body, but which is charged with the
disbursement of municipal funds.
Thousands of natives live in the foreign concessions,
coolies to unload the ships, rickshaw men to take the
place of our street cars, servants for the foreigners and
the prosperous Chinese, and merchants getting the advan-
tage of a stable modern government.
A consul general is the sole arbitor of differences
arising between citizens of his country.
Questions between a native and a foreigner are ad-
judicated in a mixed court consisting of the Consul Gen-
eral and a Chinese official.
In crimes committed by Chinese within the foreign
concessions, and of so serious a nature that the consul
cannot assign an adequate punishment, the accused is
brought before the governor of the Chinese city.
During our visit one such c iminal was executed...
by a method which the Europeans call slow strangulation
that is supposed to last for four days.
This one died the second day and is said to have
been poisoned by his wife.
5
The events and reports of the Boxer Rebellion and the seige of
Shanghai sustained a continual atmosphere of excitement and danger during
the time that Castine was in Shanghai. The social life of the British
colony offered excitement of other kinds. Leahy and his shipmates en-
joyed the heady pleasures of being apparently accepted into the inner
circle of Shanghai's social life. He enjoyed the whirl of teas, dances,
Leahy Diary, February 20, 1900.
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and social gatherings at the Country Club. Even for a provincial young
officer from the midwest, the satisfaction that he had been accepted was
by no means lessened by the fact that many of the people whom he met had
not been accepted by Shanghai society. The grim American missionaries,
especially, had failed to win acceptance by the other members of the
Shanghai foreign community and Leahy noted that most of the missionaries
with whom he had come into contact "are not very attractive."
He was impressed by the fact that "everybody" seemed to drink
whiskey and soda and smoke cigarettes and, except for the missionaries,
seemed to enjoy occasions like the spring race meetings. At these
gatherings, gentlemen riders rode little Chinese ponies, cheered by the
crowd and by "ladies in their new spring gowns, " who cheered the riders
rather than the horses and who were the real center of attraction.
In spite of the threat of small pox, the social whirl continued
to be busy and pleasant. Leahy concluded, "I think it safe to say that
all the officers like Shanghai and hope for a long stay before starting
back to the Philippines. The pleasure of their stay was increased even
more when the unpopular Commander Very left the ship in June and was
relieved by Commander C. G. Bowman.
At the beginning of June, 1900, however, rumors began to be re-
ceived by the Americans to the north in Peking that a native organization
called "Boxers" had risen against the foreigners and murdered several
Leahy Diary, March, 1900.




missionaries. By June 16, they received word that Peking was being be-
sieged by the Boxers and that the Seymour relief column with the American
Navy Captain McCalla, second in command, was on its way to relieve the
European inhabitants in Peking. The Taku forts, near Peking, had been
9
bombarded and captured by the allied European and Japanese forces. From
this point on, with the American and European ships at Shanghai on the
alert for any possible trouble, reports of the Peking uprising were re-
ceived second hand by the vessels at Shanghai, with false reports as
numerous as those which later proved to be valid.
With the troubles in the north increasing, Consul-General Goodnow,
at Shanghai urgently wired the Department of State in June, 1900 to
o
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protest Admiral Kempff 's plan to move the old gunboat Monocacy to Taku.
He complained that only the tiny British gunboat Esk operated between
Shanghai and Ichang, that there was one small Japanese gunboat in the
port. Goodnow asked Captain Bowman of the U.S.S. Castine, still under
repairs and to anchor in the harbor in order to afford better protection
with her guns. At that time, the 60 men which the Castine could have
landed were the only available American military men in the area. The
troops of the friendly Chinese Viceroy were of no use. Consul Goodnow
had observed the Chinese regular troops at "drill, " carrying spears and
12
a few rusty rifles, and in a ludicrous state of training and discipline.
Goodnow again repeated his request for permanent American gunboats, one
at Naking to operate between Naking and Hankow, and one at Shanghai,
13
operating as far as Chinkiang when necessary.
Goodnow was not alone in his apprehension at the lack of signifi-
cant naval power on the Yangtze. In a letter to the editor of the British
newspaper, The North China Herald of June 13, 1900, an irate writer com-
plained that "the utterly unprotected state of the enormous British
Goodnow to Cridler, Despatches from Shanghai, Record Group 59, June 4,
1900, June 8, 1900; U.S., Department of the Navy, "Report of the Secretary
of the Navy," in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1900
(Washington, 1900), pp. 497, 1194-50, lists the Monocacy as being in
Shanghai, China from November 11, 1899 to June 11, 1900, when she sailed
for Tangku, arriving under command of Commander F. M. Wise. She is listed
as then not only capturing several steam launches and tugs, but also as
"operating railroad toward Tientsin."
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interests, both at Shanghai and the Yangtze River, is a grave national
scandal. .. .There ought to be at all times of the year at least one cruiser
of the Bonaventure class cruising between Changliang and Hankow." The
writer complained that the four tiny British gunboats, Woodcock, Wood lark,
Snipe and Esk, capable of only slow speeds, were "in charge" of the en-
tire Yangtze for the British. Since the cruiser Hermione was scheduled
to leave the following week for Wei-Hai-Wei, the writer complained that
there would be no British ships at Shanghai, except for, possibly, the
14
Esk . In another article, "The Scandal in the Far East," the British
writer complained that with 200,000 men fighting in South Africa against
the Boers, the British government expected four "toy" gunboats, with
about eighteen men each, to "protect" 4,000 miles of Yangtze River with
their nine-knot speeds and "six-pounder pop-guns.
Slowly, however, more foreign warships and troops arrived at
Shanghai. On June 17, 1900, the Russian gunboat Otvajny anchored off
the Shanghai Bund and disembarked 55 sailors, who, with Cossacks already
at the Shanghai fort, patrolled the city, day and night.
On June 18, Consul Goodnow wired Secretary of State Hay that "a
Japanese destroyer arrived Chefoo today." On the 22nd he telegraphed
Hay that "three Chinese Armstrong cruisers arrived here today." Goodnow
15
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took the safety measure of successfully requesting the Chinese cruisers
to proceed upstream, beyond Woosung, where they would be of no immediate
threat
.
On July 3, 1900, the Consular Body at Shanghai published a "pro-
clamation. . .to all Viceroys and authorities" from the "Admiral and Senior
Officers in China" proclaiming that the Western nations in China only
intended to use force against the Boxers and against those who were be-
sieging Peking. The joint statement had previously been issued on June
22, by the senior naval officers off Taku, the port city for Peking for
the purpose of calming fears and insuring the cooperation of the Chinese
authorities. The local Viceroys and lesser authorities did attempt to
protect foreigners. The Viceroy of Nanking went as far as to send a letter
to Goodnow praising the Americans for withholding their naval fire during
the allied bombardment of the forts at Taku and expressing gratitude that
18
some American forces were at Shanghai.
While the Europeans cooperated to the north in Tientsin and out-
side of Peking for the purpose of mutual defense against the Boxers, their
cooperation in less threatened ports like Shanghai was flavored by their
Goodnow to Hay, Despatches from Shanghai, Record Group 59, June 22 and
June 23, 1900; William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the
Pacific. 1897-1909 (Austin, Texas, 1958), pp. 96-97, describes the deter-
mination of the European naval officers at Shanghai to prevent the 11
Chinese cruisers and assorted gunboats and torpedo craft which were lo-
cated up the Yangtze from either menacing the foreign naval and trans-
port ships at Shanghai, or from escaping into the open sea.
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traditional contest for local power and spheres of influence. In July
Consul-General Goodnow informed the State Department that the local Ger-
man newspaper Per Ostasiatische Lloyd had reported a promise by the Kaiser
that nine cruisers were being sent to Shanghai. Goodnow again complained
that the few little English gunboats on the river were not enough to pro-
tect American interests and that an American cruiser and gunboat should
be sent. However, he reported that he and Captain Bowman of the U.S.S.
Castine, the only American ship present at that time, had remonstrated
against telegraphic orders from Admiral Kempf f at Taku to evacuate all
non-combatants from Shanghai. Bowman insisted that such action was as
yet unnecessary, and would probably cause a panic. Admiral Kempf f then
19
gave Commander Bowman discretionary authority to delay evacuation.
In early August, the pace of foreign competition at Shanghai in-
creased when the British Admiral Seymour asked his government for 3,000
troops. His act triggered a series of countering moves by the French,
Germans and Austrians, all of whom started procedures for getting more
of their troops to Shanghai in order to protect their own interests.
Consul-General Goodnow telegraphed the Department of State and mentioned
the 1,200 Americans then in Shanghai and their "large interests" there.
He reminded the Department that the little gunboat Castine plus the
Princeton, which had arrived on August 2nd, could together land only
19
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about 120 men and requested more American military support at Shanghai.
The powers at Shanghai, in spite of their shared danger from the
Chinese rebels, and their mutual military cooperation against the Chinese
at Peking and elsewhere, continued their political power struggles in
the Shanghai area. The British plan to land thousands of troops was at
first opposed by the other powers, who feared British long-range inten-
tions in the area. The British, on their side, indignantly denied that
the importation of their troops implied any intention of seeking an in-
21
creased sphere of influence. On August 15, the British in turn were
agitated when the French newspaper Echo de Chine reported that the Consul
General of French Indo-China had decided to send to Shanghai a battalion
of French infantry and a battalion of Annamite Trailleurs, plus a battery
22
of artillery.
In August, the British community in Shanghai was further dejected
by the imminent departure of the transports with Indian troops which had
been originally scheduled for Shanghai, but which were then to be sent
20
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north to Wei-Hai-Wei. To the great joy of the English, however, the trans-
ports were recalled to Shanghai and on August 22, 1900, the 30th Bombay
Infantry disembarked in Shanghai. They proudly struck up "The Campbell's
are Coming" with an authentic lilt which made it hard for the delighted
Englishmen to believe that "the pipers were sons of India." They were
followed in a few days by the arrival of the tough little fighters, the
world-famous Gurkhas, to the great pride and relief of the British com-
23
munity in Shanghai.
At Shanghai the Castine and Bowman thus found themselves in the
center of an international power struggle in which the German forces in-
sisted that the British did not have hegemony over Shanghai and the
Yangtze region. The powers had cooperated, however, against the common
danger of a possible Boxer uprising in Shanghai or of warlike actions
on the part of the numerous Chinese naval vessels. The allied Admirals
agreed to leave the Chinese ships alone as long as they did not attempt
24
to leave the river. On board the Castine Leahy noted that:
Five Chinese warships are in the river three miles below
us. They will probably remain there because the "un-
daunted" guards the river mouth and if they come this way
we will be assisted by the two little British gunboats in
giving them a suitable reception. 25
He continued:
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It looks a little as though there may be trouble here in
Shanghai later. We have in the river now one Dutch
cruiser, the "Holland," one German cruiser, "Gif Ion,
"
two Japanese gunboats, three British gunboats and one
British destroyer, "Hart," and the Castine.
The British cruisers, "Bonaventure" and "Undaunted" are
at Woosong, where there is a Chinese fort and some
soldiers.
...Additional Ships have arrived. One Dutch cruiser,
a French cruiser and a French gungoat have come in and
the U.S.S. Princeton is at Woosong. We expect the
latter to relieve us after which it is said that we may
go up the Yangtze River. 26
Leahy described the plan of local Shanghai defense which the powers had
agreed upon:
Japanese sailors would protect the Pootung section;
British sailors Foochow Creek and Hongkew, Civilian
volunteers would defend the British and French con-
cessions, and the Americans were to protect some mis-
sionaries located outside of the native city.
However, Leahy realistically considered, with three thousand Chinese
troops in the city and fifteen hundred more in an arsenal near to the
American defensive area; that:
If a real uprising occurs and the soldiers join as they
did at Tientsin we will not last very long. We are
counting on a probability that any uprising will be in
the nature of a mob, which we should be able to handle
with our machine guns. The dangerous and not unlikely
possibility is organized opposition by Chinese troops. ^'
Leahy noted the charade carried out by western nations at Shanghai
in the face of what seemed imminent danger from the local Boxers or the
Chinese Government naval and military forces. With their eyes on long-
9fi
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range political advantage, the "Allies" maneuvered to delay the arrival
of each other's troops in Shanghai before the arrival of their own. From
the deck of the Castine the entire affair seemed farcical:
Many people think that the trouble will center here
after Peking is taken. No reason for this opinion is
apparent, but the large naval force assembling here is
an indication that European powers, especially Great
Britain, do not intend to take any changes of being un-
prepared.
It has been said that two regiments of British
Indian troops will be landed here to defend the city
and that no other nation will land troops.
The French Consul-General requested his government
to send a force and the British local officials pro-
tested, for what reason or on what grounds I do not know.
British residents were pleased with the idea that their
soldiers would arrive first anyway and have the posses-
sion which is nine points of the law, until they woke
up one morning to find that the French concession pa-
trolled by a detachment of Anamite Trailleurs from
Southern Asia, which the French Consul General must
have had concealed up his sleeve. 28
August 14th. A shipload of Indian British troops
arrived today and according to press reports they are
not to be landed because of protests made by the
French and American Consulates.
The political situation is quite beyond my under-
standing but this tuning up of the powers is likely
to end in a noisy concert before China settles down
to business again.
The newspapers are attacking everybody who
might be responsible for the failure of British
troops to land, and the French and American Consuls
General are getting most of the hammering. I do
not see any reason for us to get mixed up in the
row.
August 20th. British troops which came into
port and went out again have returned and are now
28




landing and going into camp in Hongkew the American con-
cession. It is said that the French are going to land
more soldiers and that our Consulate had asked for some.
It is difficult to imagine what they will use them for
unless it is to fight each other.
...I visited the British camp site finding two
regiments, Gurkhas, and Bombay infantry. The famous
Gurkha of Kipling is a little man who does not look
formidable and who certainly does look dirty....The
Bombay Infantry soldiers are quartered very much the
same as are the Gurkhas. They are large, better
looking men, if their fighting record is not nearly
as good as that of their smaller countrymen. 29
While Leahy's little Castine was enmeshed in the international
intrigues and pleasures of Shanghai, to the north in and around Peking,
major American Naval and Marine and Army forces were being drawn deeper
into the Boxer catastrophe. On August 4, 1900, a combined force of 18,000,
including 2,500 American troops started to fight its way to Peking. On
August 14, the city fell before the combined British, American and
lf 30Japanese assaults.
Following the fall of Peking and the collapse of the Boxer Rebel-
lion, international rivalry for spheres of influence continued unabated.
The Japanese, seeing the successful British landing at Shanghai and con-
tinued Russian encroachment into Manchuria, apparently decided to seize
Amoy. In the scramble by western powers and Japan for concessions in
China, Japan had obtained China's commitment that Fukien province,
29
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opposite Japan's new holding of Formosa, would not be ceded to a third
power, a concession which Japan treated as a de facto recognition by China
of Japan's paramount interest in that province. Amoy, located just off
the coast of Fukien province boasted a port which was of great commercial
and trading value to Japan. In addition, Atnoy offered an invaluable naval
and military operational and supply base just off the coast of China and
31
backed by the Japanese-held island of Formosa.
In August 1900, the Japanese, under pretext that a Japanese temple
had been burned by a local mob, landed troops at Amoy to "prevent mob
violence." This move was vigorously protested by the English and German
consuls. The American Consul, Anson Burlingame Johnson, was understandably
almost hysterically indignant, since he, as a member of the local foreign
volunteer defense corps, was concerned with opposing both violence and
- A • • 32unwarranted invasion.
At Amoy, Consul Johnson had led a harried existence
from the day he took over the duties of American consul in June, 1897.
As soon as he inspected his new post, the efficient Johnson reported that
31
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the affairs of the office of the Consul were in unsatisfactory condition
and forced his predecessor, D. E. Kemfer, to remain to get affairs in
33
order before his departure. In addition to his constant attempts to
make his office more efficient and to secure supplies and some local
Chinese clerical help, Johnson soon found that his greatest concern was
to counter the constant attempts of the Japanese to increase their in-
fluence over Amoy. He reported that Japanese mineral surveying expe-
ditions were on the island and that the Japanese were aggressively at-
tempting to gain control of a disproportionate amount of key waterfront
property in Amoy harbor. Johnson emphasized that if the U.S. government
"contemplates taking charge of the Philippines either temporarily or
permanently" ...that Amoy would be a key port of entry and trade for
34
the Philippines.
In March 1899, Johnson was able, with the help of the Chinese
Taotai (local representative of the Chinese government) to delay Japanese
takeover of the harbor lands. He reported that his unusual influence
with the local Chinese officials was due mainly to his having established
an Anglo-Chinese college, the Tungwen Institute, on the island with funds
which he had raised from wealthy Chinese donors. Only this special in-
fluence prevailed to encourage the Taotai to resist the Japanese demands,
33
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which were put forth with the moral help of a Japanese warship which had
35
"happened" to enter the harbor of Amoy.
Johnson emphasized to the Chinese and their Viceroy that America
did not desire any "special discrimination" in her favor, but that she
did not desire the alienation of any large portion of the land of the
port by the Japanese or other nations. He did take advantage of the
discussions to obtain several leases along the waterfront from New York
tea firms and for the American Consulate. Although the Japanese ulti-
mately managed to obtain one piece of waterfront property, Johnson re-
36
ported that it was limited in area and far from desirable.
The Japanese, jealous of Johnson's influence with the Chinese offi-
cials, finally established their own Chinese college. Their efforts in-
cluded impressive opening ceremonies and the gathering of several men-
of-war in the harbor of Amoy. Nevertheless, the Japanese could not get
the cooperation of Johnson's local Chinese friends for either moral or
37
financial support.
In July, 1900 upon the start of the Boxer troubles, the Consular
Body at Amoy met to form a plan of local defense for the little foreign
35
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colony on the harbor island of Kulangsu. Johnson was chosen as the Chair-
man of the "Committee of Three on Defense" and set about obtaining defen-
sive arms for the strongly built American and Japanese embassies. He
soon established a "rifle club" and practice sessions. The local Taotai
also cooperated by providing troops to help defend and to maintain order
in the city of Amoy.
Consul Johnson was relieved to see the U.S.S. Princeton arrive
and anchor off the United States Consulate in July 1900. In August, how-
ever, Johnson reluctantly gave Captain Knox permission to take the Princeton
39
to aid in calming even more troubled Shanghai.
Trouble in Amoy increased during the month of August with over
twenty chapels and churches being burned in as many days by Chinese rebels.
The new troubles were capped when a temple which had been rented by the
Japanese for their use was burned and they took the incident as a pretext
for landing marines. In spite of the fact that the other foreign Consuls,
the foreign community and the Taotai and other Chinese officials complained
that the fire was very probably a Japanese-rigged incident, the Japanese
Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, July 16, 1900;
Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, July 25, 1900.
39
Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, July 25 and
August 1, 1900; "Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Annual Reports,
1901, Part I, pp. 571-72, lists the busy Princeton as being successively
in Canton, Hongkong, and Swatow, China in July, 1900, arriving at Amoy
on July 21, 1900. She then sailed from Amoy on July 31, 1900, arriving
at Shanghai on August 2 and remaining until November 29, 1900, when she
sailed for Cavite, Philippine Islands; John Ley land, ed., Brassey's Naval
Annual, lists the U.S. Princeton built in 1897, as being 168 feet in
length, of 1,000 tons displacement, and carrying six 4-inch quick-firing
guns, four 6-pounders and two 1-pounders.
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Consul authorized the landing of even more troops and guns. This created
the danger of either a total Japanese coup or an international clash with
possibilities of war.
After consultation with President McKinley, acting Secretary of
State Alvey A. Adee decided to send a ship to corroborate Consul Johnson's
reports and to represent American interests at Amoy. Thus, on August. 28,
1900, Commander Bowman and the Castine received orders to hasten to Amoy
and report on the situation. The Navy Department reminded Bowman that
the United States reserved the right to land troops to protect her citi-
41
zens in case of local failure to do so.
When the Castine arrived at Amoy on August 31, Leahy wrote in his
diary:
There are two British and four Japanese Naval vessels
in port. The situation here is as follows: Japanese ships
landed a large force with artillery and it was assumed that
they intended to hold the place permanently as Japan has
since the China-Japan war advanced a claim to ownership of
this province. When British ships arrived and landed, a
great part of the Japanese returned to their ships. Nobody
seems to know what is likely to happen next.^2
In early September Johnson reported that the "most earnest" efforts
40
Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, August 8, 1900;
Johnson to Hay, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, August 24, 1900;
Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, August 26, 1900;
U.S. Department of State Telegram ceceived August 30, 1900, Johnson told
that the British landed marines and that the Japanese conduct was "unjus-
tifiable"; "The Trouble at Amoy," North-China Herald... and General News,
September 5, 1900.
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Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 101-02.
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Leahy Diary, September 1, 1900.
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of himself, the British Consul, and Captain Bowman of the U.S.S. Castine,
which was by then supporting Johnson at Amoy, had failed to remove the
Japanese. Johnson was convinced that only the presence of the British
and American ships and the cooperation of the Chinese had prevented an
43
open clash with the Japanese.
Consul Johnson cleverly used the presence of the Castine and the
threat landing its small landing party as an implied threat against the
Japanese. By prearrangement with the Chinese Taotai, the British Consul
and the Captain of the British ship, fifty British marines were landed.
This put American Consul Johnson into the much more tenable position of
being able to "demand" the simultaneous withdrawal of both Japanese and
44
British marines on the threat of American landings.
Finally the Japanese backed down and, with the British, withdrew
their Marine forces from the shores of Amoy. By that time nine warships
confronted each other in the small harbor with their guns and embarked
troops: The Japanese Idzima, Takachio Takao ; the British Isis, the U.S.S.
Castine; the Russian Rurik ; the German Tiger, and Schroeder . Another
British ship had left on the day that withdrawal had been agreed upon,
45
and a French cruiser was still on the way.
At Shanghai and again at Amoy, Leahy had seen first hand how
43
Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, September 5, 1900.
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Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, September 5, 1900;
Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, p. 102; "The Japanese Troops
at Amoy, " North-China Herald... and General News, September 5, 1900, tells
of the panic in Amoy and the landing of British troops.
45
Johnson to Hill, Despatches from Amoy, Record Group 59, September 6, 1900;
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relatively junior ship captains like Commander Bowman of the Castine often
found themselves making decisions of long range diplomatic as well as
immediate military importance. Often the little guns and the few dozen
sailors and marines on board an old gunboat would be the sole protection
for the lives and property of thousands of Americans and perhaps Europeans
and the sole guardian of the future strategic and economic interests of
the United States. Just as Admiral Louis Kempff at Taku held massive
interests of the United States in his hands at every decision, so too
Captain Bowman, of the Castine, both at Shanghai and then at Amoy, found
himself almost single-handedly managing incidents which could have meant
47
peace or war for the United States.
Even American gunboats carried Junior Marine Officers plus a few
enlisted men. The forces which carried the rifles and bayonets of
American power were usually composed of both Marine and naval personnel.
46
While the right of Europeans and Americans to be in the colonized foreign
nations or to carry out their business, military or religious schemes
is open to question, there is little doubt as to the efficiency of the
little gunboats and the Navy and Marine team to support them in times
of trouble.
47Milton Offutt, The Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces
of the United States (Baltimore, 1925), pp. 1-16; Frederick Waite, "Some
Elements of International Military Cooperation in the Suppression of the
1900 Anti-foreign Rising in China with Special Reference to the Forces
of the United States," University of Southern California School of Re-
search Studies, number twelve (Los Angeles, 1935), p. 3; Richard W. Leopold,
The Growth of American Foreign Police (New York, 1962), pp. 186-88, 264,
317-18; U.S., Department of the Navy, Regulations for the Government of
the Navy of the United States, 1896 (Washington, 1896), pp. 64-65; U.S.,
Department of the Navy, Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the
United States, 1900 (Washington, 1900), p. 76, authorizes the "Commander
in Chief" (Senior Naval Officer Present) with virtual carte blanche to
protect the "life and property" of American citizens or of American
"interests" personal or corporate.
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During the Spanish American War, 67 vessels carried Marine guards of from
6 to 80 men, for a total of only 2,000 Marines on vessels at sea. The
sailors, therefore, were counted on to provide the loyal and trained hands
who often made up the majority of the riflemen in American landing parties.
In the American armed forces operating in China, especially during
the period of the Boxer Rebellion, the naval landing forces owed as much
to the firepower and spirit of the sailors as they did to the few indis-
pensable Marines. The American warships and these men were the instru-
ments of American power on-the-scene. In addition, due to the problems
of distance and communication, they were as often the de facto instigators
49
of American naval and national policy as they were its tools.
48
W. H. Russell, "The Genesis of FMF Doctrine: 1879-1899," Marine Corps
Gazette (April-July, 1951), pp. 629-30; U.S., Department of the Navy,
"Report of the Commandant of United States Marine Corps, 1900, " in Annual
Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1900 (Washington, 1900), pp.
1098-1115; U.S., Department of the Navy, "Report of the Commandant of
the United States Marine Corps, September 24, 1898," in Annual Reports
of the Navy Department for the Year 1898 (Washington, 1898), p. 827.
49
Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (New York, 1934), p.
316, notes that, unlike the Army, the Navy "had the world for its range,"
and that naval officers were often involved in the formulation of naval
policy. Beard went so far as to feel that naval officers had been "mainly
responsible" for determining national policy in the Pacific; Braisted,
United States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 3, vii-viii, felt that diplomatic
historians too often have ignored the role of the Navy in the formulation
of foreign policy. Braisted feels that, while Naval men did not actually
dictate American foreign policy, naval matters were often the determining
factors in the formulation of American foreign policy in the Pacific during
the years of 1897-1909. Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific,
pp. 15-16, tells that, in the late 19th century cruisers and gunboats of
the small American navy were almost totally concerned with protecting the
lives and property of American missionaries and merchants, especially in
China and Korea. The American naval officers were often the best and
most available on-station reporters for the State Department. In addi-
tion, although they were seldom briefed, and were only faintly aware of
the massive changes in the international political situation brought about
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Leahy's commanding officer, Commander Bowman, and his little gun-
boat Castine, within the space of several months, almost single-handedly
represented the United States and the vital interests, lives and property
of all Americans in both the Shanghai area and during the short-lived
but critical Amoy crisis of 1900. When the Castine finally left Amoy
on September 10, 1900, to take part in suppressing the Filipinos under
Aguinaldo, Commander Bowman was convinced that the Japanese, in the ab-
sence of tangible American and British power represented by the naval
ships and marines, would move into Amoy if given the smallest pretext.
by Japan's defeat of China in 1895, they were often the effective on-scene
diplomats, usually ready to defend "American," "Foreign," or "Western"
interests as a whole against any native threat or resistance. Anthony
Preston and John Major, Send a Gunboat (London, 1967), p. 3, define "gun-
boat diplomacy" as "the use of warships in peacetime to further a nation's
diplomatic and political aims." The authors chronicle the British utili-
zation of "gunboat diplomacy," especially during the nineteenth century,
and against weak, non-white nations.
Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, pp. 95, 103.

CHAPTER 5
THE PHILIPPINES AND AFTER- -YEARS OF GROWTH
By the beginning of the year 1899, the United States, newly con-
fident of her strength after her decisive defeat of Spain, set about to
carry out another of Admiral Mahan's precepts. This policy—reserved
for those areas where there was no big-nation opposition to American
power--was one of complete American dominance.
In January, 1899, the members of McKinley's Paris Peace Commission,
on McKinley's instructions, procured a peace treaty which meant the virtual
subjugation of the Philippines by the United States. This made two things
inevitable: that the United States would do all in its power to re-sub-
jugate the Philippines, under the screen of words like "Duty and Destiny",
and that the Filipinos would have to fight the Americans if they were to
have any hope of establishing an independent government. On February
4, 1899, just one day before a scheduled Senate vote on the Paris Treaty,
soldiers of the 1st Nebraska Volunteers shot and killed two Filipino
soldiers, triggering a general conflict. The news of this outbreak was
Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother How the United States Purchased and
Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century's Turn (Garden City, N.Y.,
1961); pp. 152-73; William J. Pomeroy, American Neo-Colonialism Its









all that was needed to gain Senate approval of the treaty by one vote.
To the surprise of the American would-be conquerors, Aguinaldo's
poorly equiped and untrained forces proved to be tough, highly effective
3
fighters. In the face of the furious Filipino resistance to American
conquest, the American Navy, in addition to the Army, was forced to aug-
ment its forces. The Navy's functions included transporting and supply-
ing the ever-increasing outposts throughout the island, and lending gun-
fire support for landing operations and such operations as the taking
of Manila. The Navy's busiest task, however, was the interruption of
the communications, and the supply of arms and supplies to the insurrec-
tionists on the various islands.
Spain, in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty
transferred fifteen small gunboats to the United States. They were taken
over by the Navy and used under their original Spanish names. These and
other American gunboats of shallow draft and of several hundred tons dis-
placement were kept busy between the hundreds of islands of the Philippine
2
Paulo E. Coletta, "Bryan, McKinley and the Treaty of Paris," Pacific
Historical Review, No. 27 (May 1937), p. 139; Paulo E. Coletta, "McKinley
the Peace Negotiations and the Acquisition of the Philippines," Pacific
Historical Review, XXX (1961), pp. 341-50; Pomeroy, American Neo-Colonialism,
pp. 53-60; Wolff, Little Brown Brother, pp. 176, 197, 213-30; U.S. Senate
Document No. 331, part 1, 57 Congress 1st Session, "Affairs in the Philip-
pine Islands," Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the
United States Senate (Washington, 1902), p. 505, General Robert Hughes,
former Provost-Marshall of Manila told of the American escalation as soon
as any firing was reported.
3
U.S. Congress, A Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain,
Senate Document No. 62, 55th Congress 3rd Session (Washington, 1899),
p. 429--"Brief notes by Senor Agoncillo, " tell how Aguinaldo's forces
captured 1,500 Spanish troops and took control of the province of Cavite




Archipelago. This required so many additional officers and crewmen that
in the Spring of 1900, with no major naval power threatening the area,
the Navy deactivated all large vessels in the Philippines, including the
Oregon, which were not serving as flagships and used the released officers
and crews to man the gunboat fleet.
Leahy, who had transferred from the Newark to the Oregon on November
29, 1899, was subsequently transferred to the gunboat Castine in December,
1899. The Castine spent the period from February 1900 to August 28, 1900
in Shanghai, China, during the period of the Boxer Rebellion protecting
American interests. When the ship arrived back at Manila on September
16, 1900, Leahy found that
the war is still on....The insurgents are making just as
much of a fight... as they ever did, except in the vicinity
of our large cities, where our soldiers are too numerous
....The insurgents are adopting civilized methods of war-
fare, such as humane treatment of prisoners and release
on parole, which indicates that their organization is
getting better instead of worse as is usually the case
in an unsuccessful war.
In the Philippines, as was to be the case in every intervention
4
Wolff, Little Brown Brother, p. 316.
Allen to Remey, April 12, 1900, Record Group 45,00 File, in William
Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909
(Austin, 1958), pp. 71-72.
Leahy Diary, December 16, 1899.
Leahy Diary, February 12, 1900 to August 28, 1900. Also see Chapter 4,
"Shanghai and Amoy."
g
Leahy Diary, September 16, 1900.

81
in which he took part, in Asia and Latin America, Leahy found himself
serving in forces opposing popular native independence movements which
were defended by brave, although poorly armed native forces.
While Leahy and his former Navy shipmates were busy manning the
gunboat flotilla, other naval officers--the American Marines— saw little
action during the first part of the American suppression of Aguinaldo's
army. The main body of Marines smarted in inactivity at Cavite. Lieu-
tenant Smedley D. Butler, who had brought a battalion of 300 marines to
the Philippines by a journey which started on the American East coast on
April 13, 1899, was eager for action. Butler, a first Lieutenant of
Company A, under Lieutenant H. C. (later Brigadier General) Haines, spent
his time cheering the sporadic broadside volleys of the old monitor
Monterey, which lay off Cavite, and griping that the 10th Pennsylvania
9
volunteers "hogged the show," while the Marines stayed in the navy yard.
Butler's Marines had one hilarious "non-action" when they were
towed by a ludicrous "gunboat" which had been rigged out of a barge to
take the town of Orani on the northern shore of Manila Bay. After a
comedy of errors on their trip across the bay during which their forward
3-inch gun fell overboard, Butler's men found an empty town and a full
rum shop which made the day worthwhile.
Finally, to the relief of tigers like Butler, the 10th Army
9
Smedley D. Butler, Old Gimlet Eye; The Adventures of Smedley D. Butler
as Told to Lowell Thomas (New York, 1933), pp. 29-31.
Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 31-33.
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volunteers left the area to the Marines. Butler's first major battle
was to help take the heavily defended town of Novaleta, the principal
approach of which was up a narrow causeway under the sights of the enemy's
guns. Novaleta had already cost the Spanish many troops, once a whole
regiment, in an unsuccessful attempt to wrest it from the Filipino de-
fenders. In October, 1899, Lieutenant Colonel G. F. Elliott led his 6
companies of 376 Marines in two columns, supported by the six-inch guns
of the gunboat Petrel . The eighteen year old Lieutenant Butler, command-
ing a company in action for the first time, was "quivering with excitement."
Butler's company, in the lead, was soon pinned down by intense fire, which
crippled his first sergeant. In one of the heroic actions which were
to become his trademark, Butler led a wild attack which ended with the
fall of Novaleta to the Marine and Army columns.
In December, 1899, Butler first encountered Marine Major Littleton
Tazewell Waller, a man who later served with him in interventions "in
every corner of the world" until their last campaign in Haiti in 1917.
Butler, after his first look at the fiery, red-moustachioed Waller, re-
ceived a briefing from the older officers on Waller's outstanding record.
Waller had been in charge of a landing party of American Marines at
Alexandria in 1882, under British Admiral Sir Charles Beresford against
the Egyptians of Arabi Pasha. He had also gained attention for his
outstanding performance in charge of a 5-inch battery of the battleship
Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 33-35; Robert D. Heinl, Soldiers of the





Indiana against the Spanish fleet off Santiago, Cuba in 1898. Butler
13
soon concluded that Waller was "the greatest soldier I have ever known."
The fighting in the Philippines proved to be dirtier, in several
senses of the word, for the Marines then for the Navy. The main Marine
operation fell into two phases, first, fighting on Luzon in 1899. Two
years later, the Marines conducted operations with the Army under General
Jacob M. ("Hell Roaring Jake") Smith whose scorched earth policies sub-
jugated the island of Samar.
12
Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (New York,
1939), pp. 224-45, a detachment of seventy-three Marines, under Captain
H. C. Cochrane and Lieutenant L. W. T. Waller landed at Alexandria to
help keep order and protect the U.S. consulate after the British fleet
had bombarded Alexandria; Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 36-37; Heinl,
Soldiers of the Sea, p. 118, tells of Waller's outstanding performance
off Santiago in 1898, where his Marine gun crew fired 500 rounds of 6-
pounder shells into the fleeing Spanish ships of Admiral Cervera.
13
Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 36-37. Butler later complained that Waller
had not been chosen Commandant of the Marine Corps because "he had not
gone to Annapolis." Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 165, saw political
influence of Pennsylvania's Senator Penrose favoring the politically
well-connected Colonel W. P. Biddle over Waller. Heinl also noted that
Waller never overcame the stigma which he was to carry from his brutal
actions in suppressing the Filipinos on the island of Samar, an action
which took place after Butler had left the area for the United States
and Caribbean duty; Joseph L. Schott, The Ordeal of Samar (New York,
1964), p. 283, tells how some newspapers continued to attack him as
"the butcher of Samar" for twenty years following his court martial for
committing atrocities on Samar--a situation which did not enhance his
chances of becoming Commandant of the Marine Corps. In 1910, when
Waller was a strong contender for the Commandant's job, President Taft,
remembering Waller's record in Samar, among other things, chose Colonel
William Biddle. When Biddle himself retired in 1914, Waller was again
passed over. He finally retired in 1920 at the rank of Major General,
but never became Commandant.

84
By the fall of 1901, it was apparent that the 9th and 17th U.S.
Infantry combined could not overcome the fierce resistance of the Samar
Moro troops. On September 28, 1901, Company C, 9th Infantry had been
14
wiped out except for 26 survivors. In response to the Army's need,
Waller's 315 man battalion was sent to Samar. After sailing separately
to Samar with Rear Admiral Frederick Rogers in a converted yacht, Waller
was joined off Samar by General Smith, who told him of his scorched earth
policies. Smith told Waller, "I want no prisoners. I wish you to burn
and kill; the more you burn and kill, the better it will please me."
Good to his orders, Waller had, by November 10, burned 255 houses, killed
39 Filipinos and captured 18 more.
In November, 1901, Waller's battalion penetrated the wilderness
14
Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp. 121-23; Schott, Ordeal of Samar, pp.
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Sea, p. 123; Manila Times, April 9, 9902, tells of Smith's order; Reuben
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racism which the white American soldiers brought with them to the Philippines.
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American soldiers, "nigger" and "dago."
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85
of Samar in search of the guerrilla leader, Vicente Lukban. After the
most severe hardships and a fierce battle, Waller's battalion, in three
columns led by Waller and Captain David D. Porter and Hiram Bearss
stormed the Filipino positions. Bearss and Porter later received the
Congressional Medal of Honor for their part in the action.
By 1901, American military actions and policies in Samar had de-
generated, under the supervision of General Smith, into a virtual ex-
tirpation policy against the Filipinos. General Smith, who had risen
through the ranks during the Civil War had later learned to deal with
"savages" by methods of extermination against Apaches during the Indian
wars. On December 24, 1901, Smith issued his Circular Number Six, which
blamed the resistance of Samar on the upper-class Filipinos and gave
virtually carte-blanche to his lesser officers and troops to brutalize
the Filipino populace to whatever extent necessary to force them out of
the war. The official record is filled with the stories of burnings,
torture and rapine conducted by the American Army and Marine forces in
19
the continuing struggle to subjugate the Filipinos.
To complete the picture of the oppression, on December 13, 1901,
a policy of retaliatory murder of hostages was instituted by General
J. Franklin Bell during the Batangas Campaign:
Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 124; Schott, Ordeal of Samar, pp. 86-96.
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Batangas, P. I. December 13, 1901
The Brigade Commander. . .announces for the informa-
tion of all concerned that whenever prisoners or unarmed
or defenseless Americans or natives friendly to the United
States Government are murdered or assassinated for poli-
tical reasons, and this fact can be established, it is
his purpose to execute a prisoner of war under the authority
contained in Sections 59 and 148 (of Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field).
The prisoners of war will be selected by lot from... offi-
cers or prominent citizens. 20
Waller overstepped himself when, on January 20, 1902, he conducted
a "hanging court" of his own on a party of Filipino bearers and guides
21
who had been accused of plotting against a party of his Marines.
Regretably for Waller and his accomplice in these murders, Lieutenant
J. A. Day, General Adna Chaffee heard of the murders, as did Secretary
of War Elihu Root, who was busily trying to defend the reputation of the
Army against a storm of stories of American atrocities in the Philippines.
After conducting his own investigation of the already recorded and tried
Philippine atrocities, and the new Waller affair, the angry Root sent
Senator Lodge in February 17, 1902, a list which showed that 44 atrocities
had been tried. Of these, even guilty pleas had resulted in little more
than reprimands. The one officer who had been given five years for wanton
man-slaughter of a war prisoner had his sentence commuted and received
a light fine and loss of 35 places in the seniority list. Root ordered
General Chaffee to court martial Waller and any other perpetrators of
20
U. S. Senate, Document No. 33, part 11, 57th Congress, 1st Session,
pp. 1548, 1613-1619.
21




atrocities against the Filipinos.
In the event, both Waller and Day were acquitted. Their senior,
General Smith was court martialed for the atrocities which he had fos-
tered. He was "admonished," and ordered to be retired from the service
by President Roosevelt. Major Glenn, "expert in the water cure" was
court martialed and "admonished, " which did not prevent him from later
23
rising to Brigadier General.
As indicated on her itinerary, Leahy's ship the Castine left Cebu
to sail for Santa Cruz, on the island of Marenduque to aid in the search
for a missing party of American soldiers. When the Castine arrived in
port on 19 October, 1900, the U.S.S. Bennington and U.S.S. Villalobos
were already there, along with 1,300 American troops who had been landed
to search for the 52 missing men. Although the insurgents released the
Americans, one of whom had been killed in battle and several wounded,
they did not obey an American ultimatum to give over all of their arms.
Leahy then joined with the three vessels and 1,300 troops in a hunt for
the insurgents. On one dark night he took several boats ashore loaded
with a half company of men. Leahy did not enjoy the trip in night "as
dark as the inside of a hat," and "filled with odors of the tropical
24jungle," but all returned safely. The arms were not recovered but
22
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Leahy noted that "the trail of burned houses left by our soldiers will
probably discourage future activity by the natives of this little
25
island." " The conditions on the island were not comfortable, and
Leahy and the other shipmates longed for "a place where ice and fresh
food can be obtained." He was grateful, however, to have "duty where
there is some active service even if in the Navy it is limited to acting
as an occasional transport for soldiers."
At Iloilo, the Castine was assigned the duty of surveying the
area for a possible navy yard site and Leahy soon found himself setting
up markers and levels from morning to dark along the shores and jungles
of Iloilo. He gained an acquaintance for sorts with bands of chattering
monkeys, lizards "four or five feet long," and ants so fierce that on
one occasion they left his hands and face covered with blood after his
26
hasty retreat.
On January 1, 1901, Leahy recorded that he feared capture because
he had heard that the Padre of Molo, who had been taken prisoner, had
been tortured to death by the Americans in search of information. Saddened,
he mused
Such things make one doubt that this is the beginning
of the twentieth century. What has become of the knights
of our childhood stories, who delighted in battling with
foemen worthy of their steel, who treated vanquished
enemies as honored guests and who away from battle were
gentle souls.
25
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26
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89
One used to wonder why all the fuss about Chevalier
Bayard, "sans peur et sans reproach, " who when dying
gave half his cup of water to a wounded soldier.
I have been taught from childhood that it is the
duty of every soldier to forget his own troubles in
those of his comrades, to fight with courage while the
fight is on, and when it is finished, to make less
bitter the defeat of the vanquished.
My father was that kind of soldier, but in this
war there are few sans peur et sans reproach.
The old priest of Molo died under torture be-
cause he knew the whereabouts of some insurgent money.
Men are shot because they may once have been armed or
may have been going to be armed.
I have heard officers and gentlemen tell of how
they had prisoners shot because they knew them to be
bad characters and knew that a military court would not
convict them . [Italics supplied.]
I have heard them tell stories intended to be
humorous of the actions of prisoners while undergoing
torture by the "water cure."
...they are successful soldiers, but they are not
good knights. One doubts if there ever were more than
a few good ones outside the story books. ^7
The capture of the guerilla leader, Emilio Aguinaldo by Brigadier
General Frederick Funston, aided by the gunboat Vicksburg in March, 1901
began the slow demise of the guerilla movement, although both fighting
and American atrocities continued. Leahy's revulsion at American
atrocities stands in stark contrast to the attitude of many of his mates
in the Philippines. Lieutenant (later Rear Admiral) Yates Stirling,
in command of a small gunboat at the time was more typical of
27
Leahy Diary, January 1, 1901. The brutal attitude of many Americans
toward the Filipinos contrasts with the gallant treatment of captured
Spaniards both in Cuba and the Philippines. See Admiral Thomas C. Hart,
The Reminiscenses of Thomas Hart (New York, Columbia University Oral
History Project, 1972), p. 10, and Admiral Alfred W. Johnson, The Remi-
niscenses of Admiral Alfred W. Johnson (New York, Columbia University
Oral History Project, 1972). Both Admirals Hart and Johnson noted in




the American attitude towards the Filipinos. Sterling proudly recorded
that, as a young officer in command of the gunboat Paragua, he had helped
to round up Filipinos for the notorious Major E. F. Glenn, who then ad-
ministered the "water cure" torture to obtain information from the cap-
tives. Stirling rationalized the torture of Filipinos with the unproveable
claim that "the Major discovered and prevented the planned massacres of
many of our soldiers. Of course, the method used was uncivilized and
..28
cruel, but war is both of these.
Stirling also told of assisting Brigadier General Robert Hughes
in the "pacification" of Samar. Because of the notoriety of the "water
cure" treatment, General Hughes decreed that "There would be no written
instructions of any kind.... No high-ranking officer dared to fly in the
face of Providence." Stirling and the crew of the Paragua seemed to enjoy
their work of destruction. He spoke in almost glowing terms of one foray
on the Gumbara River in which "We certainly did a good job on the river.
After we finished up, there was very little left to speak of. We burned
the villages; in fact every house for two miles from either bank was
destroyed by us. We killed their livestock: cattle, pigs, chickens,
and the valuable work animals, the carabaos."
28
Yates Stirling, Sea Duty, The Memoirs of a Fighting Admiral (New York,
1939), pp. 61-67; Schott, Ordeal of Samar, pp. 28-29, 80, tells how Major
Edwin F. Glenn, Judge Advocate of the Department of the Visayas, was a
"leading exponent" of the so-called "water cure"—a torture would con-
sisted of filling a victim's insides with water from a hose and then
punching his stomach and supposedly forcing him to divulge information
in his agony. Although Glenn was court martialed for such activities,




Although the cocky Stirling was impressed with Leahy's adventure
of being attacked while erecting a signal on shore, he did not like
Leahy's Commanding Officer, Commander C. G. Bowman. Bowman, as Senior
Naval officer in the area, had criticized Stirling's eagerness to join
the Army forces in destructive raids on Filipino villages. For this,
Stirling, who was something less than loyal to his Navy superiors,
never forgave Bowman.
Stirling's calloused and racist attitudes toward "natives," like
Leahy's much more sensitive feelings, remained with him throughout his
career. As Commandant of all naval forces at Hawaii from 1930 to 1933,
he devoted much of his time and energy combating the local "Japanese
menace" and worrying about the dangers of "racial mixing" in Hawaii.
Like most racists a confirmed paternalist, he could never believe that
the Filipinos desired independence from the Americans. Stirling, as late
as 1939, felt that "under American leadership they have prospered, and
as a people the Filipinos are happier and more contented than they have
ever been in their history.... I do not believe the intelligent people
29
of the Philippines want independence....
The shooting incident which had impressed Stirling had occurred
on January 20, 1901, while Leahy was temporarily assigned to the gunboat
Castine on a shore signal building trip around the island of Iloilo.
During that mission Leahy and his party came under fire from a group of
Filipinos at a distance of 200 yards. Leahy later noted that only
the poor marksmanship of the enemy saved his party. After
29
Stirling, Sea Duty, pp. 67-68, 74-79; Leahy Diary, November 21, 1901,
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a quick withdrawal, he returned ashore the next day with a Colt automatic
weapon and 12 men, but only found the remains of the Filipino ambushcade
and their small hut. Leahy's party then started a cat-and-mouse game
as the native troops systematically destroyed the Americans' signal
markers as soon as they were built. The Filipinos left behind notes in
Spanish which were pathetic only because the Americans would not heed
them. The notes generally said that:
You have proclaimed our liberty to the nations of the
world. Then let us have it and peace will be with us.
More humanity and less oppression is the cry coming
from the mouths of the ten million inhabitants of these
islands. 30
On February 3rd, the Castine and the Leyte, after bombarding the
shore, landed two boatloads of sailors and Marines, one boat under the
command of Leahy and the other under the command of a surgeon, Dr. Curl.
After rescueing Dr. Curl and a four-man scouting party from another
Filipino ambush, Leahy noted, somewhat with awe, that the brave Dr. Curl:
...told me that when walking through an open space ahead
of his men he felt some dirt strike his face, heard the
report of a gun, and slid for cover behind a tree, all
at practically the same time.
He saw and fired at with his pistol one man at a
distance of 150 yards just as the natives opened fire
from a line about a hundred yards long, extending across
in front of him.
His little party. . .waiting for an attack when we
arrived
.
Dr. Curl is a good surgeon and an excellent surveying
officer, but he says there are innumerable places where
one may get shot without being seriously damaged, and is
very careless about his own safety.
30
Leahy Diary, February 1st, 1901.
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The captain of the Castine, was not agreeable to Leahy's own brave
offer to take a party of sailors and Marines to "clean up the shore line
,31
in this vicinity.
During the first week in February, 1901, Leahy got a chance to
observe an example of the American extermination policy. General Smith
had decreed that on the Island of Samar, "the enemy" would include all
32
males over 10 years of age. Leahy wrote:
...the 39th Infantry. . .had been two days in the swamp
and had seen only three natives whom they had taken pri-
soner.
...the one prisoner that I saw was a very much frightened
child about fifteen years old. While I was there the Colonel,
I think his name was Allen, told the boy that he was a bri-
gand and that he would be shot tomorrow.
The prisoner wept, protested that he was not a brigand,
was so visibly terrified, and was altogether such a pitiful
sight that I took my leave and returned to the Leyte.
During that day we followed the path of our soldiers,
by smoke from burning houses, and the next morning at day-
light we heard heavy intermittent rifle fire and returned
to the Leyte. . . .33
Leahy also saw the surrender of the rebel General Delgado in a
scene which shows that apparently only hopeless odds against the well-
armed and ruthless American forces, rather than poor moral forced the
Fi 1 ip ino surrender
:
Before our departure I was fortunate enough to see
the surrender of the insurgent General Delgado, at Jaro,
a small town two miles from Iloilo, the general's home
and the place from which his personal guard was recruited.
31
Leahy Diary, February 3, 1901.
32
Manila Times, April 9, 1902.
33
Leahy Diary, February 1, 1901.
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It was an interesting spectacle.
Leading the column was a small party of our scouts
in blue and Khaki mounted on small native horses and
looking like the tireless workers that they were. Then
came Delgado and his staff, followed by the little
native army of about two hundred rifles, marching in
good order, going through the manual of arms in a way
that showed the effect of drill, and on the whole look-
ing like a very serviceable body of native troops.
They did not look starved, or worn out as one might
expect, but seemed in every way well-equipped for active
service where a native can live on the natural products
of the tropical shore at all seasons of the year.
Army canteens and Army rifles were proudly carried
by a number of the insurgents, trophies of surprise
attacks and the driving in of our pickets.
The returning natives were received by their towns-
people with enthusiasm and they seemed happy to get home
in spite of the fact that they represented a failure,
and that two years ago they started out to obtain their
"sacred liberty" or die in the attempt.34
On 12 March, 1901, the Castine turned over the duty to the U.S.S.
Albany, and proceeded to Cavite convoying the Leyte, which had lost her
rudder during landing operations on the island. On March 28, 1901, while
the Castine was also undergoing repairs, news arrived of the capture of
Aguinaldo by General Funston. Leahy wrote:
March 28th, 1901, the U.S.S. Vicksburg came into
port, carrying Aguinaldo, President of the insurgent govern-
ment, who had been captured by Brigadier General Funston,
U.S. Volunteers. The capture is said to have been effected
by a most ingenious and daring ruse which was planned and
executed by General Funston, who has accomplished what was
the dream of every ambitious subaltern in the islands.
It is supposed that he will be rewarded with a commis-
sion in the regular army. 35
For a short while, Leahy enjoyed command of the tiny, captured
Spanish gunboat Miravales, which was armed with two 3 -pounder guns and
*34~
35
Leahy Diary, March 12, 1901.
'
Leahy Diary, March 17, 18, and 28, 1901.
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2-one-pounders plus two machine guns and a complement of 23 men. The
short experience was not pleasant for Leahy aside from the thrill of
having his own command. He had trouble in getting supplies for his small
command and in handling the motley crew, which was the dregs collected
from larger ships. After one altercation between the Chinese cook and
a "bad man of the crew," the Chinese cook was badly beaten and Leahy put
the renegade sailor on five days bread and water. Leahy laconically
recorded that "the Chinaman disappeared and after some delay another
„
37
one was sent to us.
Leahy's command experience was cut short through no fault of his
own when he grounded his ship while entering the poorly charted harbor
of Cebu. The U.S.S. Pampana helped to float the vessel free at high tide,
and Leahy proceeded to Iloilo. At Iloilo he was excited to learn from
the senior officer, Captain Craig, that his ship was scheduled to be sent
to Samar where its assistance was needed. Prior to being assigned to
Samar, however, Leahy's ship lost her port propellor while on the way
to salvage the grounded gunboat Mondoro, and ended up being towed to
38
Cavite by the Austria for repairs. Rather than wait for the extended
repairs, Leahy transferred to the U.S.S. Glacier, serving as Chief Engineer
of a decrepit engineering plant, and by the middle of August was on his
Leahy Diary, April 28, May 1, 1901.
37
Leahy Diary, June 2, 1901.
38
Leahy Diary, June 5, 1901.
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way to Australia on board the. Glacier via the colorful island of
Zamboanga
.
On board the Glacier, Leahy had the opportunity to visit many
ports of Australia and the Philippines, travelling through the country-
side whenever time allowed. In December, 1902, Leahy, who had been pro-
moted to Junior Lieutenant on July 1, 1902 was stationed on the U.S.S.
Pensacola at Yerba Buena Island at San Francisco. With no war threatening
the United States, he settled into the pleasant and busy peace-time ro-
40
tat ion between sea and shore duty. He passed his examination for full
Lieutenant in January, 1904 and married Louise Tennant Harrington in
February. After his honeymoon Leahy returned to the new cruiser Tacoma,
on board which he sailed to ports on the American West Coast and Hawaii.
When the Tacoma sailed for the East Coast on July 2, 1904, he trans-
ferred to the U.S.S. Boston and thus managed to stay in San Francisco
41
near his new bride.
From October, 1904 until February, 1905, the Boston spent a hot
and boring period at Panama where there had been rumor of impending trouble,
While there, Leahy came down with a severe case of yellow fever during
an epidemic which killed several of his shipmates. He and several other
convalescents were finally shipped back to America in March, 1905, one
42
month after the Boston had returned to San Francisco.
39
Leahy Diary, July 15, September 1, August 12, 1901.
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Leahy Diary, August, 1901 to December, 1902.
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Leahy Diary, December, 1902 to September, 1904.
42
Leahy Diary, September, 1904 to March, 1905.
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Once again Leahy underwent the peacetime schedule of training and
visits to the ports of Hawaii and the West Coast. In October, 1905, the
Boston again visited Panama, where Leahy visited with the famous doctor
William Crawford Gorgas, who had helped to save his life when he suffered
from yellow fever. The Boston returned to San Francisco in January, 1905,
in time for her crew to take part in the firefighting and rescue work
during the San Francisco fire and earthquake. In addition to his offi-
cial duties during the crisis, Leahy helped save the house and belongings
of his in-laws from the raging fire. In September, 1906, Leahy was still
on board the Boston when she was grounded on Pea Pod Rock in the Straits
of Rosario. Unlike the grounding experiences by Leahy and many of his
contemporaries in the little gunboat flotilla in the Philippines in 1900,
this grounding was both avoidable and expensive. Although Captain V. L.
Coffman of the Boston was found "not to blame" by an investigating board
conducted under the forgiving rules of those times, the grounding offered
A3
Leahy an object lesson in the need for care in navigation and piloting.
The Boston completed repairs at Bremerton Washington and again
commenced her schedule of training and post visits. In February, 1907,
Leahy and the rest of the wardroom officers of the Boston were relieved
to hear that a projected tour of duty to check possible unrest in San
Salvador would be taken by the Chicago instead of the Boston . Leahy noted
that, "If a revolution does happen in San Salvador the Chicago will do
nothing but lie off an open coast and try to intimidate the belligerents
into letting alone American citizens and their property.
43
Leahy Diary, March, 1905 to October, 1906.
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On February 22, 1907, Leahy was detached from duty on board the
Boston and ordered to instructor duty at the United States Naval Academy.
During a quiet two years at the Academy, he sharpened his own knowledge
while profiting from the fact that, as an Academy Instructor, he was auto-
matically marked as one of the inner elite of naval officers. On 14
August, 1909, he received orders to report to the U.S.S. California, at
San Francisco for duty as navigating officer under Captain (later Admiral)
45
H. T. Mayo, who had relieved Captain Coffman in August. In September,
the California as part of the 8-ship American armored cruised squadron,
sailed for Japan via Hawaii and Manila. The high point of Leahy's visit
to Japan was seeing Admiral Togo at a large reception, "a very ordinary
46
looking Jap with all his gold lace and decoration."
In February, 1910, the California returned to San Francisco and
recommenced her training target practice and visit schedule on the American
coast. During 1910, the California sailed between Chile, Hawaii, San
Diego and San Francisco on a round of training cruises. In January, 1911,
Rear Admiral Chauncy Thomas, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet chose
Leahy to be on his staff as fleet ordnance officer. In March of that year
the Pacific Fleet was mobilized in the possibility that it would be used
to intervene in the Mexican Revolutionary troubles. An Army detachment
of 1,800 men under Brigadier General Tasker Bliss was encamped at San
Diego, 500 Marines were brought into the area, and the fleet formed a
naval brigade of 1,300 men. However, the successes of Francisco Madero
45
Leahy Diary, February, 1907 to August, 1909.
46
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and the abdication of President Diaz removed the necessity for a U.S.
Force on the border. Leahy noted that, "for us this Mexican War was
ended."47
After several months of cruises on the West Coast, on October,
1911, the California and other fleet units sailed to San Francisco, to
take part in a fleet review in honor of President William Howard Taft.
Leahy was detailed as temporary aide to Taft, an assignment which did
not particularly please him. The man who was later to be the first Chair-
man of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and Personal Representative
of both Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman observed of
his four days of aide duty for Taft that, "While it was interesting and
instructive to be attached to the President's personal staff I do not
think a permanent assignment to such duty could be either agreeable or
valuable.
On 21 April, at Hawaii Rear Admiral W. E. H. Southerland relieved
Admiral Thomas as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, bringing with
him a staff of officers who would take part with Leahy in the American
49
occupation of Nicaragua. Once again the California sailed for Manila
and the Far East. After three months in the heat of Manila, the California,
in company with the South Dakota returned to California via Shanghai,
Tsingtao, and Yokahama, Japan, arriving at San Francisco on August 15,
1912. Several weeks after their return, a message arrived on board the
47
Leahy Diary, February and March, 1911.
48
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49
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California ordering Admiral Southerland and the California to proceed





Leahy Diary, August, 1912.

CHAPTER 6
NICARAGUA, HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO
William D. Leahy's early career led him repeatedly to the Caribbean
and Central American region. He first went to Cuba in 1898 during the
Spanish American War, then to Panama in 1904-05, and Nicaragua in 1912.
He later participated in the occupation of Haiti in 1915, and of the
Dominican Republic in the following year. During his first contacts with
Spanish- speaking "natives," in Cuba in 1898, the Philippines in 1899-1901,
and in Panama, Leahy developed ambivalent attitudes toward those people
and to what he considered to be the proper relationship of Americans to
them. On the one hand he was always the calmly efficient naval officer,
able and willing to carry out all orders of his superiors; on the other,
he was throughout his career often haunted by doubts as to the motives
or justification for America's actions toward those small nations. He
never shared the ingrained racism which stilled the consciences of many
Americans of his time. His early ambivalent attitudes remained with him
later, when he took part in the Nicaragua, Haiti and Santo Domingo inter-
ventions.
The freedom of Americans to dominate the nations of Central America
and the Caribbean was notably different from the situation which Leahy
had observed in the Far East. In China, the relatively weak United States
had operated behind her demand for an "open door" under which all western
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nations would share in the spoils of China trade and exploitation. Leahy
had seen during the Boxer Rebellion and Amoy crisis in China that every
move made by one of the competing western nations or by Japan was countered
by a variety of counter moves. These ranged from the movement of one
small gunboat, like the Castine, or of a few available troops, to the
more extensive economic and political agreements and treaties which tied
China in an intricate web of competing interests. This was not the situ-
ation in Central America and the Caribbean. By the first decade of the
twentieth century the Monroe Doctrine and its "Roosevelt Corollary," com-
bined with British support to make the Caribbean virtually an American
lake. In those unhindered conditions, as in the Philippines, America's
"real" personality could emerge. This personality proved to be not the
cooperative open door guardian of the Far East, but rather the blustering
bully boy of the Caribbean. When a Caribbean nation did not 'behave,
"
be it for Presidents Roosevelt, Taft or Wilson, American ships and Marines
would descend from their Panama base and impose by force the system or
ruler desired by American "interests" on the unfortunate nation. Leahy
observed this process successively in Nicaragua, Haiti and Santo Domingo.
In 1909, the Nicaraguan strongman, Jose Santos Zelaya, under whose
regime Nicaraguans had enjoyed almost two decades of general prosperity,
angered powerful American interests by refusing to allow the Americans
to gain control over Nicaraguan banking, mining, and railroad interests.
Zelaya 's independence irritated American Secretary of State Philander
A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New




Knox, whose policies consistently furthered the interests of a few large
American economic combines in Nicaragua. By October 1909, an American
fostered and financed revolution against Zelaya broke out on Nicaragua's
2
east coast.
After American naval ships and Marines, requested by the American
Consul at Bluefields, Thomas Moffat, aided the "rebel" forces to over-
come Zelaya's government troops, Zelaya fled from Nicaragua, depositing
his power with the Nicaraguan Assembly. That group elected Dr. Jose
Madriz, a renowned jurist, as Zelaya's legal successor. Knox, with his
man Diaz still a "rebel", refused to recognize Madriz. Once again American
ships interferred with the operation of Nicaraguan government ships against
the Diaz rebels, while American Marines under Major Smedley Butler for-
bade the government troops from even firing at the rebel forces in Blue-
fields, under the pretext of protecting "American lives and property."
2
U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Re-
lations, United States Senate, Sixty-ninth Congress, 2nd Sess. Pursuant
to S. Con. Res. 15, Relative to Engaging the Responsibility of the Govern-
ment in Financial Arrangements Between Its Citizens and Sovereign Foreign
Governments (Washington, 1927), pp. 1-2, 42 [hereafter cited as "Hearings,
1927"]; "Hearings, 1927," pp. 1-62; Burton K. Wheeler, "Why Are We in
Nicaragua?", originally published in Volume 11, Number 5 of the May 1928
issue of Plain Talk, and reprinted in Congressional Record, 70th Congress,
1st Session, pp. 521-22, April 16, 1928; General Raphael de Nogales, The
Looting of Nicaragua (New York, 1966), p. 8; Wilfred Hardy Callcott, The
Caribbean Policy of the United States 1910-20 (Baltimore, 1942), pp. 384-
90, 395, 462; Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest, An Analytical
Study in American Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1934), pp. 170-73; U.S. Depart-
ment of State, The United States and Nicaragua, A Survey of the Rel ations
from 1909 to 1932 (Washington, 1932), pp. 6-7; Wheeler, "Why Are We in
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in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964), pp. 171-78.

104
Madriz, helpless against the American forces, soon was "defeated" by the
3
Diaz forces, who entered the capital, Managua, on August 28, 1910.
Yet popular opposition to the American imposed regime of "Presi-
dent" Estrada and "Vice President" Diaz continued. With Knox's approval,
the American minister to Nicaragua, Elliott Northcott, demanded that
Estrada resign and turn over the presidency to Adolfo Diaz. The frightened
Estrada fled Nicaragua in May 1911, and at last Diaz, who had evidently
been Knox's chosen puppet from the beginning of hostilities in 1909 was
4
installed in the presidency.
3
U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1909 (Washington, 1909), pp. 452, 455-56; Hearings,
192 7, pp. 2, 33, 34-36; The United States and Nicaragua, 1909 to 1932,
pp. 6-7, 9; Beard, Idea of National Interest, pp. 177, 371-73, discusses
the almost mystical use of the term "American lives and property" as a
shibboleth to justify interventions during America's imperial years; U.S.,
Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1910 (Washington, 1910), pp. 746-47, 753, 729; Harold Norman Denny,
Dollars for Bullets, The Story of American Rule in Nicaragua (New York,
1929), pp. 115-20, tells of the use by Taft and Knox of the term "Zelayism"
to refer to any popular, liberal forces who opposed Knox's puppet Diaz;
see also, "Nicaragua Policy is Growth of Years," New York Times, July 22,
1928; Smedley D. Butler, Old Gimlet Eye; The Advantures of Smedley D.
Butler as Told to Lowell Thomas (New York, 1933), pp. 127-28; Munro,
Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy
, pp. 183-86, tells how the American gun-
boat Paducah prevented the effective operation of the Nicaraguan govern-
ment gunboats against the Diaz-Estrada forces. The Americans refused to
allow the legal government forces to collect customs even after they had
captured their own customs houses.
A
U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1911 (Washington, 1911), p. 655; Hearings, 1927, p.
38; A. A. Vandegrift, Once a Marine; The Memoirs of General A. A.
Vandegrift, United States Marine Corps, as Told to Robert B. Asprey




With Diaz openly in power in Nicaragua, the American State Depart-
ment had little further difficulty in negotiating a treaty to establish
an American customs collectorship similar to that in the Dominican Republic,
and identical to one which had been signed with Honduras five months
before. The treaties were so obviously unfair that Congress did not
even call up the Honduran treaty for action due to Democratic opposition,
and in spite of Taft's strong support. Nor did Congress consider the
Nicaraguan treaty before its adjournment. In May 1912, tie votes in the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee marked the end of any chance that
Knox's efforts to promote the two treaties would be successful.
Major Smedley Butler had doubts as to the honesty or justice of
Knox's actions. Butler wrote:
Adolfo Diaz was running the revolution. He was secre-
tary and treasurer of La Luz Mining Company in which Phil-
ander C. Knox, then our Secretary of State was reported to
own stock. Juan J. Estrada, a carpenter who had become
governor of the province in which Bluefields was located,
was selected to be provincial president of the new govern-
ment if the revolution was successful.
Nicaraguan politics in 1911 then became a struggle, with the forces
of Knox and the American business interests, who backed Diaz and his
Munroe, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 192-93, 203; Hearings,
1927, p. 2, also quoted in Beard, Idea of National Interest, p. 175;
Foreign Relations, 1909, pp. 452ff., quoted by Beard tells of executing
two American "dynamiters"; Denny, Dollars for Bullets, p. 79 quotes
Estrada in an interview in New York that "American commercial interests"
gave $1,000,000 to the Estrada-Diaz revolution against Zelaya and Madriz.
6
Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, p. 227; Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American
Policy of the United States (New York, 1943), p. 162, 413 n. 47, grants
that they had the right to try the Americans by military tribunal;
Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 655-60.
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conservative regime in power, versus the efforts of the popular Liberal
party to regain control.
The Nicaraguan Constituent Assembly in a last-ditch effort to
escape from the Knox-Diaz interests, elected General Luis Mena as Presi-
dent for a constitutional term to begin January 1, 1913, and extending
to January 31, 1916. General Mena, well aware of Knox's determination
to keep Diaz in power, first tried to occupy Managua, the capital, but
was foiled by the troops of Diaz's General Chamorro. Mena then with-
drew from the city to Masaya, where he was joined by his son, commander
of an army barracks at Granada and by most of the army and many sympathetic
Liberals.
For the third time the combination of American financial and diplo-
matic power plus naval and marine support was used to save the fortunes
of the puppet, Adolfo Diaz. By this time Diaz was the "legitimate" presi-
dent of Nicaragua, rather than a clerk-revolutionary as in 1909. Knox
had replaced Minister Northcott and his successor, Charge Gunther, with
George T. Weitzel, former assistant head of the U.S. State Department's
Latin American Division. Weitzel was thus in a position to intimately
o
know and carry out Knox's wishes in Nicaragua.
Foreign Relations, 1911 (October 6), p. 668, Munro, Intervention and
Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 204-05; Vandegrift, Once a Marine, p. 38.
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U.S., Department of State, Paper Relating to the Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1912, p. 594; Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy,
pp. 190-211, describes Minister Weitzel' s murderous hatred of the Liberals
in Nicaragua, the leaders of whom he wanted to hang. Weitzel 's influence
and the presence of the American armed forces insured an "election in




The die was cast for William D. Leahy's participation in the 1912
American intervention when the new Minister Weitzel relayed a complaint
to Knox from the "American corporation owning the railway which runs from
Corinto to Granada and certain steamships on the island waters of Nicaragua,"
that Mena's followers had commandeered several of the company's vessels
to bombard the "unfortified" town of San Jorge. The government of Nicaragua
(Diaz) had, not surprisingly, informed Weitzel that it could not protect
"American lives and property." Knox suggested that Taft authorize the




In August, 1912, a cipher telegram arrived from Washington ordering
Admiral W. H. H. Southerland, on board Leahy's ship the California to
proceed as soon as possible to Corinto, Nicaragua and to be prepared to
send a landing force ashore upon arrival. This marked the beginning
of William D. Leahy's participation in the 1912 American intervention
in Nicaragua. During the intervention Leahy was repeatedly struck with
the unpopularity and the rapicity of the Conservative Diaz regime and by
the obvious fact that it had been set up only by the aid of indispensable
American political and military support.
9
Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 993-1022, 1027-33, describes the direct
interference of Knox and his on-the-scene agents at Managua, in demanding
the retention of Diaz in accordance with the "Dawson Agreements" of 1910,
in which U.S. Plenipotentiary Thomas C. Dawson had insured the "election"
of Estrada and Diaz as President and Vice-President of Nicaragua.
Leahy Diary, August, 1912.
Leahy Diary, August to October, 1912; Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root
(Hamden, Conn., 1964), pp. 250-53. Former Secretary of State Elihu Root
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As the U.S.S. California, other naval vessels and marine units
converged on the Port of Corinto, the American Consul at Cornito James
Weldon Johnson, found himself heavily dependent on a small American ship,
the U.S.S. Annapolis, and her few sailors and guns. On July 31, 1912,
as soon as she received the report of General Mena's revolt against Ameri-
can-backed President Diaz, the U.S.S. Annopolis, on routine patrol duty
on the west coast of Central America proceeded to Corinto. On August 1,
on the recommendation of President Diaz, and American Minister Weitzel
at Managua, Commander W. J. Terhune, Commanding Officer of the Annapolis,
disembarked ninety seamen and five officers. These men left for Managua
by railroad and reached Managua on August 4. Captain Terhune left
Lieutenant Junior Grade J. W. Lewis in acting command of the Annapolis
and also in charge of the few sailors left at Corinto. On August 6,
Terhune reported from Managua, that his force was "comfortably situated"
in the American Legation, but the rebel force numbered 2,000 versus 950
12
loyal government troops at Managua. Also, on the urgent recommendation
by 1913 had developed strong reservations that the United States was un-
duly restricting the independence and freedom of action (i.e., the sover-
eignty) of the Latin American nations. On January 7th, 1915, Root wrote
that he questioned whether the Nicaraguan government was representative
of the Nicaraguan people and that it was apparently "maintained in office
by the presence of United States Marines in Managua"; "What Are We Doing
in Nicaragua?", The World, September 2, 1912, criticizes both the motive
and right of Taft and Knox to invade Nicaragua in support of private
American commercial interests.
12
U.S.S. Annapolis, Ship's Log, July 6, 1912, July 31, 1912, August 1,
1912; Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 1036; U.S., Department of the Navy,
"Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy, 1912, " in Annual Reports
of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1912 (Washington, 1913), p.
12; Terhune to Navy Department, August 6, 7, 1912.
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of Mr. Weitzel, 338 Marines and 10 Marine officers under Major Smedley
Butler were dispatched from Panama on the collier U.S.S. Justin . They
arrived at Managua on August 15 to reinforce the legation guard previously
13
sent by the Annapolis .
On August 3, Consul Johnson cooperated in the landing from the
Annapolis of Commander Terhune's initial small legation guard. On the
fourteenth of August he was relieved to see the Justin arrive with Major
14
Smedley Butler and three hundred and forty-six more marines from Panama.
After Butler moved inland, Johnson with the help of young Lieutenant
Lewis of the Annapolis, and the little force of sailors, tried to maintain
control and order at Corinto. Starting on August 16, 1912, he was plagued
by the presence of Dr. Toribo Tijerino, Diaz's personal representative
in Corinto and the surrounding area. Tijerino had left his force of 300
troops at Paso Caballos, but reported insurgent victories at Leon, and
supposed atrocities committed by the insurgents during the fighting.
Tijerino 's reports created wild excitement at Corinto. Consul
Johnson and Lieutenant Lewis took a six-pounder gun from the Annapolis
and mounted it on a railroad flatcar with a small crew of sailors. The
13
Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 1032-33. U.S., Marine Corps, "Report of
the Major General Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, " in Annual
Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1912 (Washington,
1913), p. 582.
14
James Weldon Johnson, Along This Way, The Autobiography of James Weldon
Johnson (New York, 1933), pp. 276-77. - •-
Johnson, Along This Way, pp. 277-78.
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flatcar was placed at the junction of the railroad and the main street
of Corinto, and a machine gun was manned at a commanding corner of the
custom house. The lonely Johnson, backed by Lieutenant Lewis ' 20
sailors stood up to the bullying of Tijerino, who attempted to take over
control of Corinto in Diaz's name. After several stormy sessions, Consul
Johnson and Lieutenant Lewis, who at one point "arrested" Tijerino, finally
gained his grudging cooperation. On the afternoon of August 12, Johnson
was relieved to see the U.S.S. Denver arrive at Corinto. On the next
day, William D. Leahy's ship, the U.S.S. California arrived, with Admiral
1 o
W. H. H. Southerland, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet on board.
Now the ships of the U.S. Navy began to converge on Nicaragua.
The U.S.S. Tacoma landed fifty men at Bluefields on the east coast of
Nicaragua and herself remained off Bluefields from August 6, until October
19
19, 1912. Also in view of the increasing possibility of victory of
the Liberal forces of General Mena, an additional regiment of marines,
consisting of 29 officers and 750 men sailed from Philadelphia on board
20
the U.S.S. Prairie . Soon the supply vessel Glacier and the colliers
James Weldon Johnson, "Miscellaneous Record Book, Corinto, Nicaragua,
from July 29th to November 14, 1912," in James Weldon Johnson's Collec -
tion, Bieneke Library, Yale University, August 18, 1912 entry; Johnson,
Along This Way, p. 278.
Johnson, "Miscellaneous Record Book," August 18, 20, 1912; Johnson,
Along This Way, pp. 280-81.
1
8
Johnson, "Miscellaneous Record Book," August 27, 28, 1912; Johnson,
Along This Way, p. 286.
19
"Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1912," p. 12.
20
"Report of the Major General Commandant of the United States Marine
Corps," 1912, p. 582.
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Prometheus and Saturn arrived at Cor into. The final arrivals were the
Colorado and Cleveland, bringing an overwhelming naval force to Nicaragua.
21
The virtual army of sailors and marines ashore came to a total of 2,350.
On the afternoon of August 28, Admiral Southerland transferred
to the Annapolis, which had tied up alongside the pier at Corinto. Late
on the evening of the 28th, the landing force and a one-pounder gun was
22
transferred from the California to the U.S.S. Annapolis . A battalion
of five companies of sailors and marines were also landed. This force,
together with men from the Annapolis, was to take and hold the railroad
line between Corinto and Leon. Commander W. J. Terhune was given overall
command of the expeditionary force consisting of the California contingent
of 300 men, a company from Annapolis of 70 men, a 60-man company from
the Denver and 350 marines whom Smedley Butler had left at Leon to safe-
23
guard his communications and the railway routes.
On August 29, the same day that Admiral Southerland officially
shifted his staff to the U.S.S. Annapolis, the Admiral sent the California
to Panama to pick up the marine expeditionary force under Colonel Joseph
21
"Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1912," p. 13; Foreign
Relations, 1912, pp. 1051-52; Ship's Log, U.S.S. California, August 28,
1912; Taft to State Department /War Department, August 27, 28, 30, Record
Group 59, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs
in Nicaragua, 1910-1929 shows an exchange of notes between Taft and the
Secretaries of War and State in which Taft, who first considered sending
the 10th U.S. Infantry Regiment to Nicaragua, was advised by the Secre-
tary of War, that Marines should be sent since the sending of Regular
Army troops would result in international complications.
22
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Annapolis, August 28, 1912.
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Pendleton. He sent the Denver south to San Juan del Sur to protect the
cable station there and to relay wireless messages. Admiral Southerland
appointed Lieutenant Commander Major of his staff to be in charge of the
railroad and appointed Leahy to be in command of Corinto and its defenses.
With the California and Denver gone, Leahy and Consul Johnson faced a
rumored attack with a total local defense force of twenty sailors, a steam
launch, and a boat gun. Luckily, the rebel attack never materialized.
Admiral Southerland had planned to merely seize and hold control
of the railroad, which in itself would have crippled the revolution.
However, after receiving orders from Washington to take a definite stand
24
to support the Diaz regime, he took a more aggressive attitude. Leahy
noted
:
...later orders from Washington directed us to take a de-
finite stand on the side of the existing government which
has resulted in disarming the rebels and supporting a weak
unpopular tyrannical government, against which the people
will in self defense take up arms again as soon as we
leave the country. 25
24
Wilson to Taft, August 30, 1912 and September 23, 1912, National Archives,
State Department Files, both quoted in Richard Turk, "United States Naval
Policy in the Caribbean, 1865-1913" (unpublished dissertation, Fletcher
School, Tufts University, 1968), pp. 175-77, 205, tells of the anger of
Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson, an ardent Diaz booster,
at the intention of Admiral Southerland to stay strictly neutral. Souther-
land was thus ordered by Secretary of the Navy Meyer to "keep the rail-
road open without interruption" for the government forces, which meant
that Southerland was forced to oppose the Liberal revolutionists who con-
trolled major cities on the railroad.
25
Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 208-09, tells of Weitzel's
murderous hatred of the rebels and of Diaz's and Weitzel's influence on




When the American expeditionary force reached Leon, the ever-
cautious Terhune, hearing of the presence of a large body of rebel troops,
camped his force at a bridge nearby. When Colonel Pendleton's 750 marines
arrived at Corinto, however, they were sent through Leon and into tem-
porary camp beyond the city. Admiral Caperton's forces were then divided
into districts throughout Nicaragua: Corinto to Paso Caballos under the
command of Lieutenant Commander William D. Leahy; Paso Caballos to Leon
under Commander Terhune, and all beyond Leon under the command of Colonel
Pendleton. Lieutenant Colonel C. G. Long, with a company of marines was
camped near Leon. Leahy's first trip on the rickety railroad was a four-
teen mile haul to Leon to deliver the command assignments. His train
"stalled on grades, pulled draw bars, broke through culverts, and ran
off the rails." Leahy also noted that
During the first four days work of the expeditionary
force in getting trains through to Leon, the officers and
men were continuously employed day and night on outpost
duty and railroad repair work. Few of them had their shoes
off for four days. Major Hill, Aide to Terhune, broke down
from heat exhaustion and was brought back to the "Glacier"
where he attempted to commit suicide. He has since recovered
and is back on duty in Leon. 26
Leahy Diary, September 1912; A. A. Vandegrift, Once A Marine; The Memoirs
of General A. A. Vandegrift, United States Marine Corps, as Told to Robert
B. Asprey (New York, 1964), pp. 36-41. Vandegrift related how, in view
of the all-important military value of railroads, especially in the rugged
and poorly developed Latin American nations, Major Smedley Butler spent
much imagination and effort in training his Panama-based battalion in
every phase of railroading, from engineering to track laying. The constant
training paid off when Butler's battalion and other marine and naval forces
were forced to not only capture, but repair and operate the Nicaraguan
west coastal railway, the main supply and military artery of that nation;
U.S., Department of State, The United States and Nicaragua, 1909 to 1932,
p. 1 noted that about seven-eighths of the population of Nicaragua and about
the same proportion of the national wealth were on the western side of
of Nicaragua. All of the major cities of the country, Corinto, Granada,
Leon, and Managua, were also located on the key western railway.
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With the railroad in operation between Corinto and Leon, Admiral
Southerland expanded his operation by sending Major Butler with his Marines
and a group of Annapolis sailors to take the city of Granada, at the
southern-most end of the railroad and on the shores of Lake Nicaragua.
Once again, Butler, although barely able to stand with a malarial fever
of 104, faced the rebels under General Zeledon, who controlled the key
town of Masaya, between Managua and Granada. Zeledon 's forces did what
they could to stall the advance of Butler's train, including putting milk-
weed on the tracks to make them too slippery for the train to climb the
slopes leading through Masaya. Zeledon' s forces controlled the tracks
through Masaya from trenches on the slopes of two opposing hills "Coyotepi,
"
and "Barranca." They engaged in a sharp fire-fight with Butler's force,
wounding five of Butler's men and capturing three.
Butler, who loved the excitement of battle described the scene
when his train worked its way through the center of Masaya:
I yelled to our men to shoot. Sixteen machine guns were
mounted on the roofs of the cars. The Marines blazed
away... the native engineer frightened to death had crawled
under the seat.... I climbed into the fireman's seat and
leaned out of the cab window. It was a gorgeous spectacle.
A sheet of fire was spitting into the darkness on both
sides of the road. Four hundred Marine rifles were popping
with tongues of flame, the sixteen machine guns were rapping
out a stacatto beat, the engines were screaming and puffing
all in one narrow little street while the natives shot back
at us from both sides of the road. The whole performance
lasted only about twenty minutes. 27
Butler, who found that he had three men missing after the battle,
27
Leahy Diary, September, 1912; Vandegrift, Once A Marine, p. 41; Butler,
Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 151-56.
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angrily demanded the immediate release of his men on the threat of taking
the town. His demand was granted and the three men were released by the
rebels. Finally free to get at General Mena, who was at Granada, Butler
continued his train trip to Granada, taking over five more days to reach
the city.
Once Butler had safely passed Masaya, Admiral Southerland decided
that he could direct operations best from Managua. He left Leahy to handle
all staff work and local defenses at Corinto and took the rest of the
staff to Managua. Since Southerland took along Lieutenant Commander Major,
the harassed Leahy found that he had also inherited Major's responsibility
for the Corinto end of the railroad, a duty which proved to be the "most
29
trying and least satisfactory part of my work." ' He had reason to be
sure of Admiral Southerland 's satisfaction with his performance at Corinto
when on September 20th, Southerland wrote an official letter to Captain
W. A. Gill, Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Colorado and Senior Officer
present at Corinto
:
My Dear Captain Gill
:
Please send the following to the Department. 'Sec. Nav.
Washington'
Lieutenant Commander Leahy is in command of Corinto and
the defenses thereof and at his own request will not be
detached until the present situation has cleared. He is
a valuable officer and I need his services. Southerland,
please show this to Leahy before you send it, and direct
Commander Washington to put it in code. 30
28
Leahy Diary, August, 1912; Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, p. 157.
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Leahy Diary, August, 1912.
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Leahy Diary, September, 1912; William D. Leahy, "Officer Fitness Reports,
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While in charge of naval forces at Corinto, Leahy, like Lieutenant
Lewis before him, worked in close conjunction with the black American
Consul at Corinto, James Weldon Johnson. Johnson, intelligent and capable,
greatly impressed Leahy, who noted that, "The United States Consul at
Corinto, Mr. Johnson, an American negro was of daily assistance to me in
my command of the town and in the staff work. One is accustomed to expect
little of United States Consuls and almost as little of Negroes, but this
one is a man of excellent judgement, and well fitted for his post made
31
difficult by our occupation of the country." Regrettably for Johnson,
the racism and Democratic party spoilsmanship of the Wilson-Bryan regime
cost him his appointment to the State Department. Under Bryan, the De-
partment refused to confirm President Taft's previous re-appointment of
Johnson to a post in the Azores. The State Department's loss was America's
gain in other ways as Johnson went on to a varied and highly productive
career as a writer, poet, Secretary of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, fighter for black rights, and Professor
32
in Creative Literature at Fisk University.
for the periods April 12th to September 30th, and from September 30th
to October 18, 1912, " signed by Admiral W. H. H. Southerland, Commanding
U.S. Pacific Fleet, describe Leahy's duties as being "Military Governor
of Corinto, Nicaragua. . .assisted in the management of the railroad from
Corinto to Granada. These duties were performed in the most thorough




, September, 1912, October 18, 1912.
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"Johnson Resigns From the Service, " in The New York Age, September 25,
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While Leahy and Johnson were busy at Corinto, Butler finally reached
Granada. He decided, showman as always, to impress General Mena with the
vast horde of Marines in his small force. Camping at a small railroad
station just outside Granada, Butler rigged his two guns under canvas
to make them appear to be heavy artillery, and arranged his 400 men
around himself in such a manner as to appear to be an overwhelming force
to Mena's emissaries. He even had himself mounted on a raised platform
like an oriental potentate to appear more foreboding. Apparently impressed,
on September 22, 1912, Mena signed his "X" to a paper sent him by Butler,
in which Mena agreed to turn over all of the captured railroad property,
including the commandeered lake vessel Victoria .
Although Butler had the situation well in hand, Colonel Pendleton
arrived with a large force several days later on the rumor that Butler's
forces were being besieged and fighting for their lives in the streets.
Pendleton and his two battle-ready battalions from Managua found Butler's
33
force "engaged" only in washing their grimy uniforms.
Pendleton was closely followed by Admiral Souther land, whom Butler
had requested to come to Granada for a conference. On Butler's recommen-
dation Admiral Souther land agreed to grant Mena amnesty if he would sur-
render himself to be sent to Panama on an American ship. Gaining the
agreement of Admiral Southerland, Butler went to confront the Old Tiger,
Mena, but found instead a desperately sick old man. Mena was guarded in
the fortress-like San Francisco Cathedral by a garrison of seven hundred
33
Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, p. 157.
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men, but was crippled and moaning on his back in continual pain. Butler
learned that Mena had been crippled almost from the beginning of the re-
volt, and had tried to conduct all operations through his son, Daniel and
the loyal General Zeledon. Mena, with no alternative, accepted the offer
of Butler and Admiral Southerland and his soldiers surrendered control
of the city and of the remaining two lake steamers which the rebels had
used to serve as gunboats. In addition Butler captured 10,000 rifles,
many of them modern Remingtons, several machine guns and field pieces,
and a million and a half rounds of rifle ammunition. Mena, his son and
a servant were shipped to Corinto on their way to Panama and exile. Leahy's
mixed emotions toward the Liberal General Mena were evident as he commented
on Mena's arrival at Corinto:
Mena is an old savage who has been the cause of much suf-
fering in his unhappy country, who is probably not much
better or worse than other leaders on both sides in this
war, and who probably richly deserved a worse fate than
he met; but his arrival at Corinto in a steaming closed
box car at midnight was a pitiful sight. In the dim light
of a railroad lantern held over him by one of our guards
I could see that his face was drawn with pain of the long
journey which must have been enough to try the stoicism of
an Indian.... It was a sad picture of the mighty fallen.
A leader of his people and an absolute autocrat, escaping
under our protection to save from destruction the wreck
of a body that was left to him. 34
34
Butler, Old Gimlet Eye
, pp. 159-64; Leahy Diary, September, 1912; Souther-
land to Navy Department, Record Group 59, September 20, 21, 1912, tell
of Butler's safe arrival at Granada and of his freeing the three captives
from General Zeledon at Masaya. Southerland reported "all quiet," and
that he had accepted control of all of the property of the American con-
trolled railroad, including two lake steamers. He also reported that
he had agreed to accept the surrender of General Mena; Panama to State
Department, Record Group 59, October 2, 1912, reported that the severely
crippled General Mena was checked into Ancon Hospital in the Canal Zone,
entirely crippled from what was diagnosed as "siphilitic rheumatism."
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As late as the time of General Mena's surrender Admiral Souther-
land's attitude had remained that of a neutral desiring only to protect
the lives and property of foreigners. . .but on the day of Mena's surrender
Southerland received further orders from the Secretary of the Navy to
take definite action on the side of the Conservative government of Diaz
and to turn over all prisoners to Diaz's troops. Admiral Southerland,
who had already agreed with Smedley Butler and Mena to allow Mena's re-
moval to Panama, wired Washington that the message had been received too
late to fully carry out the instructions, since he had already given Butler
A 35orders.
With the surrender of Mena, the hopes of the Liberals rested solely
on General Zeledon, who unfortunately now faced the determination of
American Secretary of State Knox to keep Diaz and the Conservative in-
terests in power. This meant that Zeledon's forces faced not only thousands
of American sailors and marines already at Nicaragua, plus powerful war-
ships but also the threat of as many more as would be required to silence
Liberal opposition to Diaz. After the direct order from the Secretary
of the Navy to win the Conservative's fight, Southerland 's whole force
turned its attention to Zeledon's stronghold at Masaya. Diaz's Conser-
vative troops, after receiving all of the arms and ammunition captured
by Butler in Granada, boasted that they would overcome Zeledon's forces
with 2,500 government troops. Diaz's forces actually did little more
than slowly shell Zeledon's position. It was by then obvious that Admiral
35
Leahy Diary, September, 1912; Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, p. 163.
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Southerland's sailors and marines would win their war anyway.
Within a few days, after General Zeledon had refused Southerland's
offer of safe passage out of the country if he surrendered, the Americans
Of!
attacked Zeledon 1 s positions. At dawn of October 3, the American forces
attacked Zeledon's hill positions, killing 27 of Zeledon's force, cap-
turing nine, and routing the rest. General Zeledon was hunted down by
37
Diaz's cavalry and killed. After Zeledon's defeat, Diaz's four thou-
sand government soldiers, who had been unwilling to fight Zeledon's forces,
now stormed into the demoralized town, routing and killing the last of
the Liberal defenders. Butler described the scene, a repeat of the Con-
servative's takeover of Leon and a preview of what was in store for the
Liberals of Nicaragua:
I took my battalion down the hill. As I passed through
Masaya to load the guns on our train and steam away,
the four thousand government soldiers, half naked, were
parading in high silk hats, and women's underclothes.
Everybody was reeling in circles, drunk and hilarious.
A few were playfully shooting their own comrades. Other-
wise there was no violence. °
Leahy also noted that the drunken, looting Federals had at times
0£
Leahy Diary, October, 1912.
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Leahy Diary, October 8, 1912; Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 165-67;
and Vandegrift, Once a Marine, p. 42.
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Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, p. 167. Butler, pp. 140-48, also noted the
rapine inflicted on the captured Liberal stronghold of Leon by a seven-
hundred man mercenary force under one of Diaz's generals named Duron.
The people of that ravished city finally rose en masse against Duron's
force and wiped out all Duron's entire force, including two American




shot each other during their orgy in Masaya. The day after the looting
of Masaya, the Colorado 's battalion and two companies of Marines under
Major Hill occupied Leon. Commander Terhune was placed in charge of all
towns between Corinto and Leon. Colonel Pendleton occupied Leon itself,
39
and Major Butler's forces controlled Granada.
Under the umbrella of absolute protection of the American armed
forces, Diaz's troops repeated the rape of towns throughout Nicaragua.
Leahy noted
:
All other cities were being held by Federals who
busied themselves getting even with inhabitants who had
sided with the defeated rebels. The only hope for any
person out of favor with the Federal regime was to reach
one of the cities occupied by our forces where they were
given protection from their countrymen. The party that
had come into power through our efforts seemed unable to
understand why we would not permit them to rob and exe-
cute their late antagonists.^
On October 12, 1912, with the Liberal threat destroyed and with
Mena at Panama and Zeledon killed, Admiral Southerland sent Leahy, Captain
Gill of the Colorado and Lieutenant Commander Washington, on an extended
"inspection trip" from Corinto to the end of the railroad at Granada.
Once again, the trains suffered their usual series of derailments, dif-
ficulties in climbing the steep grades, and breaking of draw bars. In
addition, they were periodically startled by sudden volleys of wild rifle
firing by still-celebrating Federal troops, firing into the air in a com-
bined celebration and threat. While conditions were difficult enough
39
Leahy Diary, October, 1912.
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in their private war, they were even wilder in the native passenger cars,
where there were "natives closer than I have ever seen people packed into
a broadway surface car in a rush hour. Even the outside platforms were
crowded, some people even sitting (sic) on the lower steps with their
41
feet dangling."
At Managua, Leahy skeptically listened to a Mr. O'Connel, manager
of the American owned railroad, who insisted that he had been prepared
to operate the railroad at any time since the beginning of the occupation.
Leahy, no fool, concluded that O'Connel was merely preparing his company's
claims for damages against the very American government forces which had
saved the railroad for its owners. He was similarly disillusioned and
unimpressed by American Minister Weitzel. Leahy noted:
We called at the legation on Mr. Weitzel, the Minister
from the United States. Some persons have said that he
is responsible for the revolution. But I have no know-
ledge of his part in the beginning of the trouble. He
is now very much in favor of the excuse for a government
that now holds office through our defeat of the Liberals.
Weitzel further shocked Leahy, but unconsciously gave a perfect
example of the modus operandi of Taft-Knox regime in Central America
when he
:
Made a statement that seems remarkable to a sailor, as
follows: Instructions issued by the State Department
to an officer in the field must always purposely be
vague and capable of different interpretations in order
that the Department may always in case of necessity un-
load responsibility for its mistakes upon some subor-
dinate.
41
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Leahy noted that "we are all familiar with the practice of our
State Department but I have never before heard a diplomatist enunciate
..43
that doctrine.
Their trip onward to Granada was accomplished in a "very special
train consisting of one glass enclosed hand car and a toy engine the
"Nindire" which had much difficulty with our dimunitive car on the steep
slopes." The train stopped at Masaya for three hours where Leahy studied
the recent battle. He noted that:
Even without opposition climbing the steep hill under a
burning sun was a task and it was apparent at once that
a well intrenched body of men should have held the place
indefinitely. A trench on the summit had been used to
bury natives who were killed, the bodies being in many
cases only partly covered with earth.
In Masaya there was evidence everywhere of the
thorough looting that the town suffered at the hands of
the victorious Federals after we took the commanding
hills.
At Granada, the party inspected the massive Church of San Francisco
which had "for years been used as a fortress and arsenal by one or the
other side in succeeding revolutions." Leahy correctly predicted that
the 10,000 rifles which the Americans had seized in the church-fortress
and turned over to the Federal General Chamorro would make him "the balance
of power in the state." The party then retraced their trip, this time
stopping at Leon, where Colonel Long and his men and the sailors from
the Colorado were still in occupation. The sailors were located in a
church at the city's edge:
A3
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It had been barracaded (sic) and provided for defense
by natives but abandoned by them when our sailors appeared.
It was strange to see our sailors housed in a church amid
the gaudy Latin American paintings and decorations, but
the roof did not leak and the sailors seemed quite as well
satisfied as they could have been in any other structure.
As his final diary comment on Nicaraguan politics, Leahy predicted:
General Chimorra (sic), said by his enemies to be
an illegitimate son of the house of that name, a strong
character, and an experienced revolutionist now holds
all the power in Nicaragua. The President Diaz is pro-
bably, according to our standards, the best man in the
government but he is generally considered to be not strong
enough to hold his office without assistance from us.
Mr. Weitzel says that General Chimorra (Chamorro) does
not aspire to the presidency but natives of both politi-
cal parties consider him a probable source of danger to
peace. 44
Within a few weeks Leahy sailed for Panama on board the Colorado, crossing
the Isthmus by train and then sailing from Colon on October 22 on board
the S.S. Cristobal . By December he was in Washington where he chose his
new duties as Assistant Director of Target Practice and Engineering Com-
petitions in the Division of Operations, in charge of the Engineering
Branch, since it offered better opportunities for professional experience
than the job of instructor at the Naval Academy which was also offered
. u- 45to him.
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19-20. Emiliano Chamorro easily won the "election" of 1916 in Nicaragua.
His nephew, Diego was "elected" President in 1920. On p. 20, Nogales
lists 13 members of the immediate Chamorro family occupying most of the
major political police and military posts of Nicaragua in 1920 (list
provided by the Pan American Federation of Labor).
45
Leahy Diary, December, 1912.

126
In his famous 1912 speech to Congress, President William Howard
Taft justified the successful intervention of American Naval and Marine
forces in behalf of the Diaz government and supporting American interests.
In his speech Taft boasted of "substituting dollars for bullets." He
boasted of the "idealism" which such a policy entailed, in addition to
strictly commercial American interests. In another part of his annual
message, Taft, not surprisingly, attributed the Nicaragua troubles and
atrocities to the Liberal forces or "malcontents." He implied that the
entire Nicaraguan situation could have been averted if only the U.S. State
Department had encouraged a policy of loans to the Central American states.
Taft praised the actions of the Navy and Marine forces, lamented the deaths
of seven Americans in the Nicaraguan campaign but boasted that subsequently,
elections had been held in Nicaragua in "conditions of peace and tran-
quility." Never forgetting the aims of his Secretary of State, Knox,
Taft said that, "The only apparent danger now threatening Nicaragua arises
from the shortage of funds." He then duly chided Congress for still not
having approved the notoriously one-sided Knox-Castrillo convention of
1911, which would have given American bankers unprecedented entry into
46
the complete financial control of Nicaragua.
The eyewitness accounts of the situation in Nicaragua in 1912,
as observed and commented on by Leahy and other participants, rebutted
the rhetoric of Taft and Knox. The Central American policy can scarcely
be termed one of "substituting dollars for bullets." It would be more
46
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accurately termed one of "introducing American (investment) dollars with
bullets."
Once back in Washington, Leahy thrived on his duties as Assistant
Director of Target Practice and Engineering Competitions in the Division
of Operations. With little clerical assistance he tabulated reports on
the gunnery and engineering performances of all of the combat vessels
of the fleet. In August, 1913, Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, Aide for
Personnel to the new Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, asked Leahy
to serve in his office as assistant. Leahy reported to Admiral Mayo in
August and soon saw Mayo relieved by Admiral William F. Fullam. Fullam
in turn went to the Naval Academy as superintendent, leaving Leahy, still
a Lieutenant Commander, in charge of the Personnel Division. Leahy worked
often and well with Secretary Daniels, although Leahy suspected that
Daniels disliked naval officers as a group.
In 1914, Leahy was assigned as detail officer and handled with
no assistance the assignment of all officers in both line and staff and
all disciplinary court-martials of officers. In 1915, he was designated
to command the newly constructed destroyer tender Melville, but instead,
Secretary Daniels assigned Leahy to command his personal dispatch vessel,
the U.S.S. Dolphin . Leahy relieved Commander G. S. Lincoln of command
of the Dolphin on September 18, 1915. Within a few months Leahy was
ordered to take the Dolphin to the Caribbean.
On February 25, 1916, Rear Admiral Caperton and his staff boarded
Leahy's ship, the Dolphin at Port-au-Prince and Leahy took over the duties
previously filled by Captain Edward L. Beach and his ship, the Memphis.

128
Caperton appointed Leahy to succeed Beach as his Chief of Staff. This
assignment kept Leahy in contact with the local political situation.
Since Caperton knew no French, Leahy found himself serving in the added
capacity of interpreter for Caperton.
Leahy praised the work of the Marine force in Haiti commanded by
Colonel L. W. T. Waller and of Major Smedley Butler who was busy setting
up the Haitian constabulary. Like Butler, and indeed like most Americans
in America's new dependencies, Leahy boasted of the great "Miracles in
improving the condition of the poor inhabitants who were poverty and
disease stricken beyond words, but it was bad fortune for the ruling
class most of whom were taken off the payrolls and none of whom could
under their social system accept any employment that did not carry with
it official rank."
In his dual role commanding the Dolphin, and serving as Rear
Admiral William B. Caperton 's Chief of Staff, Leahy repeated many of
the experiences of his predecessor, Captain Edward L. Beach, commanding
officer of the U.S.S. Memphis, in dealing with the Haitians. As Admiral
Caperton' s successive Chiefs of Staff, both Beach and Leahy saw the brutal
side of American military and political domination of Haiti and the
48
Dominican Republic. Prior to the American invasion of 1915, although
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Leahy Diary, September 18, 1915, February, 1916; Officers Fitness Re-
port of William D. Leahy; U.S.S. Dolphin, September 18, 1915; Haiti and
Nicaragua were the only "colonial" areas in which Leahy operated in which
he did not seem to see the human side of the natives' problems and in
which he uncritically accepted the stereotyped self-justifying boast of
establishing law and order, roads and improving living conditions.
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it was by no means a legitimate excuse for United States intervention,
the Haitian political situation was admittedly chaotic, even by the
standards of that country. Between the years 1912 and 1915, Haiti ex-
perienced a succession of seven Presidents, the last being Vilbrun
49
Guillaume Sam.
On July 27, 1915, General Oscar Etienne, military Governor of
Port-au-Prince under the bloodthirsty Guillaume Sam, ordered the murder
of 167 political hostages, including former President Oreste Zamor. At
this act, Port-au-Prince arose in fury. First Etienne was hauled from
the Legation of Santo Domingo, killed, and mutilated. The terror-stricken
Sam, hiding in the French Legation, was soon discovered by the mob, killed
and literally torn to pieces and paraded, in pieces, through the streets
of Port-au-Prince.
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18, 1915. Leahy relieved Commander G. S. Lincoln; Leahy Diary, January,
1916. The Dolphin was ordered to the Caribbean to relieve the U.S.S.
Memphis, under the command of Captain E. L. Beach; U.S.S. Dolphin, Ship's
Log, February 26, 1916, "Rear Admiral Caperton, USN, Commander in Chief,
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flag on this vessel... The Commanding Officer called officially on the
United States Minister of Haiti."
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U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1916 (Washington, 1916), pp. 311ff., 326, Davis to
Lansing. Secretary of Legation Davis summarizes the succession of Haitian
presidents from 1870 to 1916.
Captain Edward Beach, U.S. Navy, "Admiral Caperton in Haiti," unpublished
manuscript (1920), National Archives, Naval Records Collection, Record
Group 45, Box 850 ZWA 7, pp. 20-21; Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, p. 181. Both
Captain Beach and Smedley Butler described the customary Haitian revolu-
tionary cycle, usually bloodless, in which revolutionary leaders would
collect troops on the poverty-stricken north of Haiti, and march south.
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Admiral Caperton, leaving the Eagle at Cape Haitien, sailed for
Port-au-Prince, arriving on board U.S.S. Washington on July 28th. On
that same day, at the request of the Secretary of State to the Secretary
of the Navy, he was ordered to land Marines. The next day, Caperton
ordered the Haitian "Committee of Safety" to ensure that all Haitians
in the city were disarmed. On August 4, the battleship Connecticut ar-
rived carrying a badly needed regimental headquarters, and five companies
of the 2nd Marine Regiment. Also, at Caperton 's request for more marines,
a Brigade was organized under command of Colonel L. W. T. Waller.
Caperton ordered an 11 o'clock curfew on Port-au-Prince. He then
ordered his Chief of Staff, Leahy's predecessor, Captain Edward L. Beach
to intimidate Doctor Bobo into resigning his claims to the presidency.
Beach invited Bobo and his chief ministers on board the flagship Memphis
and then proceeded to bully the suddenly frightened Bobo into resignation
At the surrender of St. Marie, 50 miles from Port-au-Prince, the incum-
bent President automatically stepped down to be pensioned off and the
new President continued his march, entered Port-au-Prince, and was duly
inaugurated; U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1915 (Washington, 1915), Davis to Lansing,
July 28, 1915, describes the events surrounding the riot and murders.
Foreign Relations, 1915, July 28, 1915, Lansing to Daniels.
Robert Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, The United States Marine Corps,
1775-1962 (Annapolis, 1962), p. 171; James McCrocklin, Garde D'Haiti,
1915-1934; Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the United
States Marine Corps (Annapolis, 1956), pp. 12-14, 21-24; Clyde H.





at the point of Caperton 1 s naval guns.
On August 15, Colonel L. W. T. Waller arrived on board the armored
cruiser Tennessee with his new 1st Marine Brigade Headquarters and eight
companies of Marines, reinforced by a field artillery battalion. On
September 3, Caperton proclaimed martial law at Port-au-Prince. Within
a month, Waller had accomplished his dual mission of generally quieting
the major cities and towns and especially of taking over the key customs
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houses. His Marines soon were in control of ten cities.
After former President Legitime, and other Haitian notables re-
fused to run for President, Caperton chose the pliable southern Haitian
mulatto Sudre Philippe Dartiguenave. Dartiguenave "won" the election
with 94 out of 116 votes from an Assembly ringed by American Marines
52
Beach, "Admiral Caperton in Haiti," pp. 140-44; William B. Caperton,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, "History of the Career of Rear Admiral William
B. Caperton, Commencing January 5, 1915," unpublished manuscript, Na-
tional Archives, Record Group 45, Box 802, pp. 63-65; U.S. Congress,
Senate, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo.
Sixty-Seventh Congress, Volume 1 (Washington, 1922), pp. 313-17; McCrocklin,
Garde D'Haiti, pp. 26-28; Metcalf, History of the United States Marine
Corps, pp. 24-25, 378. " "
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Soldiers of the Se a, p. 171; McCrocklin, Garde D 1 Haiti, pp. 12-14, 21-22;
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an aggressive senior naval officer on the colonial frontier, Admiral Caper-
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with ready weapons and in which Admiral Caperton's Chief of Staff, Captain
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Beach circulated "in a friendly manner" on the floor of the Assembly.
Under these conditions it was not surprising that as Smedley
Butler laconically recorded it:
Senator Philippe Dartiguenave, had our backings. When the
National Assembly met, the Marines stood in the aisles
with their bayonnets until the man selected by the American
minister was made president. His excellency, Philippe Sudre
Dartiguenave was put in office in September. I won't say
we put him in. The State Department might object. Anyway,
he was put in.
Charge Davis reported to Secretary Lansing on August 12, that "Today
at about midday Sudre Dartiguenave elected President, receiving 94 out
of 116 votes. Election held under protection of marines."
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Montague, Haiti and the United States, pp. 213-16.
Foreign Relations, 1915, Davis to Lansing, August 12, 1915; Butler,
Old Gimlet Eye, pp. 182-83. Butler's Marines and his willingness and
flair in terrorizing the natives was of continual value to the American
puppet Dartiguenave. In 1917, after the plucky Haitian Congress had twice
refused to allow Dartiguenave to write a new constitution allowing foreign
(American) land ownership, Butler and his Marine-officered "native con-
stabulary" dissolved the Congress at rifle point. (Butler, Old Gimlet
Eye, pp. 212-17) Foreign Policy Association, "The Seizure of Haiti by
the United States," A Report on the Military Occupation of the Republic
of Haiti and the History of the Treaty forced upon Her (New York, 1922).
In this report, a group of 24 distinguished Americans, including Zachariah
Chafee, Jr., and Felix Frankfurter of Harvard Law School accused the United
States of invading a "recognized sovereign nation... a signatory to the
Hague Convention of 1907." Their report accurately emphasized "that no
American citizen has been injured in person or property by the people of
Haiti; nor have any other foreigners been molested. .. .Foreign investments
had at all times been respected, the interest on Haitian foreign debt
has been scrupulously paid...." The report pointed out that the American
puppet Sudre Dartiguenave "proclaimed himself a candidate for election
to the Presidency of the Republic and offered if President to acede to
any (sic) terms which the United States might name." The report was
entirely derived from the 1922 investigation of the Haitian situation,
"Official Report of the Hearings before a Select Committee of the United
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Following the resignation of Haitian foreign secretary Sannon,
Dartiguenave and the Haitian Senate continued to delay the approval of
the tough American treaty, while Dartiguenave and the new foreign secre-
tary, Borno, unsuccessfully sought changes in that treaty.
The treaty was finally "approved" in February 1916 by the Haitian
senate only after the United States 1 refusal to loan the government
$100,000 for salaries and expenses.
On July, 1915, the American Charge D'Affaires at Santo Domingo,
instructed by Robert Lansing the American Secretary of State, had taken
the unprecedented step of warning Arias and his dissatisfied faction that
the United States would back President Jimenez no matter what forces were
gathered against him. This American interference was immediately answered
in an open message of General Horatio Vasques contesting the right of
58
the United States to interfere in Dominican internal affairs. By the
summer of 1915, Jimenez suffered a severe mental and physical breakdown.
Nevertheless, on September 17, 1915, the new American Minister William
States Senate pursuant to Senate Resolution 112, authorizing an inquiry
into the occupation and administration of the territories of the Republic
of Haiti and the Dominican Republic."
Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 442-45.
Foreign Relations, 1916
, pp. 322-27, 458; Foreign Relations, 1915, pp.
447f., quoted in Montague, Haiti and the United States, pp. 221-23.
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Metcalf, History of the United States Marine Corps, pp. 339-42; Sumner
Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924 (New York,
1928), pp. 611-34, 675-81, 690-99, 7CS-08, 718-48, tell of the determina-
tion of U.S. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and, later, of
Woodrow Wilson, to vest the "ultimate decision regarding the domestic
policies of the Dominican Government in the hands of representatives of
the United States" (quote, p. 748).
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H. Russell was instructed to make a mandatory demand on the Dominicans
to institute an American customs and financial control of the country,
and de facto American political control by the establishment of an
America-officered Dominican constabulary. Dominican public opinion was
immediately aroused both against the demands and against the pliable
Jimenez. This marked the start of a series of frantic American moves
to prevent the impeachment of Jimenez by the angry Dominican Congress,
or the military takeover by the forces of the popular (with the Domini-
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cans) General Arias. On January, 1916, Secretary of State Lansing
notified the wavering President Jimenez through Minister William H. Russell
that Jimenez had the full support of the American government. On January
15, President Wilson himself sent Jimenez reassurances of his support.
In March, 1916, Russell reported to Lansing that Arias' forces had taken
over the fortress which dominated Santo Domingo city following an attempt
by Jimenez to arrest General Cesario Jimenez, the Commander of the Fortress
and General Cesario Jimenez, the Chief of the National Guard. The frightened
President Jimenez was prevented from resigning only by the pleadings and
demands of American Minister Russell.
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Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, pp. 755-63,
Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 220, January 24, 1916, Lansing to Russell;
March 14, 1916, Russell to Lansing; April 15, 1916, Russell to Lansing;
April 27, 1916, Russell to Lansing; Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, pp. 755-58,
767, describes Russell, who replaced the inefficient and allegedly cor-
rupt American Minister James Mark Sullivan in 1915. Regrettably for the
popular political forces in Dominican Republic, Russell was a returnee
from a previous tour as Minister during the dollar diplomacy days of Taft
and Knox. Russell looked on the patriot leader Arias and all like him,
as enemies if they were not completely amenable to American control.
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Jimenez's pliability and half-collapsed emotional state made him
extremely valuable for the carrying out of the proposed American policy,
which was to effectively bring Dominican Republic under American political,
military and financial control through imposition of the demands of Sep-
tember, 1915. Minister Russell therefore, intensified his efforts to
keep the increasingly reluctant Jimenez in power and to keep Arias out
of the Presidency, by force if necessary. Both houses of the Dominican
Congress voted to impeach Jimenez. The President, however, with Russell's
support and probable instigation, refused to allow his own impeachment
and retired to the outskirts of Santo Domingo City with a weak force,
to await the military aid promised by Russell. Russell had been request-
ing troops and ships for several months, and had already caused several
hundred sailors and marines to be landed while larger forces were on the
way. Jimenez nevertheless found the strength to refuse Russell's demand
that Jimenez go on record as requesting American armed support in Santo
Domingo City. At the insistence of his family, Jimenez finally resigned
on May 7, leaving Russell with no other puppet in sight and leaving the
presidential chair declared officially vacant by the Dominican Congress.
On April 16, 1916, Admiral Caperton received an urgent message
Foreign Relations, 1916, May 1, May 2, 1916, Russell to Lansing; May 2,
Lansing to Russell, reiterates the American intention to fully support
President Jimenez regardless of circumstances or the wishes of the Domi-
nican people or their Congress; Foreign Relations, 1916, May 3, May 7,
1916; Welles, Naboth's Vineyard
, pp. 766-70; Foreign Relations, 1916,
Russell to Lansing tells of the attempts of the Dominican House and Senate,
opposed in every way by Russell, to impeach President Jimenez for his
apparent readiness to capitulate to the unpopular American demands for
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from the Prairie, located at Santo Domingo requesting support against
the rebel forces of former Dominican Minister of War, Desiderio Arias.
Caperton, his work on subjugating Haiti well in hand, decided to shift
62
his flagship Dolphin in Santo Domingo City.
By the time Admiral Caperton arrived at Santo Domingo City on
board the Dolphin, the Prairie and Castine had already landed several
hundred sailors and marines outside the city at Russell's request. This
was despite the fact that even President Jimenez had finally resigned
rather than authorize such an obvious infringement on Dominican sovereignty
by the United States forces. Caperton ordered the Culgoa to bring several
more companies of marines from Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien to Santo
Domingo City. The Hector brought 150 more marines from Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.
On the afternoon of May 12, Caperton, accompanied by Commander
Leahy as his Chief of Staff, attended a meeting which included Desiderio
Arias, American Minister Russell and Cesario Jimenez, the Commandt of
the Fortress. Russell and Caperton, determined to destroy Arias as an
independent political and military force, demanded that he disarm and
surrender his forces by May 15. At Arias' refusal, Caperton returned
to the Dolphin and ordered that landings be made. On May 12, and 13,
seven companies of marines were landed from the Colgoa, while ships com-
panies of sailors were landed from the Memph is, Prairi, Dolphin, and
Castine . Leahy watched the landings with fascination from the deck of
the Dolphin ;
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. . .over three hundred men with equipment and field guns
in the glare of searchlights from the ships were landed
over the surf with no casualties other than a few smashed
boats. When the mixed force of Marines and sailors as-
saulted and scaled the walls of the city, Arias had fled
and there was no battle. ^
In spite of his precipitous flight from the American forces, Arias'
supporters were determined to elect him president. However, on May 15,
Russell reported to Lansing that it was "impossible for any good to come
by the election of a new President since it was probable that Arias or
his candidate would be elected." Arias still held back his forces,
"trusting to the Dominican constitution." He was convinced that the
Dominican Congress would elect him as legally acknowledged president.
Unfortunately, for Arias, at that same time Minister Russell repeatedly
advised Lansing against allowing Arias or any of his supporters to be
elected to the Presidency. Russell recommended that Arias be "finally
eliminated" as a political and military factor in Dominican affairs.
Russell reminded Lansing that, in view of his repeated accusations against
Arias "during the last few years," Arias was unacceptable (to the Americans)
as a President. Ironically, considering the intentions and political
and military actions of Russell and Caperton, but consistent with the
pattern of American actions versus offical statements in the Caribbean
Leahy Diary, May 1916; Caperton, "History of the Career of .. .Caperton,
"
pp. 254-55; Foreign Relations, 1916, May 2, 1916, Russell to Lansing, de-
scribes Jimenez's flight from the city of Santo Domingo, Jimenez withdrew
and after a comic opera "advance" on the city, waited for the Americans
to fight for his power. The naive Arias, trusting apparently to American
good faith or respect for Dominican sovereignty, also waited outside the
city with his strong forces and, aware of his own popularity "relied on
the provisions of the constitution"; Metcalf, History of the United States
Marine Corps, pp. 343-44; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp. 180-82.
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area, on May 14 Caperton and Russell issued circulars in the city of
Santo Domingo boasting that Caperton' s forces had only arrived to "guarantee
64
the free election of the next President of the Republic by the Chambers."
Commander Leahy took note of the effects of American intervention
on the government and people of the Dominican Republic:
No responsible government existed at this time and
the inhabitants refused to elect a government during my
stay. The Dominicans definitely did not like us, dif-
fering from the Haitians in that some of the latter were
in favor of our efforts to stabilize their government
and their finances. . . .The natives who speak Spanish are
all said to have some African ancestry. In most of them
this is not apparent. They are proud, intelligent, in-
efficient, and unfriendly toward Americans. -*
Once again, as in Nicaragua and Haiti, the American Minister and
Senior Naval officer found themselves exerting every effort, including
military force, to support or install a non-popular puppet, while at
the same time fighting off the efforts of popular forces to take charge
of their own government and country. To their credit, the Dominicans,
unlike the Nicaraguans or Haitians, refused as a group to bow to American
demands. Nor did any individual offer himself in the subtle manner of
Diaz, in Nicaragua, or Dartiguenave in Haiti to be the American's puppet
for a price. On May 23, Minister Russell was further infuriated when
the Haitian Congress ignored his "request" to delay final election of the
new president. The Dominican House elected Dr. Francisco Henriquez y
64
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p. 773.
Leahy Diary, May, 1916.
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Carvajal, however, since he did not agree to bow to the American demands.
The U.S. State Department informed Russell that neither Carvajal nor
Arias were "acceptable" as candidates for the Dominican presidency.
This intensified the long struggle between Russell and popular
Dominican forces led by Arias. Russell and Caperton with the direction
of the American State Department, were determined to impose an "acceptable"
(i.e. complete pliable) man in the office of President. Russell was con-
vinced that if the Dominican Congress were "allowed" to elect a President,
he would "undoubtedly" be the highly popular but undesirable (for purposes
of American control) Arias. Russell and Caperton therefore made every
effort to delay the election of a Dominican president until a means was
ft 7
found to insure that he would be controllable.
On June 4, in view of the insistence of the Dominican Senate to
proceed with the election, the American- influenced Council of Ministers,
with the support and probable instigation of Russell, arrested four Sena-
tors who were strong supporters of Arias. The popular uproar which fol-
lowed the arrests forced Russell to "advise" release of the Senators.
Meanwhile, Arias and his forces, refusing to capitulate to Caperton and
Russell, withdrew to the north to Arias' political base and military
stronghold, Santiago. On June 18, the 4th Marine Regiment, under command
of Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, arrived at Santo Domingo City and on the
r p
next day was shipped north to capture Arias' stronghold of Santiago.
Foreign Relations, 1916, Russell to Lansing, May 18, 1916.
Foreign Relations, 1916, May 15, 1916, Russell to Lansing; Welles,
Naboth's Vineyard, pp. 775-77.
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Pendleton's northern Marine force landed in two contingents, one
fighting southward from the port of Monte Cristi, and the other from the
port and railroad terminal of Puerto Plata. The two columns joined at
the railroad junction of Navarette, and continued their fighting advance
into the City of Santiago. Although two Marines, a private and a captain
were killed during the advance, the city of Santiago fell without a final
69
struggle on July 7 and Arias surrendered to the provincial Governor.
During this period, on June 16, William D. Leahy's tour in Santo
Domingo ended when the Dolphin was ordered to be detached from Admiral
Caperton's command and sailed, first to Vera Cruz and Puerto Mexico. In
Mexico Leahy found the local populace to be bitterly resentful as the
result of Wilson's interventions. The Dolphin then sailed to Norfolk,
Virginia on July, 1916 for repairs. Leahy and the Dolphin narrowly
missed tragedy at Santo Domingo. On August, 1916, the Memphis which once
again was serving as Admiral Caperton's flagship, anchored off the City
of Santo Domingo, was driven ashore by a storm and wrecked with the loss
of 40 lives from boat drownings and engine room explosions.
The Dominican situation was finally resolved by the Americans in
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a typically imperalistic manner. The Secretary of State wrote the Presi-
dent on November, 1916, that Stabler, Chief of the State Department's
Latin American Division, had recommended that in view of the fact that
the popular Arias could never be defeated in a fair political contest,
Captain Knapp, who had just taken over the Caribbean squadron, should
72
also take over the governing of the Dominican Republic.
On November 29, military government was proclaimed by Captain Knapp.
His proclamation had been drawn up in the State Department and approved
by President Wilson . The Americans initially hoped that Dominican offi-
cials would cooperate in running a puppet regime, but when no Dominicans
came forward to act as puppets for their American conquerors, Knapp filled
all vital positions with American naval officers.
Then began a series of bloody operations by the American Marines
against Dominican forces, who were called "Political bandits," the appel-
lation of "bandit" making it much easier to justify their annihilation
by Marine forces. By 1920 most of the bandit groups had been killed or
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CHAPTER 7
THE FORCE OF SHARED ASSUMPTIONS
William D. Leahy and his fellow officers served in the vanguard
of American expansion during the late 1890 's and the first two decades
of the twentieth century. They and their ships and guns were the agents
for destroying the power of Spain over her former colonies. They then
were the means by which America moved into Spain's former empire and im-
posed American rule over certain small nations.
Their field of action involved not only military but also politi-
cal problems of vital significance in America's foreign relations. Like
their English cousins and mentors, America's imperialists shared many
assumptions concerning the proper interrelationship of God, Anglo-Saxons,
white Americans, and other peoples of the world. These assumptions may
be termed limiting assumptions in that they were so deeply held that
options to them were usually unrecognized or discredited by those who
held them. Thus, they partially blinded their adherents and limited the
operation of either conscience or justice when Americans dealt with
"lesser" peoples. Nor were the workings of these one-sided assumptions
noted by American historians, most of whom have shared the same assump-
tions as articles of unquestioned faith. The most powerful of these
often invisible limiting assumptions were:
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1. The Calvinistic belief dating back to Puritan times, that the
inborn virtue of white Americans had gained for them the ad-
vocacy of the all-powerful Christian God in their dealings
with other people.
2. The racist belief, reinforced by the scientific jargon of
Social Darwinism, of the innate racial superiority of whites,
and especially of the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic branches of
the white race.
3. A Chauvinistic conviction of the superiority of the American
economic, political and cultural systems.
V
4. A consequent conviction of the "Duty and Destiny" of Americans
to impose their control and ideology on other peoples.
These four basic assumptions stood Americans in good stead, guarding
their consciences during the extirpation of the Indians of America, the
enslavement, and post-Civil War re -ens lavement of America's blacks and
the continual erosion of the rights and exclusion of America's orientals.
By the end of the nineteenth century the lure of overseas economic and
strategic advantage, made possible by the use of the growing new American
fleet and the fall of Spanish power soon brought new batches of non-whites
—this time overseas—for the Americans to dominate.
The four basic assumptions were ideally suited to enable Americans
to rationalize their new imperialistic course. The limiting assumptions
made it certain that "American lives and property" would be protected
overseas at all costs, even when the private American "interests" involved
by no means represented the American "national interest." The assumptions
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made it possible for Americans including Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow
Wilson and William D. Leahy and his comrades, to feel genuine fury when
"natives" had the affrontery to oppose American control or the installa-
tion of American-backed puppet governments. Similarly the assumptions
of the innate Tightness of the Americans' position and future, made it
"obvious" that only "bandits" or "malcontents" would oppose the desires
of American political or economic opportunists, while natives who co-
operated were by definition, "good."
The limiting assumptions, made it certain that when the Americans
found themselves with the fallen apple of the Spanish empire almost in
their hands and realized that their shiny new fleet could fight, no prob-
lems of conscience or justice toward their victims would arise to upset
their calculations. Even the vast majority of those who opposed America's
imperialistic course usually did so on the grounds of racist, self-serving
arguments. The problems of both method and conscience for dealing with
new batches of non-white subjects overseas had been long since resolved
by white Americans in dehumanizing and subjugating the Indians, blacks
and orientals within America's borders.
Richard Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," in America
in Crisis; Fourteen Crucial Episodes in American History, edited by
Daniel Aaron (New York, 1952), pp. 173-200, described the conscience
deadening effect of the Manifest Destiny concept; Richard F. Trask,
Victory Without Peace, American Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century
(New York, 1968), pp. 20-22. Trask concluded that moral, racist, and
social Darwinist rationalizations were developed to justify the basic
economic, strategic and power drive of the United States; Gunnar Myrdal,
"An American Dilemma," Vol. 1, The Negro in a White Nation (New York, 1962),
Introduction, pp. lxx-lxxv. Both Trask and Myrdal emphasized the historic
dichotomy between the statements and self-imagery of Americans and their
actual actions towards non-whites; Reuben Francis Weston, Racism in U.S .
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The Calvinistic certainty of God's grace operated more than any
other factor to still the historical consciences of American conquerors
of weaker peoples. Under the Calvinist scheme success in any endeavor
was an outward sign of God's probable grace. Thus, Dewey, after his over-
whelming victory at Manila Bay in May 1898 could conclude that, "the hand
of God was in it." It was a short step from such "reasoning" to conclude
that a God-ordained Manifest Destiny justified American imperialism.
Leaving aside all immediate American strategic or economic interests
or plans, these limiting assumptions were in themselves the constant yet
invisible underlying motivating force for America's accelerated imperialist
expansion, especially after the 1898 Spanish War victories had shown the
ease of imperial conquests. They enabled America's expansionist leaders
to operate in certainty of the proper interrelationship of God, America
and the Anglo-Saxon peoples, and the proper position of the world's "lesser"
peoples, both within and outside of the borders of the United States.
These assumptions were shared to a large extent by those on the frontiers
who were to carry out the policies of America's leaders. Largely products
of the same class and background and ideology, most of the junior military
and naval officers and functionaries felt few qualms about carrying out
Imperialism; The Influence of Racial Assumptions on American Foreign Policy,
1893-1946 (Columbia, S.C., 1972), documents the constant, underlying Ameri-
can conviction of racial superiority and of the inferiority of non-white
peoples. This attitude, often operating "invisibly" helped both to insti-
gate and to rationalize America's subjugation of the small nations in
which Leahy served; Christopher Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, The Philip-
pines, and the Inequality of Man," Journal of Southern History, XXIV (1958),
pp. 319-31, details the racism of anti-imperialists and southerners who
opposed the absorption of "inferior" races.
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the dictates from Washington. Their shared assumptions made it almost
certain that, regardless of their surface motives or declarations, when-
ever confrontations arose between American interests, national or pri-
vate, and the sovereignty or rights of the people of small, non-white
nations, automatic, often unplanned bullying or intervention by American
political or military power would be the result.
William D. Leahy shared to a considerable degree the standard
assumption of his times on the superiority of western ways, and of the
American economic and political system. During his early days he had
no doubts as to the primacy of American interests over all others. He
was, like most of his shipmates, a quietly religious Protestant with a
strong, idealistic determination to defend "my country, right or wrong."
In Guam, the Philippines and the countries of Central America,
he found the "natives" to be immoral, lazy, and backward. Like many of
his shipmates, Leahy was somewhat ill at ease in interracial social
gatherings which he attended in the Philippines, Japan and the Latin
American republics. However, unlike most American men of his own or
other eras, his sense of "differentness" apparently made non-white women
generally unattractive to him. He was singularly unattracted by "native"
women, whenever he encountered them and not even the "strange manipula-
2
tions" of Hawaiian hula dancers attracted him.
Leahy judged the relationships of his country and himself with the
2
Leahy Diary, October 30, 1900, September 12 and September 8, 1902, January
19, 1909, December, 1904 to March 1, 1904, September 16 and September
29, 1902, December 5, 1911.

149
small nations always from the viewpoint of American interests above all
others. In 1906, he noted Japan's anger at American racist policies which
had segregated oriental children in San Francisco schools, deprived
Japanese citizens of their rights and lands in California and some other
western states, and placed restrictions on Japanese immigration. Al-
though he was an admirer of Japanese patriotism and intelligence, he
feared the Japanese aim of forcing the white nations out of Asia and of
creating an "Asia for the Asiatics." He went so far as to regret that
the United States had not supported Russia, a white, Christian nation
against Japan, "a nation of ambitious pagans who have nothing in common
with our culture and whose record in Korea would have shamed Nero." In
a burst of patriotism he concluded that "I am for the United States ex-
clusively and always, regardless of the ambitious desires or even the
rights of other nations, and for that reason think it was a mistake to
assist Japan."
Like most of his contemporaries, Leahy was a firm believer in the
work ethic- -American style, and was an opponent of such threats to the
status quo as militant unionism. He was certain that cities often bred
"degenerates." Like his civilian and military superiors and contem-
poraries, he considered the Caribbean nations to be troublesome wards
whose "stubborness and recalcitrance was not to be tolerated." When
in 1906 trouble arose in Cuba, he felt that it was "time to take over
3
Leahy Diary, September 23, 1906.
4
Leahy Diary, August 27, 1902, September 16, 1902.
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permanent possession of the island, using experience gained in the Philip-
pines." He felt the same exasperated superiority toward the people of
recently-subjugated Panama, who "although dirty and getting rich... do
not want the canal completed because their opportunities then to get
money from us will be less frequent. . .they hate and despise us.... Every-
body... seems to agree that it was time long ago to stop temporizing with
the natives, who if (sic) the country is to be left in their possession,
ought to be assisting instead of retarding work." He had no patience
with the local political schemes and maneuverings of the leaders of the
"ridiculous little Republic."
On the positive side of his attitude toward the peoples of America's
new imperial empire, Leahy was infinitely more ready to recognize their
problems and viewpoint than most Americans of his time. He did not share
the strong social Darwinist racism or disregard for the rights and lives
of non-white, non-Americans that infected many of his contemporaries.
He was capable of admiring and fearing the intellectual, organizational
and physical prowess of the Japanese even while he feared their takeover
of the Orient. He sympathized with the position of the Philippine in-
surgents who had fought against the American forces in 1899-1901. He
recognized the organization of the Filipino rebels and their humane treat-
ment of prisoners and civilians. Although a participant in "search and
Leahy Diary, August 27, 1902, April to June, 1906.
Leahy Diary, November 2, 1905, September 3, 1906, December 11, 1904.
Leahy Diary, September 23, 1906.
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destroy" missions against the Filipinos, Leahy had no stomach for American-
inflicted atrocities against the natives. He was certain that his father,
an officer in the Union Army during the American Civil War, had been a
chivalrous soldier and would have been compassionate toward any defeated
enemy. The sight of a fifteen-year old Filipino "suspect," weeping and
hysterically protesting his scheduled execution saddened Leahy, not enough
to openly protest, but enough to prompt him to sadly return to his ship,
the Leyte, and leave the executions to the soldiers of the 38th American
Q
Infantry Regiment. Similarly, he had sympathized with the plight of
the Cuban refugees, especially the children during and after the Spanish-
9
American War.
Throughout his life Leahy could recognize and admire a capable
individual or a fellow fighting man, of any nation or color. In 1898,
at the beginning of his career and during the American taking of Cuba,
Leahy had met a Cuban colonel, a "tall, handsome, courteous soldier whose
appearance would have been creditable in any army." He recognized the
brave record of the little British Gurkha soldiers who were stationed
at Shanghai in 1900 and the bravery of Aguinaldo's troops as they fought
American subjugation. Just as he praised the character and performance
of the black American Consul at Corinto, James Weldon Johnson in 1912,
Q
Leahy Diary, September 16, 1900, October 28, 1900, February 12, 1901,
March 12, 1901.
9
Leahy Diary, July 6, 1898.
Leahy Diary, June 26, 1898.
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Leahy in 1948 was impressed with black American Governor William Hastie
of the Virgin Islands who Leahy found to be "a highly intelligent, very
attractive man who is undertaking an extremely difficult task."
Regardless of his relative sensitivity to the plight of those who
were oppressed by American imperial expansion, Leahy was, in the final
analysis, no less effective an agent of that imperialism than was an
insensitive individual like Yates Stirling. The ideals and assumptions
which both men shared with their leaders insured that the "inefficient,
non-white, natives," who had the ill fortune to be born in lands which
the Americans of those times wanted, for whatever reasons, would be con-
quered and subjugated. Their attitudes and weapons insured that, insofar
as the territories which the Americans coveted and had opportunity to
seize, it was a case of "America Uber Alles."
In many ways Leahy represented the best of the military tradition
of a democratic nation. Officially he was the non-political centurian
whose only aim is to serve the interests of his nation as determined by
his superiors. In another, unofficial manner, Leahy was privately a
thinking, questioning individual who observed and recorded many of the
iniquities which America inflicted on her new imperial wards in the name
of economic advantage or strategic interest.
Leahy participated in interventions under four American Presidents.
Each of these ostensibly had differing aims in both foreign policy and
in their relations with vested American interests overseas. Yet their
Leahy Diary, August 29, 1900, February 1, 1901, March 12, 1901, September
1912, October 18, 1912, February 20, 1948.
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on-the-scene policies uniformly resulted in the stifling of popular forces
in the small nations in which Leahy saw American imperialism in action.
The "hidden" unifying factor was the operation of their limiting assump-
tions concerning American relations with "others" who had the misfortune
to be non-white and to control land, economic or strategic resources de-
sired by America's leaders. These assumptions insured a rationalized
disregard for the rights of the "natives" of America's new empire just as
they had for "natives" within the United States. They were shared not
only by every American President during the period 1897 to 1917, but also
by other civilian and military leaders, anti-imperialists, religious
leaders and much of the American public.
American expansionism was always conducted under such banners as
"the white man's burden" or "the spreading of democracy." Yet, America,
no less than her imperialist competitors proved to be an insufferable
economic and psychic burden on the nations which she subjugated. United
States intervention usually favored small comprador elites and was the
major factor in eliminating any realistic chance that popular political
forces would be allowed to rule their nations in a democratic manner.
In each intervention United States leaders acted with differing "reasons"
but their shared assumptions insured that non-representative comprador
governments or American military regimes were established in those countries.
As an example, the practical result of the 1909-1912 American in-
tervention into Nicaragua destroyed the hope of the Nicaraguan liberals
of obtaining power in their own country against the overwhelming power





The intervention intensified the already prevalent
fear and mistrust of the United States in other Central
American countries. On the other hand, for several years
after 1912 the recognition of what happened to Mena's
rebellion discouraged potential revolutionists. .. .When
disturbances threatened, the appearance of an American
warship was enough to restore tranquility. The belief
that the United States would intervene to uphold Consti-
tutional governments helped the gro ps in power in each
country to remain in power with little regard for the
rights of their opponents, but it at least gave Central
America an era of much needed peace. 1^
In another example, in the case of the Dominican Republic, when
no Dominicans offered themselves as puppets in 1916, President Wilson
and Secretary of State Lansing established a military dictatorship under
Admiral Knapp which ran the nation by means of Naval and Marine personnel.
The duality and conflict between Leahy's acceptance of America's
unhindered right to use any necessary military measures to promote her
own interests versus his sensitivity to the suffering of those who were
the victims of American policies continued to the end of his career.
From his earliest experiences in Cuba and the Philippines, he opposed
the use of inhumane policies or maiming weapons. Leahy was repelled in
September, 1944 upon visiting his brother, Commander Michael Arthur
Leahy, who was in charge of the naval unit of the Chemical Warfare School
at the Edgewood Arsenal, where toxic weapons were being developed. He
12
Dana Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900 -
1921 (Princeton, 1964), p. 215. Munro often apologist in tone and inter-
pretation, at least recognized the brutality of the American intervention
and its negative actual effect on any chance of democratic growth in the
midst of the Central American republics, as long as Americans had the
will and the power to intervene or to give tacit economic, political and
military support to local comprador regimes. Typically, Munro "justified"
American intervention because it made "an era of peace," i.e., "law and
order" under American bayonets.
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especially fought the use of the atomic bomb, a weapon which he put in the
same inhumane category as poison gas. He felt that dropping the bombs
on Japan was unnecessary, and he was later convinced that "the use of
this murderous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material as-
sistance in our war against Japan." He also feared that "...the scientists
and others wanted to make this test because of the vast sums that had
been spent on the project." Leahy concluded:
The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the
future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being
the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard
common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not
taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be
won by destroying women and children. We were the first
to have this weapon in our possession, and the first to
use it. There is a practical certainty that potential
enemies will have it in the future and that atomic bombs
will sometime be used against us.
That is why, as a professional military man with a
half century of service to his government, I come to the
end of my war story with an apprehension about the future.
These new concepts of "total wars" are basically distaste-
ful to the soldier and sailor of my generation. Employ-
ment of the atomic bomb in war will take us back in cruelty
toward non-combatants to the days of Genghis Khan.... Per-
haps there is some hope that its capacity for death and
terror among the defenseless may restrain nations from
using the atom bomb against each other, just as in the
last war such fears made them avoid employment of the new
and deadlier poison gases developed since World War I...."
However, the duality in Leahy's attitude reappeared when he con-
cluded that, "until the United Nations or some other world organization
can guarantee. . .that the world will be spared the terrors of atomic
13
William D. Leahy, I Was There, The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff
to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made
at the Time (New York, 1950), pp. 440-42.
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Leahy Diary, October 17, 1945; Leahy, I Was There, p. 442.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
There are several major weaknesses in the literature of American
diplomatic history as it relates to America's dealings with the small,
non-white countries which she "conquered" during the first two decades
of the twentieth century. Insofar as they have shared the assumptions
of those American leaders about whom they write, American diplomatic
historians have usually taken an unconscious, ahistorical position of
"advocacy" in examining and analyzing American relations with those
nations. Including such historians as Samuel Flagg Bemis and Dana Munro,
they constructed a positively biased model, almost in spite of their own
good intentions. To build and defend their model, they had to overlook,
excuse or rationalize a series of American attitudes and actions in the
foreign policy field and to downplay negative aspects of that policy.
Their model postulated a benevolent, Christian, God-fearing United States.
The actions of this "model United States" were assumed to be based on
good intentions. These "advocate" historians could not bring themselves
seriously to consider selfish or mercenary motives on the part of offi-
cials or behind-the-scenes makers of America's foreign policies. All
of these were considered to be "gentlemen," beyond reproach or, as illo-
gically, "innocent until proven guilty." Advocate historians insisted,
for example, basing their conclusions more on official rhetoric than
facts and actions, that American policy in the Caribbean was based more
on "strategic" considerations than the dirty motives of dollar diplomacy.
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The experiences of William D. Leahy and other witnesses indicates other-
wise. Herein lies the flaw in the writing of America's diplomatic his-
tory—a stance of "advocacy" necessarily works against objectivity. The
role of advocate or "defense lawyer" for America's leaders led historians
with the best of intentions and consciences, to twist both their selec-
tions of facts and their analysis thereof and produce more propaganda and
myth than history. Merely as an example, Samuel Flagg Bemis ' The Latin
American Policy of the United States was written from a flagrant "advo-
cate position."
Bemis criticized Charles A. Beard, who in The Idea of National
Interest, An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy partially based
his conclusions critical of the Nicaraguan intervention on the sworn ex
parte testimony of former high Nicaraguan official Toribio Tixerino, and
Thomas Moffat, "a critical and discontented former United States consul-
general in Nicaragua." Bemis never could bring himself seriously to con-
sider the testimony of "natives" or of men like former Consul -General
Moffat, who, in Bemis' eyes, had broken the "rules of the club" by testi-
fying against the depredations of Knox and Diaz in Nicaragua. Bemis thus
strongly contested Beard's emphasis on the apparent influence of private
American business interests on the policies of their former associate,
Secretary of State, Knox in Nicaragua. Bemis, rather, consistently chose
to emphasize the more "acceptable" motive of strategic interest. Bemis
at the same time criticized J. Fred Rippy's Nicaragua, Caribbean Danger
Zone, also for minimizing the "positive" Central American treaties of
1907 and 1923, which in Bemis' opinion "explain the policy of the United
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States more than does 'dollar diplomacy 1 ." The treaties of 1907 and 1923,
which Bemis felt "explained the policy of the United States" did, indeed,
illustrate that policy, but in a negative sense. In Bemis' own pages,
in The Latin American Policy of the United States, it is obvious that
the negative policies and actions of the United States had led directly
to the destruction of both of those agreements. The United States refused
in 1916 to support the decision of the Central American Court of Justice
against the one-sided American- imposed Knox-Castrillo Agreement, thus
effectively destroying the influence of the Central American Court which
had been established by the 1907 treaty. Similarly, the obstructionist
tactics of the American dominated Nicaraguan government destroyed any
chance of success of the 1923 agreements. Bemis, in extolling those two
agreements well demonstrated his sustained capacity to overlook and mis-
read evidence before his own eyes in order to fit his benevolent model
of American foreign policy.
Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New
York, 1943), pp. 412ff. also quotes U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Sixty-ninth
Congress, 2nd Sess. Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 15, Relative to Engaging
the Responsibility of the Government in Financial Arrangements Between
Its Citizens and Sovereign Foreign Governments (Washington, 1927), January
25, 27, 28, and February 1927, but criticizes Beard's use of the testi-
mony of former Consul Moffat. Beard "discredited" Moffat by terming him
a "critical and discontented former United States Consul-General in
Nicaragua"; Dana Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean,
1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964), pp. 171-80, Munro, like Bemis, a member of
the "advocacy school" of American diplomatic history described (p. 178)
how in 1907, "officials in the State Department had been discussing possible
methods by which a popularly elected government that would respect the
1907 treaties might be installed" in Nicaragua. Characteristically, Munro
did not seem to be bothered by the logical impossibility of "installing"
a "popularly elected" government.
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The realities of American foreign policy as seen by William D.
Leahy and his associates on the outer edges of American expansion differed
widely from the benevolent model of American diplomacy which was developed
by Bemis and advocate historians. The corrective to "history as propa-
ganda" is not, as has happened in the case of Cold War historiography,
a counterattack by "prosecutors," but a new look from the viewpoint of
on-the-scene witnesses in each instance to determine "what probably
happened" and why.
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